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THE CASE OF THE DISHONEST SCRIVENER: 
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE CREATION OF 
THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION 
William Michael Treanor* 
At the end of the Constitutional Convention, the delegates appointed the Com-
mittee of Style and Arrangement to bring together the textual provisions that 
the Convention had previously agreed to and to prepare a final constitution. 
Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris drafted the document for the Com-
mittee, and, with few revisions and little debate, the Convention adopted Mor-
ris’s draft. For more than two hundred years, questions have been raised as to 
whether Morris covertly altered the text in order to advance his constitutional 
vision, but modern legal scholars and historians studying the Convention have 
either ignored the issue or concluded that Morris was an honest scrivener. No 
prior article has systematically compared the Committee’s draft to the previ-
ously adopted resolutions or discussed the implications of those changes for 
constitutional law. 
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This Article undertakes that comparison. It shows that Morris made fifteen 
significant changes to the Constitution and that many of the Constitution’s 
central elements were wholly or in critical part Morris’s work. Morris’s changes 
strengthened the national executive and judiciary, provided the textual basis 
for judicial review, increased presidential accountability through an expansive 
conception of impeachment, protected private property, mandated that the 
census report reflect “actual enumeration,” removed the constitutional text 
suggesting that slavery was just, and fought slavery’s spread. 
This Article also shows that Morris created the basis for the Federalist reading 
of the Constitution. Federalists—notably including fellow Committee member 
Alexander Hamilton—repeatedly drew on language crafted by Morris as they 
fought for their vision of the Constitution. Because the changes Morris made 
to the Convention’s agreed language were subtle, both Republicans and Feder-
alists were able to appeal to text in the great constitutional battles of the early 
republic. Modern originalists claim that the Republican reading reflects the 
original understanding of the Constitution, but this Article argues that the 
largely dismissed Federalist reading explains words, phrases, and punctuation 
that the Republican reading ignores or renders unintelligible. By contrast, the 
Federalist reading of the Preamble (which they saw as a grant of substantive 
power), the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses (which were contrasted to 
argue for expansive executive power), the Article III Vesting Clause (which 
they read to mandate the creation of lower federal courts), the Contracts 
Clause (which they read to cover public as well as private contracts), the Im-
peachment Clause (which they read to cover both nonofficial and official acts), 
and the “law of the land” provision (which they construed as a basis for judicial 
review) gives effect to Morris’s—and the Constitution’s—words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
That instrument [the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which write this letter. 
—Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering1 
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the 
pen of Mr. Morris; the task having, probably, been handed over to him by the chair-
man of the Committee, himself a highly respectable member, and with the ready con-
currence of the others. A better choice could not have been made, as the performance 
of the task proved. 
—James Madison to Jared Sparks2 
Gouverneur Morris was probably the most brilliant member of the Pennsylvania del-
egation and of the convention as well. Sharp-witted, clever, startling in his audacity, and 
with a wonderful command of language, he was admired more than he was trusted . . . . 
—Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution3 
 
After more than three months of debate—including a month debating the 
final draft of the Constitution—the delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion elected “a Committee of five to revise the style of and arrange the articles 
agreed to by the House.”4 The chair of the Committee asked delegate Gouver-
neur Morris to prepare a draft constitution, which Morris did over the course 
of three days. With limited debate and minor changes, Morris’s draft was 
adopted by the Convention and became the Constitution submitted to, and 
ratified by, the states.5 
 
 1. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 THE REC-
ORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 419, 420 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 
rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  
 2. Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 1, at 498, 499. 
 3. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 21 
(1913). 
 4. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547. 
 5. For discussion of the work of the Committee, see infra Section I.C. For the complete 
text of the Committee’s report, see Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 590. For a photographic reproduction of the original report, see Com-
mittee of Style Report, AM. TREASURES, https://constitutioncenter.org/american-treasures/com-
mittee-of-style-report/kiosk [perma.cc/VCJ9-CX36]. In producing his record of the 
Convention, constitutional historian Max Farrand assembled the previously adopted provisions 
as they were referred to the Committee of Style. See Proceedings of Convention Referred to the 
Committee of Style and Arrangement [hereinafter Convention Proceedings], in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 565. The Appendix to this Article presents the text of the provisions 
adopted by the Convention and referred to the Committee of Style alongside the Committee’s 
revised text. 
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Largely forgotten today, Morris had been a dominant figure at the Con-
vention. He fought for a constitutional vision that largely anticipated the Fed-
eralist agenda in the early republic: he pushed for a national government with 
expansive powers; he wanted a powerful executive who would be held ac-
countable by a Congress with broad impeachment powers; he supported a 
strong federal judiciary, including judicial review of federal and state legisla-
tion and the creation of lower federal courts; he pressed for strong protection 
for private property; and he denounced slavery with more fierceness than any 
other delegate to the Convention.6 
Morris’s forceful views and rhetorical gifts aroused the suspicion of his 
contemporaries. During a House debate on the scope of the General Welfare 
Clause in 1798, Congressman Albert Gallatin charged Morris with deceptively 
(and subtly) changing the text of that clause. Gallatin accused Morris of con-
verting a comma into a semicolon in order to convert a limitation on the tax-
ing authority into a broad positive grant of power, but delegate Roger 
Sherman caught the “trick” and restored the original punctuation.7 
Gallatin’s charge has been noted by a range of modern scholars, and it has 
been discussed in the context of academic work on individual clauses.8 Yet 
both scholars studying the Convention and Morris’s biographers have either 
ignored the charge or concluded that Morris was an honest scrivener.9 Re-
markably, no scholarly work has systematically compared the provisions re-
ferred to the Committee of Style with the draft the Committee produced. 
Comparison of the document Morris and the Committee produced with 
the text previously approved by the Convention reveals a series of crucial (if 
typically subtle) changes, including changes to some of the most prominent 
part of the Constitution. “We the People of the United States”—the opening 
words of the Preamble and undoubtedly the most famous phrase in the docu-
ment—was the Committee’s creation, as were the Preamble’s substantive 
ends: “in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domes-
 
 6. For Morris’s personal history, see infra Section I.B. For his views at the Convention, 
see infra Part II. 
 7. For Gallatin’s charge, see 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379. For discussion, 
see infra Section I.D. 
 8. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial 
Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 n.25 (1987) (noting charge); David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the 
Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 252–54 (1995) (General Welfare Clause); Philip 
Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 317 n.112 
(same); ); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in 
Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2003) (same); Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (2002) (New States 
Clause); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1998) (Engagements Clause). For further discus-
sion, see infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
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tic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Wel-
fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty . . . .” The Committee reinserted the 
Contract Clause into the Constitution—it had been rejected on the floor—and 
altered the clause’s scope, providing a textual basis for it to reach public con-
tracts. It created the familiar structure of the Constitution: Article I (legisla-
tive), Article II (executive), and Article III (judicial). It differentiated the 
Article I Vesting Clause from that of Article II and revised the Vesting Clauses 
of Articles II and III. It altered, in important (though unobvious) ways, the 
language of the law-of-the-land provision, the Engagement Clauses, the Qual-
ifications Clause, the Impeachment Clause, the Census Clause, the Presiden-
tial Succession Clause, and the New States Clause. Finally, the Committee 
removed the word “justly” from the Fugitive Slave Clause.10 
Morris’s contemporaries—apart from Gallatin—failed to recognize the 
significance of Morris’s changes. Yet they were of immediate consequence. 
During the great constitutional controversies of the Washington and Adams 
administrations, Federalists repeatedly invoked language that Morris had 
placed in the Constitution. Morris authored the constitutional text that Fed-
eralists invoked in the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Sedition Act, 
the creation of the Bank of the United States, the presidential succession act, 
state statutes repealing land grants, the Quaker antislavery petitions, and the 
first impeachment case to be considered by the House and Senate, as well as 
the early cases establishing judicial review. Most notably, Federalists read the 
Preamble, now treated as hortatory or as a gloss on powers otherwise granted 
Congress, as a separate (and capacious) grant of power. 
Even though the Committee’s mandate was limited to style and arrange-
ment, Morris covertly made fifteen substantive changes to the text. These 
changes advanced ends that he had unsuccessfully fought for on the Convention 
floor. The man who drafted the final version of the Constitution did not limit 
his work to matters of style and arrangement. He was a dishonest scrivener. 
The primary focus of this Article is historical. Part I discusses the Com-
mittee of Style, its membership, and its mandate as well as presenting a mini-
biography of Morris. Part I also discusses the scholarly consensus that as Pro-
fessor Michael Klarman observes in his leading account of the origins of the 
Constitution the Committee simply “put the finishing touches on the Consti-
tution.”11 Part II studies Morris’s constitutional philosophy (an almost unex-
amined topic) and highlights the ways he failed to achieve his goals during 
floor debates before the Committee of Style began its work. 
Part III is the heart of the Article. It discusses the fifteen substantive 
changes Morris made and how they advanced goals that were central to his 
constitutional vision. This Part also shows the role of those changes in early 
constitutional debates. As the drafter for the Committee of Style, Morris 
 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 188 n.* (2016). 
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sought to shift meaning without being discovered by delegates who disagreed 
with him. He later admitted to having covertly made substantive changes to 
the Constitution’s provisions concerning the judiciary: “[I]t became necessary 
to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, 
nor shock their selflove . . . .”12 While this is the only substantive change he 
confessed to having made, the same description is equally applicable to his 
other changes. As a result, Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans alike were 
able to rely on his text in the major constitutional debates of the early republic. 
At the same time, Morris’s words were (unsurprisingly) more consistent with 
the Federalist vision than with the Republican vision—Jeffersonian Republi-
cans had to dismiss critical words as without substantive meaning or ignore 
them altogether in order to advance their constitutional arguments. Finally, 
Part III discusses modern interpretations of the clauses changed by Morris 
and highlights how modern originalists have generally favored Republican 
readings while disregarding Federalist readings. 
Part IV discusses the implications of this historical research for modern 
constitutional law. It first shows that recognizing Morris’s role as dishonest 
scrivener offers a new justification for one of the primary objections to draft-
ers’ intent originalism, namely, that there was no collective intent among the 
drafters as to what constitutional clauses meant. The Part also shows that, even 
though drafters’ intent originalism is now largely rejected as a matter of con-
stitutional theory, it still shapes current conceptions of the original under-
standings of clauses revised by the Committee of Style, leading commentators 
to rely on the debates at the Convention before the Committee began its work 
while ignoring the actual text of the Constitution. The Part also looks at the 
Supreme Court case law involving the Committee of Style. While the Court 
has never recognized that the Committee systematically departed in substan-
tive ways from text previously agreed to—since that fact has never before been 
shown—a number of cases have asked the Court to decide whether to rely on 
text submitted to the Committee of Style or to treat the Committee of Style’s 
text (which is the ratified constitutional text) as controlling. Remarkably, with 
only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court has consistently either relied on the 
text referred to the Committee or assumed that the text referred to the Com-
mittee has the same meaning as that of the ratified Constitution. This Part 
explains why the first approach is inconsistent with democratic theory and the 
second is at odds with the actual drafting history. From the standpoint of pub-
lic meaning originalism, Justice Thomas’s approach is the correct one. 
Finally, Part IV shows that Morris’s changes established the basis for the 
Federalist Constitution. Morris crafted the Constitution to reflect his political 
ideals: a national government of broad powers (beyond those enumerated in 
Articles I and II), a strong executive, a broad conception of impeachment that 
included impeachment for nonofficial acts, a strong judiciary (involving both 
judicial review and a requirement that there be lower federal courts), and pro-
tection for public contracts against state interference. Furthermore, because 
 
 12. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420. 
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of Morris, the Constitution did not embrace slavery as moral, and its text 
could have prevented the creation of new slave states partitioned from existing 
slave states. 
Academics have long embraced the view that Hamilton and the Federal-
ists practiced “loose construction” of the Constitution, whereas Madison and 
the Republicans were “strict constructionists.” But at least with respect to the 
crucially important parts of the Constitution revised by Morris, the Federalist 
reading parsed the Constitution’s text more carefully than that of the Repub-
licans. On point after point, the Federalist reading of the Constitution is truer 
to Morris’s words. Or, to put it another way, the Federalist reading is more 
faithful to the original understanding of the Constitution’s words. 
I. THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE AND MORRIS’S CONSTITUTION 
This Part discusses the Committee of Style’s mandate, the selection of its 
members, Morris’s biography, the questions about his integrity, and his role 
as draftsman. It also discusses the Convention’s consideration of the Commit-
tee of Style’s draft constitution, with a focus on its review of the General Wel-
fare Clause. Finally, it discusses the fact that modern scholars have failed to 
recognize that Morris was a dishonest scrivener. 
A. The Membership of the Committee 
Although standard accounts of the Constitutional Convention highlight 
the floor debates that led to the Connecticut Compromise and the three-fifths 
rule, much of the critical drafting at the Convention took place in the com-
mittees, of which there were a total of twelve.13 The membership of the Com-
mittee of Style was unlike the membership of any other committee. Selected 
by their fellow delegates, the Committee consisted of Alexander Hamilton, Wil-
liam Johnson, Rufus King, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris.14 James 
Wilson, although not a Committee member, worked informally with the Com-
mittee as it prepared its draft.15 Uniquely among all the Convention’s com-
mittees, the membership of the Committee of Style was strikingly nationalist. 
While Johnson has been categorized as a moderate nationalist, all the others—
Hamilton, King, Madison, Morris, and Wilson—were among the small group 
of strongly nationalist delegates.16 Indeed, these five were (along with Wash-
ington) not only members of the nationalist wing of delegates but were its 
 
 13. John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 
1787, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 174 (2006). 
 14. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 553. 
 15. See 3 id. at 170. For further discussion, see infra Section I.C. 
 16. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 186–87 (1985). 
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leaders.17 It was also strikingly a committee from the northern states—with only 
one representative from the South (Madison) and no one from the Deep South. 
The membership of the Committee reflected in part the change in who 
was attending the Convention. As the Convention drew towards its close and 
the adoption of the Constitution came to seem inevitable, delegates who were 
ambivalent or hostile to the Constitution began to head home. Thirteen of the 
fifty-five delegates were no longer attending in the last month, and the group 
included some of the most forceful critics of proposals for a strong national 
government.18 Only one delegate who had been absent returned at the end of 
the proceedings, the strongly nationalist Alexander Hamilton.19 
It reflected, as well, the process by which the Committee was selected. The 
Convention had two different types of committees, and there were different 
selection processes for the different types.20 Virtually all the committees had 
one member from each state and each states’ delegation chose its own repre-
sentatives; the combination led to committees embodying diverse perspec-
tives.21 In contrast, the two drafting committees—the Committee of Detail 
and the Committee of Style—each had only five members, which meant that 
not all states were represented, and these committees’ members were chosen 
by the votes of individual delegates (rather than having a state’s delegate cho-
sen by the state’s representatives).22 The combination of these factors pro-
duced a committee unlike any of its predecessors—weighted towards the 
North and towards the nationalist wing of the delegates. 
The prior drafting committee—the Committee of Detail—had presented 
its report on August 6,23 and its proposals had been subject to a series of 
votes.24 When the Committee of Style was elected on September 8 and given 
 
 17. See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 57–58 (2018). 
 18. See 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 586–90 (noting attendance records); RICH-
ARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 353 (2009). 
 19. BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 202–03. 
 20. David O. Stewart, Who Picked the Committees at the Constitutional Convention?, J. 
AM. REVOLUTION (Sept. 13, 2018), https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/09/who-picked-the-com-
mittees-at-the-constitutional-convention [perma.cc/33MM-JV9T]. I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Stewart for writing this article, which he wrote in response to our discussions about how 
the committees at the Convention were selected. For a competing view, see JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 379 n.38 
(1996) (arguing that each delegate voted as an individual for all committees). Both the Rakove 
and the Stewart view lead to the same conclusion for the Committee of Style: delegates voted 
individually to select the Committee members. 
 21. Stewart, supra note 20. Rhode Island did not send delegates, and two of New York’s 
three delegates departed early (leaving Hamilton as the sole delegate; two delegates were neces-
sary for a state to vote). BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 81, 202–03. Thus, the committees of eleven 
represented each of the delegations that could vote. 
 22. Stewart, supra note 20. 
 23. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 177. 
 24. Id. at 193–95. 
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responsibility for preparing for the delegates’ consideration a final draft, the 
delegates did not formulate a charge for the Committee, but the various names 
used to describe it reflect an understanding that its mandate was simply sty-
listic. According to the official Convention records, it was a committee “to 
revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House.”25 Madison 
described it in similar terms in his notes: it was a committee “to revise the stile 
of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House.”26 Others 
used different names. Using a shorter version of these formulations, the Con-
vention’s secretary, William Jackson, called it the “Committee of revision,”27 
and Maryland delegate James McHenry referred to it in his notes as the com-
mittee “to revise and place the several parts under their proper heads.”28 Fol-
lowing Madison’s notes and the Convention records, the Committee has come 
to be known as the Committee of Style and Arrangement or, more briefly, the 
Committee of Style.29 
B. Gouverneur Morris 
When the Committee convened, Johnson, the chair, asked Morris (“with 
the ready concurrence of the others,” Madison observed) to prepare a draft 
Constitution.30 As a strong nationalist, Morris had views in that area that 
aligned with those of the other Committee members, and like most of the 
Committee members, he came from a northern state. Given Morris’s strength 
and experience as a wordsmith and legislative drafter and the respect in which 
he was held, he was an obvious selection even among a very talented group. 
But his reputation was complicated. 
There is a great irony to Morris’s place in history: he is both largely for-
gotten and seemingly unforgettable. Even apart from his role at the Constitu-
tional Convention, he led a life crowded with incident and work of profound 
consequence.31 
 
 25. Id. at 547. 
 26. Id. at 553. 
 27. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 193–96 (1894). 
 28. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 554. 
 29. For anyone interested in independently pursuing the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
the Committee of Style through a database search, I note that, for some reason, the Supreme 
Court has (erroneously) referred to the committee as the “Committee on Style” (ten times) more 
than it has called it by its correct name of the “Committee of Style” (eight times). See Lexis search: 
“committee pre/2 style” in cases/Supreme Court (conducted February 12, 2020). 
 30. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499. 
 31. Morris is the subject of four serious, relatively recent biographies (although the treat-
ment in each of the Committee of Style is limited). See WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, GOUVER-
NEUR MORRIS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE (2003); RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN 
REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2003); 
JAMES J. KIRSCHKE, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS: AUTHOR, STATESMAN, AND MAN OF THE WORLD 
(2005); MELANIE RANDOLPH MILLER, AN INCAUTIOUS MAN: THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 
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Gouverneur Morris—the name Gouverneur was his mother’s maiden 
name32—was a descendant of one of the wealthiest, most politically prominent 
families in New York.33 Trained as a lawyer,34 he became politically active in 
the movement for independence. In 1775, at twenty-three, he became a mem-
ber of the New York Provincial Congress,35 and in May 1776, he delivered a 
lengthy oration arguing for independence.36 In 1777, Morris was one of the 
three principal drafters of the New York State Constitution (along with his 
close friend John Jay and Robert Livingston).37 That year, he was also elected 
as one of New York’s representatives to the Continental Congress, where he 
served for two years before being denied reelection.38 From 1781 through 
1784, he was the nation’s assistant finance minister, serving under his close 
friend and future business partner Robert Morris, the superintendent of fi-
nance (no relation).39 From 1784 to 1787, with the conclusion of the war, he 
focused on his business activities, which were principally with Robert Morris.40 
Morris was physically unforgettable and had a vivid personality. Like 
Washington, he stood over six feet tall,41 and the two towered over most of 
their fellow delegates. Indeed, the two men were of such similar size that the 
sculptor Jean-Antoine Houdon used Morris as the model for Washington’s 
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body when he created the statues of Washington that now stand outside In-
dependence Hall and the state capitol in Richmond.42 By comparison, Madi-
son was five feet four inches,43 and Alexander Hamilton was five feet seven 
inches.44 Morris’s right arm was scalded as a result of a childhood accident, 
and he had a peg leg.45 It was rumored that his leg was shattered when he 
jumped out of a window to avoid a jealous husband.46 Although historians 
attribute the injury to a carriage accident, Morris’s promiscuity has become 
central to his historical reputation: one leading modern biography is subtitled 
“The Rake Who Wrote the Constitution,”47 a second has the subtitle “Man of 
the World,”48 and a third has seventeen entries under “romances” and none 
under “Committee of Style.”49 He was irreverent, witty, and gregarious, and 
he had a gift for friendship.50 
Morris’s ability left a profound impression on his fellow delegates. In his 
private character sketches of fellow Convention delegates, Georgia’s William 
Pierce wrote: 
Mr. Gouverneur Morris is one of those Genius’s in whom every species of 
talents combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing in public de-
bate:—He winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him 
such a glare that he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who 
hear him.51 
Like Pierce, Madison and Hamilton both chose the same word to describe 
Morris: they called him a “genius.”52 
Morris played a leadership role from the start of the Constitutional Con-
vention. Before the deliberations began, Morris and fellow Pennsylvania del-
egate James Wilson worked closely with James Madison and the Virginia 
delegation on the highly influential Virginia Plan, the strongly nationalist 
draft constitution that Governor Edmund Randolph presented at the begin-
ning of the Convention.53 After Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, Morris 
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rose to advocate for it, an apparently choreographed effort to build support for 
the proposal at the Convention’s outset.54 Morris went on to speak more than 
any delegate—173 times.55 He also proposed more resolutions than any other 
delegate (39) and had more resolutions adopted than any other delegate (22).56 
Beyond his eminence at the Convention, Morris’s involvement in drafting 
the New York Constitution of 1777 made him the logical choice to serve as 
the Committee’s drafter.57 Even apart from that experience, however, Morris 
had a strong background as a drafter of legal documents. As a New York leg-
islator, Continental Congress representative, and assistant superintendent of 
finance, he had been called upon to write literally hundreds of reports and 
statutes, including major documents such as Congress’s 1778 rejection of the 
British peace commission’s proposal to end the war and grant America a 
measure of self-rule.58 At the Convention, Morris had already been enlisted to 
prepare critical parts of the Brearley Committee report, which proposed many 
changes to the constitutional text—including the creation of the electoral col-
lege—and which was the last committee report before the Committee of Style 
began its work.59 
Morris’s eloquence was equally relevant to his selection as drafter. His 
speeches at the Convention read differently than those of his fellow delegates. 
In contrast to Madison and Wilson, who were typically dry and careful, Mor-
ris—to again quote fellow delegate Pierce—“winds through all the mazes of 
rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that he charms, captivates, and 
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leads away the senses of all who hear him.”60 The fact that he delivered the 
eulogies of both Hamilton and Washington61 reflected not just the closeness 
of his ties to them but acknowledgement of his gifts as an orator. As historian 
Richard Brookhiser recently observed, there were four great writers in the 
Revolutionary generation—Morris, Jefferson, Paine, and Franklin.62 Jefferson 
and Paine were not at the Convention, and Franklin was in intellectual de-
cline, so Morris’s selection as the Committee’s drafter was logical. 
Perhaps the most striking recognition of Morris’s power with words is 
that Hamilton asked Morris to join him in the writing of The Federalist.63 In-
deed, Hamilton turned to Madison only after Morris rebuffed him, which al-
most certainly makes Madison the most consequential backup choice in the 
history of political theory. One such consequence was that The Federalist, for 
all of its intellectual contributions and historical significance, lacks the rhetor-
ical power and eloquence that Morris could have brought to the project. To 
quote Brookhiser, “[T]he Federalist Papers [Hamilton, Madison, and Jay] 
wrote are clear, earnest, and intelligent, often ringing, but they have made 
their way without Morris’s sparkle.”64 Thus, people in the Revolutionary era 
and early republic repeatedly turned to Morris when words mattered. 
Equally significant for Morris was words and precise word choice. A pow-
erful example of his attention to language (as well as his capacity for decep-
tion) is the Territories Clause. Morris wanted to limit the number of new 
states and their political power, and he covertly secured constitutional lan-
guage to advance this end. Toward the end of the Convention, as the delegates 
worked through the Committee of Detail’s draft and turned to its provision 
on new states, Morris rose to propose a new clause: 
The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the U. 
States; and nothing in this constitution contained, shall be so construed as to 
prejudice any claims either of the U— S— or of any particular State.65 
While the clause was adopted without discussion of its import, Morris 
saw its oblique language vesting in Congress the power to “make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to 
the U. States” as profoundly consequential. In a letter to Henry Livingston 
written at the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Morris boasted that he 
had crafted the Territories Clause in such a way that it barred newly acquired 
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territories from becoming states. Moreover, Morris admitted that he had hid-
den the clause’s meaning so that his fellow Framers would fail to realize what 
the clause meant: 
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it 
would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in 
our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article [of the Con-
stitution], I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclu-
sion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly 
expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.66 
So when Johnson selected Morris, he picked a drafter of substantial polit-
ical experience, a leading voice at the Convention, someone whose great intel-
ligence commanded respected, and someone who was both skilled with words 
and who took words seriously. 
At the same time, Johnson picked someone whose integrity was widely 
questioned. “[T]he world in general allows greater credit for [Morris’s] abili-
ties than his integrity,” Hamilton’s good friend John Laurens wrote to Hamil-
ton in a 1779 letter.67 Delegate William Pierce said Morris was “fickle and 
inconstant.”68 According to a confidential report prepared by the French em-
bassy, Morris was “without morals, and, if one believes his enemies, without 
principles.”69 As the great constitutional historian Max Farrand observed, Mor-
ris “was admired more than he was trusted.”70 Challenges to Morris’s integrity 
and morality had several bases. His promiscuity appalled many of his fellow 
delegates.71 Others suspected him of enriching himself while serving as assis-
tant superintendent of finance.72 Perhaps most important, he was suspected 
of having encouraged (unsuccessfully) a mutiny of the army’s officers in 1783 
in the hope that the mutiny would force Congress to assert greater power.73 
Morris’s deceptive crafting of the Territories Clause suggests the chal-
lenges to his integrity were justified. It gives credibility to Gallatin’s charge 
and warrants a close examination of his work as drafter. 
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C. Morris’s Draft and the Work of the Committee 
We have limited historical information about the Committee’s delibera-
tions. Unlike the Committee of Detail’s drafts, the Committee of Style’s drafts 
were not preserved, and as Jared Sparks, Morris’s first biographer, wrote, Mor-
ris left “hardly a scrap of paper on the subject of the Convention.”74 There are 
no notes of the discussions. We do know, however, from letters written by 
Morris and Madison that Morris was the Committee’s drafter. Madison de-
scribed Morris’s work as stylistic, rather than substantive. Morris’s own ac-
count was similar, asserting that he had only tried to change the Constitution’s 
meaning in one area. Yet each had reasons to state that Morris had not 
changed the meaning of the text. 
Morris addressed the work of the Committee in an 1814 letter to Timothy 
Pickering. Morris’s letter began by dismissing the relevance of drafting history 
for constitutional interpretation and instead championed a textualist ap-
proach: “[W]hat can a history of the Constitution avail towards interpreting 
its provisions. This must be done by comparing the plain import of the words, 
with the general tenor and object of the instrument.”75 Such an approach is 
not surprising for someone who, as this Article shows, selected words to ad-
vance his own constitutional goals rather than those of the delegates as a 
whole. He elevated text, rather than drafting history, because the text he drafted 
departed from the expressed views of the Convention majority. 
Morris then proclaimed that he had written the Constitution and that he 
had been (largely) an honest scrivener, with the sole exception of the Consti-
tution’s treatment of the judiciary: 
That instrument was written by the fingers, which write this letter. Having 
rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believed it to be as clear as our 
language would permit; excepting, nevertheless, a part of what relates to the 
judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions had been maintained with so 
much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to select phrases, 
which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their 
selflove, and to the best of my recollection, this was the only part which 
passed without cavil.76 
Madison described Morris’s role on the Committee of Style in a letter to 
Jared Sparks from 1831. Sparks, as he was writing Morris’s biography, had 
written to Madison to ask about what role Morris had played at the Conven-
tion.77 Madison responded: 
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly 
belongs to the pen of Mr Morris; the task having, probably, been handed over 
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supra note 1, at 497. 
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to him by the chairman of the Committee, himself a highly respectable mem-
ber, and with the ready concurrence of the others. A better choice could not 
have been made, as the performance of the task proved. It is true, that the state 
of the materials, consisting of a reported draft in detail, and subsequent res-
olutions accurately penned, and falling easily into their proper places, was a 
good preparation for the symmetry and phraseology of the instrument, but 
there was sufficient room for the talents and taste stamped by the author on 
the face of it. The alterations made by the Committee are not recollected. 
They were not such, as to impair the merit of the composition. Those, verbal 
and others made in the Convention, may be gathered from the Journal, and will 
be found also to leave that merit altogether unimpaired.78 
Madison is here both giving Morris credit for the drafting and treating his 
contributions as merely stylistic. He underlined the word “finish.” At the end 
of the letter, Madison portrayed Morris as someone willing to cede to the sen-
timent of the majority when he lost a debate: 
It is but due to Mr Morris to remark, that, to the brilliancy of his genius, 
he added, what is too rare, a candid surrender of his opinions, when the lights 
of discussion satisfied him, that they had been too hastily formed, and a read-
iness to aid in making the best of measures in which he had been overruled.79 
This comment suggests that Morris was an honest scrivener bowing to the 
decisions of the whole. The description of the Committee’s mandate in Mad-
ison’s notes characterized its role as a committee “to revise the stile of and 
arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House”80 and similarly 
emphasized that the Committee’s work was about “style.” 
Two other primary sources bearing on authorship are hearsay from non-
Committee members. One is the diary of Ezra Stiles, the president of Yale Col-
lege. Stiles reported that he had been visited by Georgia delegate Abraham 
Baldwin shortly after the Convention’s end.81 Baldwin summarized the Con-
vention’s proceedings and concluded with a discussion of the Committee of 
Style’s work. According to Baldwin, “a Committee of 5 viz, Mess. Dr Johnson, 
Governeur Morris[,] Wilson . . . reduced [the Constitution] to the form in 
which it was published. Messrs Morris & Wilson had the chief hand in the last 
Arrangt & Composition.”82 
In an 1828 letter to John Lowell, Timothy Pickering also reported that 
Wilson had a limited role in the Committee’s work. Pickering wrote that Wil-
son had informed him that he reviewed the Committee’s final draft purely for 
matters of style: 
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In conversation with . . . [Wilson], above thirty years ago, he told me, that 
after the entire instrument had been agreed on, in its existing form, the final 
revision of it was committed to him in regard to grammatical accuracy or 
correctness of style (such is the impression in my memory); certainly not to 
introduce a single idea.83 
Stiles’s account is the only one that equates Wilson’s role with Morris’s. More-
over, it reports hearsay from a delegate who was not on the Committee (Bald-
win) and who erred in listing the Committee membership (including Wilson 
and omitting Madison and King). Pickering describes Wilson’s role as limited: 
he gave the Committee report a final review when it had been completed to 
check for “grammatical accuracy” and “correctness of style.” By contrast, both 
Morris and Madison are clear that Morris was the drafter. Gallatin’s account 
also implicitly identifies Morris as the drafter.84 
Madison’s and Morris’s letters share the common theme that Morris, as 
drafter for the Committee, was simply making stylistic changes (with Morris 
suggesting that the only time he had shifted the meaning of the Constitution 
concerned the judiciary). Nonetheless, Morris made a series of subtle textual 
changes of great import. So, why did Madison and Morris both minimize the 
Committee’s work? 
By the time Madison wrote his letter about the Committee in 1831, he had 
largely broken with the constitutional jurisprudence he held at the time of the 
Convention. In the 1790s Madison adopted a constitutional vision that in-
volved a national government of limited powers and a constrained role for the 
executive and the judiciary.85 By providing support for a broad role for the 
national government, a strong executive, and a powerful federal judiciary, 
Morris’s changes contradicted Madison’s mature constitutional vision at each 
point. In critical fights in the 1790s, Madison battled Hamilton and other Fed-
eralists about how to read the Constitution and advanced readings of the text 
at odds with Morris’s constitutional vision.86 Thus, Madison’s assertion that 
Morris had only given the Constitution its “finish” reflected the way he had 
come to read that text. Equally significant, Madison was in a real sense boxed 
in. If Morris had written text that altered the Constitution’s meaning, Madi-
son, as a Committee member, was either complicit in the change or had failed 
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to detect it. Both as a champion of a particular constitutional vision and as a 
politician protecting his reputation and legacy, Madison had to treat Morris’s 
changes as merely stylistic. 
Morris also had reason to minimize his contributions. Morris could not 
acknowledge that he had intentionally crafted text to change the Constitu-
tion’s meaning without undermining the legitimacy of his work. Such an ac-
knowledgment would indicate that Morris’s changes were at odds with the 
views of a majority of the Convention’s delegates and thereby undercut the 
goals he wanted to advance. 
The one area in which Morris acknowledged altering the Constitution’s 
meaning was with respect to the judicial role, but this was also the one area in 
which he had a record to contend with. In 1802, then-Senator Morris argued 
that the Preamble was a constitutional bar to the Jeffersonian attempt to elim-
inate federal courts of appeals.87 The Committee of Style’s Preamble was dra-
matically different than the Preamble that had been drafted by the Committee 
of Detail;88 Morris, in invoking the Preamble as supporting a strong federal 
judiciary, relied on language he had drafted.89 Similarly, in that speech he 
looked to language from the Article III Vesting Clause that he had also 
crafted.90 Writing in 1814, Morris would therefore have found it hard to deny 
that language he had crafted provided support for a strong federal judiciary, 
since he had publicly relied on that language to support that view. But because 
in no other case did Morris rely on his text to defend a view of the Constitu-
tion, he was free to claim that, except with respect to the judicial role, his draft-
ing was purely stylistic. 
A related question is whether Committee members other than Madison 
were aware of Morris’s changes. There is no direct evidence indicating their 
awareness of the changes. The most relevant indirect evidence concerns how 
the Committee members construed the constitutional text they produced. The 
historical record of how King and Johnson interpreted the Constitution in the 
great debates of the early republic is limited: though both served in the Senate 
after ratification, Senate debates of the period were not recorded. By contrast, 
there is ample evidence of Wilson and Hamilton repeatedly drawing on subtle 
changes made by the Committee. Wilson, as an associate justice of the Su-
preme Court, used Committee of Style language in asserting the power of judi-
cial review,91 states’ suability in federal court,92 and the Contract Clause’s 
coverage of public contracts.93 Hamilton used Committee language in arguing 
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for judicial review and broad presidential power over foreign affairs, in support-
ing federal assumption of state government Revolutionary War debts, and (like 
Wilson) in taking the position that the Contract Clause covered public con-
tracts.94 
Both men may have independently arrived at these readings of the Com-
mittee of Style’s text. Alternatively, they may have become aware of these read-
ings by participating in the drafting of the relevant constitutional provisions. 
Thus, though the historical record does not reveal whether Morris acted alone 
or whether others on the Committee were aware of the changes, if there was 
complicity, Hamilton and Wilson were the Committee members most likely 
to have been complicit. 
D. The Convention’s Consideration of the Committee of Style’s Draft and the 
Committee’s Punctuation of the General Welfare Clause 
In any event, the Committee’s work was rapid. The Committee was se-
lected on September 8.95 On September 12, it delivered its report to the Con-
vention.96 The Convention spent three days reviewing the Committee’s draft 
and discussing other matters (primarily the possibility of a Bill of Rights) be-
fore voting in favor of the Constitution on September 15. The weary delegates 
quickly went through the document in order to bring the Convention to a close.97 
Madison’s notes of these discussions are cursory, and they reflect no 
recognition by the delegates that the Committee had made substantive 
changes.98 The one change that led to limited discussion—though not about 
the change itself—was the Committee’s inclusion of the Contract Clause. 
While the clause had been voted down the only time it had been discussed on 
the Convention floor,99 no delegate mentioned that fact or that the scope of 
the clause was different than the version previously considered. Elbridge 
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Gerry suggested that the clause be extended to both the national government 
and the states, but no one agreed with Gerry, and his motion was rejected.100 
Madison’s notes do not mention the only Committee change that was dis-
covered and rejected: its altered punctuation of the General Welfare Clause 
was noted, and the original punctuation was restored. The General Welfare 
Clause, as it had been approved by the Convention before the Committee of 
Style began its work, provided that “[t]he Legislature shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for 
the common defence and general welfare of the United States.”101 By contrast, 
the Committee of Style’s draft gave Congress the power to “lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the com-
mon defence and general welfare of the United States.”102 
In the version of the clause sent to the Committee, Congress is granted 
the taxing power (and the power to impose duties, imposts, and excises) to 
provide money to pay for “the common defence and general welfare.” Alt-
hough there was some disagreement about how to read the clause,103 the 
standard understanding is that the reference to “the common defence and 
welfare” was a limitation on the taxing authority, not a separate grant of con-
gressional authority. Thus, to the extent that Congress otherwise has power to 
legislate for the “common defence and general welfare,” the clause provided 
Congress with a way to pay for relevant expenditures. 
In the printed report of the Committee of Style, the comma that follows 
the word “excises” in the provisions referred to the Committee became a sem-
icolon.104 While the Committee of Style’s version has some ambiguity, the 
semicolon at the very least would have made possible the argument that the 
language about the “common defence and welfare” should be understood as a 
separate grant of power to Congress to legislate for “the common defence and 
welfare.” Thus, Article I, Section 8 would have provided for three separate 
grants of power to Congress: “[t]o lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises”; “to pay the debts . . . of the United States”; and to “provide for the 
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common defence and general welfare of the United States.”105 In the version 
of the Constitution that was finally adopted by the Convention, the semicolon 
in the Committee of Style’s report had become a comma again. So, the ratified 
Constitution has a comma, not a semicolon.106 
Morris never commented on the Committee of Style’s alteration of the 
General Welfare Clause’s punctuation, but the revised punctuation accorded 
with his belief that the General Welfare Clause should be a broad grant of 
power. The relevant evidence comes from Maryland delegate James 
McHenry’s notes of a conversation that he had had with Morris, Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts, and Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania shortly 
before the Committee of Style began its work. The topic under discussion was 
whether the national government had the power to construct piers. According 
to McHenry’s notes, Morris told the others that he read the General Welfare 
Clause as vesting that power in the national government but found that they 
disagreed.107 Thus, the punctuation change would have advanced the reading 
that Morris (but none of the fellow delegates he was speaking to) wanted the 
clause to have. 
The punctuation shift became the subject of public notice because of Con-
gressman Albert Gallatin’s 1798 speech, which took place as part of a debate 
about the meaning of the General Welfare Clause. Gallatin, who had not at-
tended the Philadelphia Convention, stated that “he was well informed that 
those words had originally been inserted in the Constitution as a limitation to 
the power of laying taxes.”108 He added: 
After the limitation had been agreed to, and the Constitution was completed, 
a member of the Convention, (he was one of the members who represented 
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the State of Pennsylvania) being one of a committee of revisal and arrange-
ment, attempted to throw these words into a distinct paragraph, so as to cre-
ate not a limitation, but a distinct power.109 
He is clearly referring here to Morris, the only Pennsylvanian on the Committee 
of Style. (Wilson was not a member, although he reviewed the document.) 
Gallatin concluded by observing that the ploy had proven unsuccessful 
and the original language restored: “The trick, however, was discovered by a 
member from Connecticut, now deceased, and the words restored as they now 
stand.”110 The heroic proofreader of Gallatin’s account was Roger Sherman, 
the only member of the Connecticut delegation no longer living in 1798.111 
Madison discussed the punctuation issue at the end of his life, at a time in 
which the question of whether the General Welfare Clause was a grant or a 
limitation was again a topic of great moment. Madison wrote (but did not 
publish) a memorandum about the clause’s meaning. He declared, “It was not 
the intention of the general or of the State Conventions to express, by the use 
of the terms common defence and general welfare, a substantive and indefi-
nite power.”112 He acknowledged that some published editions of the Consti-
tution had a semicolon after the word “excises,” but he asserted that this was 
a mistake. He wrote that the correct punctuation was a comma because the 
engrossed copy of the Constitution, the copy of the Constitution sent by the 
Philadelphia Convention to the Continental Congress, the copies of the Con-
stitution sent by Congress to the states, and the surviving copies of the official 
versions of the Constitution printed by the ratifying states all had a comma 
after “excises.”113 
His memorandum then turned to the punctuation in the Committee of 
Style’s report: “The only instance of a division of the clause afforded by the 
journal of the Convention is in the draught of a Constitution reported by a 
committee of five members, and entered on the 12th of September.”114 Madi-
son strikingly distanced himself here from the Committee of Style; he gave no 
indication that he was one of its five members. 
Madison’s memorandum dismissed the significance of the “division of 
the clause”—that is, the break caused by the semicolon—in the Committee of 
Style’s report. He noted that in the provision referred to the Committee of 
Style, “the parts of the clause are united, not separated.”115 The punctuation in 
the Committee of Style’s draft “must have been an erratum of the pen or of 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 265. 
 112. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 491. 
 113. Id. at 492. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
24 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 120:1 
the press.”116 As in his letter to Sparks about Morris’s contributions as the 
Committee of Style’s drafter, Madison took the position that the Committee 
did not try to change the substantive meaning of the Constitution. Thus, 
where Gallatin saw a “trick,” Madison saw a transcription error. 
E. Scholarship on the Committee of Style 
Gallatin’s charge raises the question whether Morris was an honest scrive-
ner. Remarkably, despite the fact that Gallatin challenged Morris’s integrity as 
drafter more than two hundred years ago and the fact that there is (to put it 
mildly) a substantial body of historical and legal scholarship closely probing 
the Constitution’s text, there has not been a single study systematically exam-
ining the changes that Morris made as drafter for the Committee of Style. 
The brief historical treatments of the Committee of Style’s revision of the 
General Welfare Clause have split on whether Gallatin’s charge has merit. Pro-
fessor David Engdahl dismisses Gallatin’s charge as “hearsay.”117 Professor 
Robert Natelson reaches the same result, observing that “[t]he story assumes 
that Morris thought he was playing with fools, easily hoodwinked—at the 
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 117. Engdahl, supra note 8, at 252. 
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Philadelphia convention, the ‘assembly of demigods!’ ”118 But historian For-
rest McDonald is convinced that Morris secretly changed the punctuation 
when he found that McHenry and Gorham disagreed with his reading of the 
General Welfare Clause.119 The key for McDonald is his assessment of Morris 
as a person: he was “audacious.”120 The more important question, however, is 
not whether Morris altered the punctuation of the General Welfare Clause to 
advance a particular end, but whether there was a larger pattern of Morris 
covertly making changes. 
Recent years have seen a serious focus on the drafting history of the Con-
stitutional Convention, including three important studies by David Stewart, 
Richard Beeman, and Michael Klarman. But none of these studies even notes 
the controversy about whether Morris attempted covertly to alter the Consti-
tution’s meaning. They simply see Morris and the Committee as successfully 
executing the important but nonsubstantive task of producing a coherent con-
stitution from the Committee of Detail’s draft, the work of the five subsequent 
committees, and the various floor votes over the previous month. David Stew-
art observes that “[the Committee of Style’s draft] had to be faithful to the 
Convention’s actions. Morris could be trusted to do that.”121 Morris had a “co-
operative spirit,”122 and he produced a “masterful final draft of the Constitu-
tion.”123 The Committee “put the finishing touches on the Constitution,” 
according to Michael Klarman.124 The Committee “was working to provide 
the ‘last polish’ to the document,” Richard Beeman reports.125 Gallatin’s 
charge is simply absent from the leading recent accounts of the Convention. 
Three earlier historians of the Convention noted Gallatin’s charge, com-
pared the Committee of Style’s draft with the provisions referred to it, and 
pronounced Morris an honest scrivener. Each treatment, however, is conclu-
sory and does not offer textual analysis to support its conclusion. In his im-
portant 1967 study, 1787: The Grand Convention, Clinton Rossiter reported: 
Although Morris liked to think in later years, as did some of his enemies in 
the Jeffersonian ranks, that he had taken certain ‘liberties’ in order to give 
the national government even more strength and tone, the fact is that he was 
a faithful servant of the committee and the committee of the Convention.126 
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He concluded, “The report of the committee of style was an adroit and tasteful 
rendering of the will of the Framers.”127 
In his history of the Convention, Max Farrand noted that “just a little sus-
picion attaches to the work of Morris in preparing this last draft of the consti-
tution.”128 But he compared the Committee’s draft with previously adopted 
provisions and concluded that “no undue liberties had been taken.”129 Simi-
larly, in The Making of the Constitution, Charles Warren asserted that “the 
Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of 
substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport 
to do so . . . .”130 
Morris has been the subject of four biographies in the past fifteen years. 
Only one biographer, Richard Brookhiser, looks at the question whether Mor-
ris tried to alter the Constitution’s meaning as the Committee of Style’s 
drafter. “Did the careful scribe try to smuggle in an argument for national-
ism?” Brookhiser asks.131 After noting Gallatin’s charge, Brookhiser dismisses 
it out of hand: “At the time the charge was made, Sherman was dead, and 
Morris was out of the country[.] Morris was not above sleight of hand, but he 
made his convictions explicit elsewhere.”132 Thus, Brookhiser concludes that 
Morris did not try to change the Constitution’s meaning, although such ma-
nipulation would not have been out of character. The other three recent biog-
raphies of Morris by Professors Adams,133 Kirschke,134 and Miller135 do not 
note the charge at all. 
While a number of law review articles have discussed the changes the 
Committee made to a particular clause, and some have even noted Gallatin’s 
charge, none of these articles has confronted the question of how, as a matter 
of constitutional theory, the Committee’s changes should be viewed today.136 
Instead, articles have, without extensive (or in some cases any) analysis, 
simply asserted one of three very different positions. Some articles point out 
that the Committee’s mandate was limited to style and any substantive 
changes should be disregarded. Others argue that regardless of whether the 
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Committee exceeded its mandate, the ratified text of the Constitution should 
be applied today because the ratified text was the text adopted by “We the 
People.” Still others frame the provisions referred to the Committee of Style 
as an interpretive gloss to the Committee’s proposals because the drafters as-
sumed that the earlier proposal and the Committee’s text had the same mean-
ing.137 All these articles, however, view a particular change in isolation. None 
has recognized that there are many changes and that they fit into a larger pat-
tern. By contrast, this Article argues that Morris used his role as drafter to 
reverse losses he suffered on the Convention floor and to write into the Con-
stitution his vision of what the Constitution should entail. 
To develop this argument, the next Part discusses Morris’s constitutional 
vision and the extent to which the Constitution failed to embody that vision 
before the Committee of Style began its work. The following Part then ana-
lyzes how the changes Morris made as drafter for the Committee of Style in-
corporated his positions into the Constitution’s text. 
II. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS’S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 
Despite his central role at the Convention, Morris’s constitutional philos-
ophy has received almost no scholarly attention.138 This Part examines his 
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speeches at the Convention to reveal his core principles. Morris was a strong 
nationalist. He championed both a strong executive and a strong judiciary. He 
stood apart from his fellow delegates in his devotion to the protection of pri-
vate property, his elitism, and his opposition to slavery. He sought to limit the 
political power of new western states. In addition to uncovering Morris’s con-
stitutional vision, this Part shows that, before the Committee of Style began 
its work, the provisions of the Constitution that had been adopted by the del-
egates dramatically differed from Morris’s goals in each area. 
A. Nationalism 
Throughout the Convention, Morris was one of the few forceful and con-
sistent nationalist voices, and his conception of the proper scope of national 
power was broad.139 Morris favored a strong and supreme federal govern-
ment, even taking the controversial position that the federal government 
should possess the police power. By the time the Committee of Style began its 
work, however, the draft constitution adopted by the Convention was far from 
reflective of Morris’s nationalist values. 
Where other delegates at the Convention spoke of themselves as repre-
sentatives of their states, Morris (a New Yorker elected to represent Pennsyl-
vania) proclaimed that he came “as a Representative of America . . . in some 
degree as a Representative of the whole human race.”140 He denounced those 
who sought “to truck and bargain for [their] particular States.”141 “State at-
tachments, and State importance,” he declared, “have been the bane of this 
Country.”142 He was explicit that state interests must yield to national inter-
ests: “It had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the 
nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views . . . . [P]articular States 
ought to be injured for the sake of a majority of the people, in case their con-
duct should deserve it.”143 
At the start of the Convention, the Virginia Plan provided a broad grant 
of power to the national government. It provided that 
the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative 
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in 
 
Stiles, Morris owned the second largest library in the country, surpassed only by Harvard Col-
lege’s. Id. at 626 n.9. While scholars have generally decided that Morris does not merit study as 
a political thinker, it is unquestionable that, at the very least, he owned a lot of books! 
 139. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 186–87; GIENAPP, supra note 17, at 58. 
 140. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 529. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 530. 
 143. Id. at 552. 
October 2021] The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener 29 
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation . . . .144 
Morris rose to enthusiastically endorse this plan. He declared “that a Un-
ion of the States merely federal” would not accomplish the goals that the Ar-
ticles of Confederation had sought to achieve, “namely common defence, 
security of liberty, & genl. welfare.”145 He asserted that “a national Govern-
ment” should be created and that that it should “consist[] of a supreme Legis-
lative, Executive & Judiciary.”146 
He later sought to vest the national government with the power to “attend 
to matters of general police, the State of Agriculture and manufactures, the 
opening of roads and navigations, and the facilitating communications thro’ 
the U. States.”147 This was a capacious conception of the scope of the national 
government, particularly in its use of the word “police,” which meant, to quote 
Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, “[t]he regulation and government of a city or coun-
try, so far as regards the inhabitants.”148 No one else at the Constitutional Con-
vention argued that the national government should have the “police” power. 
To the extent that other delegates spoke of the “police” power, they discussed 
it as a power of the states.149 
Morris’s fight for a strong national government continued until literally 
the end of the Convention. The Convention’s last document was its letter, un-
der Washington’s signature, transmitting to Congress the Constitution the 
delegates had adopted. That letter was produced by the Committee of Style 
and is in Morris’s handwriting.150 It states: “In all our deliberations on this 
subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest in-
terest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is in-
volved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence.”151 Thus, 
this letter, which Professor Daniel Farber has referred to as the Constitution’s 
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“cover letter,”152 explicitly presented the Constitution as an act of “consolida-
tion.” During the Convention, delegates repeatedly expressed their opposition 
to “consolidation,”153 and no delegate on the Convention floor used the word 
“consolidation” positively.154 Having fought throughout the Convention for a 
strong national government, Morris used this sensitive word and reinforced the 
reading that the document embraced his nationalist goals. 
The provisions that the Convention adopted and that were referred to the 
Committee of Style, however, were well short of Morris’s goals for the Consti-
tution. The general grant of power featured in the Virginia Plan was replaced 
with a list of enumerated powers.155 In a similar vein, the Preamble presented 
the Constitution as a document created by the people of the individual states: 
We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Caro-
lina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitu-
tion for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.156 
Thus, as the Committee of Style began its work, the draft Constitution was 
one that created a government of limited, enumerated national powers and that 
was framed, by its preamble, as a creation of the people of the thirteen states. 
B. The Presidency 
With Wilson, Morris was the principal voice for a powerful president at 
the Convention. Before the Committee of Style began its work, Morris had 
made crucial gains toward creating a strong executive that he saw as impera-
tive for efficient governance and checking Congress, but the text still fell short 
of his vision. 
While Morris was a consistent champion of a powerful executive, his po-
sition on impeachment shifted during the course of the Convention. He first 
strongly opposed it, but later called for an expansive impeachment provision. 
The text that the Convention sent to the Committee reflected a narrower con-
ception of impeachment than the one Morris ultimately embraced. 
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1. Presidential Powers 
Shortly after the Convention, Morris wrote a letter explaining his expan-
sive vision of the presidency: 
The extent of our country, and the deliberative freedom of its legislative au-
thority, require an active and vigorous executive. Every subordinate power 
should be tied to the chief, by those intermediate links of will and pleasure, 
which, like the elasticity of the arterial system, render sensible the pulsations 
of the heart at the remotest extremities.157 
There were deep conflicts over the Presidency at the Convention.158 Not 
only did Morris confront delegates who favored a weak presidency, but the 
weak-presidency champions were dominant for much of the Convention. The 
idea that there would be one president was itself controversial. At least twelve 
delegates believed that the presidency should be shared by several people,159 and 
the New Jersey Plan embodied this vision of a plural executive.160 
As of early August, the Constitution gave the president only two limited 
powers, apart from his veto: “[the] power to carry into execution the National 
Laws” and the power “to appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise provided 
for.”161 Moreover, the appointment power was limited because the 
“cases . . . otherwise provided for” were significant: the Senate would appoint 
judges.162 Until early September, the Senate alone had the power to make trea-
ties.163 The idea of even a qualified veto was controversial, with Gunning Bed-
ford opposing giving the president any veto power.164 Perhaps most significant, 
for most of the Convention the Constitution contemplated a parliamentary 
system in which Congress had the power to select the president.165 
 
 157. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to William Carmichael (July 4, 1789), in 2 SPARKS, 
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 159. See MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 240, 240–41 n.48 (citing arguments at the Conven-
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Morris fought forcefully on each of those points. He argued that a 
properly constituted presidency was crucial to “the efficacy & utility of the 
Union among the present and future States.”166 Morris also believed that the 
size of the United States mandated a strong presidency: “We must either then 
renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient 
vigor to pervade every part of it.”167 The nation also needed a strong executive 
as a check on Congress: 
It is necessary then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of 
the people, even of the lower classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the 
Great & the wealthy who in the course of things will necessarily compose—
the Legislative body. . . . The Executive therefore ought to be so constituted 
as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people.168 
Morris and Wilson argued against congressional selection because it 
would undermine presidential independence. Each pushed initially for the 
president to be elected by popular vote.169 When that failed, Morris proposed 
the germ of what became the electoral college.170 When the Brearley Commit-
tee (on which Morris served) presented a complete version of the electoral 
college, Morris was the principal defender of the plan.171 Morris wanted an 
absolute presidential veto and initially opposed impeachment of the president 
(though he ultimately changed his mind).172 He opposed presidential term 
limits and argued for either lifetime tenure or unlimited eligibility for reelec-
tion.173 He wanted the president alone to appoint judges and “ministerial of-
ficers for the administration of public affairs.”174 
Morris articulated an expansive conception of presidential power. He 
contended that the president should be responsible for “the discharge of mil-
itary duties.”175 His vision of domestic presidential powers was of unrivaled 
breadth. He envisioned a cabinet—his term was “Council of State”—that 
would “assist the President in conducting the Public affairs.”176 It would in-
clude secretaries of commerce and finance, foreign affairs, war, marine, and 
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state; and the scope of their offices reflected both Morris’s hope for a strong 
national government and a strong executive under the president’s direction.177 
While Morris, more than any delegate, was responsible for the fact that 
the presidency was as powerful as it was before the Committee of Style began 
its work,178 that power was nonetheless limited.179 The list of enumerated ex-
ecutive powers—not meaningfully different from the powers listed in the 
Constitution as eventually adopted—was brief. Significantly, the text of the 
Vesting Clause did not provide an obvious basis for recognizing presidential 
powers beyond those specifically enumerated. It read: “The Executive power 
of the United States shall be vested in a single person.”180 The emphasis is on 
who—one person, not several—rather than what power that person would 
have. The text clarifies that there was to be one president, not the multiple 
presidents many delegates had sought. And the text explicitly did not appeal 
to the capacious British concept of the executive: its subject was “[t]he Execu-
tive power of the United States.” 
2. Impeachment 
Though Morris championed a strong presidency, he also came to believe 
that the possibility of impeachment was an important check. The critical de-
bate for the evolution of Morris’s position occurred on July 20. Morris began 
by arguing against impeachment for the president because it “w[ould] render 
the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach.”181 But after listening 
to Mason and Franklin’s arguments for impeachment, he decided impeach-
ment was appropriate under certain circumstances: “[C]orruption & some 
few other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable; but . . . the cases 
ought to be enumerated & defined.”182 
But as the debate continued, he changed his position yet again, adopting 
a more expansive view of impeachment. Madison reports: 
Mr. Govr. Morris,’s opinion had been changed by the arguments used 
in the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if 
the Executive was to continue for any time in office. Our Executive was not 
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like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an heredi-
tary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his 
trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger 
of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst 
it by displacing him . . . . The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable 
for treachery; Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other causes of 
impeachment.183 
Similarly, Morris proposed that cabinet members should be impeachable “for 
neglect of duty malversation, or corruption.”184 Few delegates had such an ex-
pansive view of the grounds of impeachment. 
Morris appears to have again argued for an expansive conception of im-
peachment in the final debate in the Convention on the topic, which took 
place on September 8. Prior to that debate, the Impeachment Clause provided 
that the Senate could convict for “Treason (or) Bribery.”185 Mason proposed 
on September 8 that the president also be impeachable for “maladministra-
tion.”186 Madison argued against the term—“So vague a term will be equiva-
lent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”187 According to Madison’s 
notes, Morris responded, “it will not be put in force & can do no harm—An 
election of every four years will prevent maladministration.”188 
Morris’s statement, as recorded by Madison, is not a model of clarity. It 
appears, however, that Morris supported using the term “maladministration,” 
positing that it “can do no harm” because as a practical matter, maladministra-
tion would not be used as a basis for impeachment—“[i]t will not be put in 
force.” The position that maladministration should be a basis for impeachment 
is consistent with the approach in the New York Constitution of 1777, of which 
Morris was a principal drafter.189 Article 33 of that constitution provided that 
officers could be impeached “for mal and corrupt conduct.”190 It is also con-
sistent with his proposal that other officers be impeachable for “malversion.”191 
Despite Morris’s support of “maladministration,” Mason withdrew the 
term and substituted “other high crimes & misdemeanors.” As the clause was 
submitted to the Committee of Style, it provided that the president “shall be 
removed from his office on impeachment by the House of representatives, and 
conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery or other high crimes and mis-
demeanors against the United States.”192 
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C. The Judiciary 
Morris was one of the principal advocates at the Convention for the cre-
ation of a strong national judiciary. As the Committee of Style began its work, 
the Constitution did not reflect his views in two critical ways: Congress was 
not required to establish lower federal courts, and the text did not give federal 
courts the power of judicial review. 
1. Lower Federal Courts 
The Convention’s deliberations reflected sharp disagreement among the 
delegates on whether there should be lower federal courts. The Virginia Plan, 
which Morris helped draft and which Randolph introduced, mandated their 
creation.193 John Rutledge, supported by Roger Sherman, countered that 
lower federal courts would be an infringement on state authority,194 and the 
Rutledge-Sherman proposal providing that the Supreme Court would be the 
only federal court was narrowly adopted.195 Wilson and Madison then offered 
a compromise under which Congress would have authority to establish lower 
federal courts but would not be required to do so. Their proposal provided 
“that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals.”196 
This proposal—which has come to be known in both the scholarly literature 
and the caselaw as the “Madisonian Compromise”197—was adopted, eight del-
egations in favor, two opposed, and one divided.198 
Although Morris did not speak in this initial debate, he opposed a subse-
quent attempt by Pierce Butler and Luther Martin to revisit the Madisonian 
Compromise and strip Congress of the power to create lower federal courts. 
Randolph responded to Butler and Martin by asserting that “the Courts of the 
States can not be trusted with the administration of the National laws.”199 
With its suspicion of state courts, Randolph’s statement reflected, not the 
Madisonian Compromise, but his Virginia Plan’s mandate that Congress cre-
ate lower federal courts. According to Madison’s notes, Morris was the next 
speaker: “Mr. Govr. Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision.”200 
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Morris’s brief statement echoed Randolph’s position. The delegates reaf-
firmed the Madisonian Compromise, with no delegation voting against it.201 
Thus, the constitutional text referred to the Committee of Style when it 
began its work gave Congress the power to create lower federal courts but did 
not require it to do so. 
2. Judicial Review 
During the Revolutionary era, there were a handful of state court cases 
invalidating statutes, although in a number of these cases the exercise of the 
power was controversial.202 The Virginia Plan did not mention judicial re-
view.203 The delegates at the Constitutional Convention spent comparatively 
little time discussing judicial powers, and the comments on judicial review 
were scattered. Morris was a leading advocate for the power, and he expressed 
his belief that federal courts would be able to hold both state and federal leg-
islation unconstitutional and that judicial review was desirable. 
Morris and Madison were the two delegates who spoke most often about 
judicial review, each speaking three times.204 Morris made his first statement 
about judicial review in a speech opposing granting Congress a power to in-
validate state legislation. He said that a negative was unnecessary because of 
judicial review: “A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judi-
ciary departmt.”205 He later invoked judicial review when arguing that the 
Constitution should be submitted to conventions rather than legislatures. He 
said that if it were submitted to legislatures and not all approved it, courts 
would find the Constitution “null & void” because the Articles of Confedera-
tion required legislative unanimity.206 Finally, Morris asserted that a veto and 
judicial review were necessary checks on Congress in the context of the debate 
over an absolute executive veto that could not be overridden.207 
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Despite the fact that there was more support for judicial review than op-
position to it (at least among those who mentioned it)208 and the fact that Mor-
ris, Madison, and Wilson—the three leading voices of the nationalist 
delegates—all favored it, there was no provision that provided textual support 
for the practice as the Constitution went to the Committee of Style. 
D. Property 
Morris fought forcefully for property rights at the Convention. Most of 
the ideas he championed were rejected. At the same time, the most salient 
protection for private property in the Constitution is the Contract Clause. But, 
when a contract clause was proposed, Morris argued against it. Historians 
have erroneously assumed that Morris was opposed to the idea of a contract 
clause. Closer study, however, indicates he was sympathetic to the goals of a 
contract clause, was only speaking against the particular proposal that had 
been made, and, in fact, believed that public contracts, as well as private con-
tracts, deserved constitutional protection. 
1. Morris’s Commitment to Property 
Morris’s commitment to the protection of private property was profound. 
He believed that the principal purpose of the state was protecting private 
property. “Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value[] than prop-
erty,” Morris observed, but he rejected that view.209 “An accurate view of the 
matter,” he declared, “would nevertheless prove that property was the main 
object of Society.”210 
Morris, Madison wrote with more than a hint of sarcasm, did not “incline 
to the democratic side.”211 He “contended for certain articles, . . . which he 
held essential to the stability and energy of a government, capable of protect-
ing the rights of property against the spirit of democracy.”212 But while Madi-
son derided Morris as too protective of property interests, Morris had a 
greater suspicion of the propertied than Madison. Madison believed that the 
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wealthy, having acquired a level of resources sufficient to satisfy their own in-
terests, would support the common good.213 Morris believed that rich and poor 
alike were motivated by economic self-interest and that the Constitution should 
be constructed to protect against misrule by the wealthy as well as by those 
without property.214 Reflecting this concern about giving the wealthy too much 
power, Morris’s advocacy of a strong executive was rooted in part in the expec-
tation that the president would be “the guardian of the people, even of the 
lower classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in 
the course of things will necessarily compose—the Legislative body.”215 
Most of Morris’s focus at the Convention, however, was on protecting 
property rights and the interests of the propertied. As a delegate, Morris made 
five property-related proposals. He argued that only property owners should 
be able to vote. If the propertyless were enfranchised, Morris forecasted that 
“they w[ould] sell [their vote] to the rich who will be able to buy them.”216 He 
contended that the House and Senate should be able to establish property re-
quirements for service in Congress, along with other conditions.217 He pro-
posed that senators serve for life, be unpaid, and represent property interests.218 
He argued that each state’s representation in Congress should be based on the 
value of its property as well as its population.219 Finally, he wanted a ban on 
states’ ability to issue paper money, reflecting support for the interests of cred-
itors over the interest of debtors, who favored an inflationary money supply.220 
Morris’s defense of property and other qualifications for representatives 
and senators is particularly noteworthy since Morris’s position on qualifica-
tions was discussed by the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack.221 Morris 
wanted “to leave the Legislature entirely at large” in choosing whether to add 
requirements for service, but the majority of the delegates opposed his view.222 
The Convention ultimately rejected all of Morris’s proposals other than the 
ban on states issuing paper money. 
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2. The Contract Clause 
In addition to these proposals championed by Morris, the Convention 
considered one other major proposal concerning property rights—the Con-
tract Clause. Morris’s position here is complicated. Morris made conflicting 
statements about the desirability of a contract clause at the Convention, sug-
gesting his support for such protection at one point, then speaking strongly 
against a proposed contract clause at another. Morris’s true position has con-
sequently been subject to misinterpretation, and scholars have suggested he 
was opposed to such a clause. This view is incorrect. Morris believed in the 
need to prevent state interference with contracts, and the Committee of Style’s 
last-minute resurrection of the Contract Clause reflected his unwavering com-
mitment to safeguarding property rights. 
During the Convention, Morris gave a speech that seems to call for a con-
stitutional bar on interference with contract rights: 
Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people—a remission of debts and 
similar measures, will at sometimes be popular, and will be pushed for that 
reason . . . . It might be thought that the people will not be deluded and mis-
led in the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson.223 
Arguing for a strong check on legislation that provides for “a remission of 
debts,” Morris appears to be calling for a contract clause. Reflecting on his role 
at the Convention in 1814, Morris remembered that “[p]ropositions to coun-
tenance the issuance of paper money, and the consequent violation of con-
tracts, must have met with all the opposition I could make.”224 Again, this 
statement suggests that he favored a contract clause. 
Nonetheless, when Rufus King proposed a contract clause, Morris spoke 
in opposition. According to Madison’s notes, as the Convention debated the 
provisions restricting state governments, “Mr King moved to add, in the 
words used in the Ordinance of Cong[res]s establishing new States, a prohi-
bition on the States to interfere in private contracts.”225 King was apparently 
referring to the contract clause of the Northwest Ordinance, which provided 
that “no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that 
shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or en-
gagements, bona fide and without fraud previously formed.”226 Morris re-
sponded negatively to King’s proposal: 
This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws relating to bringing 
actions—limitations of actions & which affect contracts—The Judicial power 
of the U— S— will be a protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and 
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within the State itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief 
done among themselves.227 
While Wilson and Madison spoke on behalf of King’s contract clause pro-
posal, Mason echoed Morris and voiced opposition, observing that “[t]his is 
carrying the restraint too far”228 and suggesting that states should have the 
freedom to alter statutes of limitations.229 
After a number of other speeches, Rutledge proposed that a prohibition 
on bills of attainder and a ban on retrospective laws be substituted for a con-
tract clause.230 Rutledge’s motion passed with seven states in favor and three 
opposed.231 The Contract Clause, once rejected, was not discussed on the floor 
of the Convention again until the clause somehow reemerged in the Commit-
tee of Style’s draft.232 
While it has often been argued that Morris’s speech reflected opposition 
to a contract clause,233 that conclusion misconceives the nature of Morris’s 
objection to King’s proposal. His earlier speech at the Convention attacking 
state “remission of debts and similar measures” and his 1814 letter suggest 
support for a contract clause. In opposing King’s proposal, Morris was not 
objecting to a contract clause per se. He was instead arguing that the North-
west Ordinance went “too far.” The relevant text of the Northwest Ordinance is 
broad in scope, covering legislation which “shall, in any manner whatever, in-
terfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without 
fraud, previously formed.” Morris’s objection to King’s proposal—and its cov-
erage of state statutes that “in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect 
private contracts or engagements”—was that it was too open-ended, calling 
into question “a thousand laws relating to bringing actions.”234 
Even more significant than their overlooking Morris’s view that the con-
tract clause went “too far,” scholars have overlooked the situation in which 
Morris would have thought the clause did not go “far enough.” The Northwest 
Ordinance’s contract clause, by its terms, applied only to “private contracts or 
engagements.”235 While there was no discussion at the Convention of the ap-
plicability of the Contract Clause to bar revocation of state grants of corporate 
charters, Morris had previously suggested that a state should not be able to 
revoke a corporate charter as a matter of constitutional law. 
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Morris first advanced this argument before the Pennsylvania Assembly 
when it was considering repealing the statute incorporating the Bank of North 
America. The Bank was the brainchild of Robert and Gouverneur Morris.236 
It was privately funded (and Gouverneur Morris was a stockholder),237 but 
created pursuant to statutes of the Continental Congress and the Pennsylvania 
legislature.238 It was, in effect, the first national bank, and its notes circulated 
as currency.239 It was also controversial, and in 1785, the Pennsylvania Assem-
bly moved to repeal the bank’s statute of incorporation.240 Reflecting his belief 
in the sanctity of corporate charters, Morris’s address to the legislature argued 
that the repeal of the charter was unconstitutional because “rights acquired by 
law can[not] be destroyed by law.”241 
Thus, Morris’s floor opposition to King’s proposed contract clause does 
not show that he opposed the concept in principle. Although Morris thought 
King’s proposed contract clause went “too far” by affecting statutes of limita-
tion, he generally favored protecting contracts from state interference. And as 
his defense of the Bank of North America shows, he also wanted that protec-
tion to include contracts to which the state was a party. 
E. Slavery and New States 
Two areas of central concern to Morris were slavery and the admission of 
new states. Morris was the leading voice at the Convention denouncing slav-
ery, and he was one of the principal voices urging limits to the political power 
of new states. The two positions were linked. Although Morris’s elitism 
spurred his concerns about giving new states equality with the original states, 
he was also concerned that the new states would predominantly be slave states 
and shift the balance of national power in favor of slavery. 
1. Slavery 
An opponent of slavery throughout his career,242 Morris was unquestion-
ably the most forceful critic of slavery at the Convention. Only a handful of 
his fellow delegates (primarily Luther Martin and Rufus King) expressed op-
position to slavery. 
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“[D]omestic slavery,” Morris declared, “was a nefarious institution—It 
was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed.”243 He bitterly de-
nounced the Three-Fifths Clause, which dramatically increased representa-
tion in the House of states with large numbers of enslaved people. He said he 
could not accept the Clause, even if the failure to include it in the Constitution 
would lead the southern states to leave the Convention.244 Madison reports 
Morris asserting that he “was compelled to declare himself reduced to the di-
lemma of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature, and he 
must therefore do it to the former.”245 
In addition to attacking the Three-Fifths Clause, Morris tried to diminish 
the slave states’ representation in the House through an amendment to the 
provision concerning the size of congressional districts. When the Conven-
tion was debating a proposal stating that Congress shall “regulate the number 
of representatives by the number of inhabitants . . . at the rate of one for every 
forty thousand,”246 Morris moved that the word “free” be inserted before “in-
habitants.”247 Attacking the unamended provision, he declared: 
The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes 
to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast of 
Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his 
fellow creatures from their dearest connections & dam(n)s them to the most 
cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection of 
the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa or N. Jersey who views with a 
laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.248 
Morris lost on each substantive provision concerning slavery. This meant 
that before the Committee of Style began its work, the delegates had accepted 
the Three-Fifths Clause, guaranteed that the importation of enslaved people 
would continue until 1808, and adopted the Fugitive Slave Clause. 
None of these clauses, however, used the word “slave.” The Three-Fifths 
Clause spoke of “three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the fore-
going description.”249 The Slave Trade Clause barred federal legislation pro-
hibiting “[t]he migration or importation of such persons as the several States 
now existing shall think proper to admit.”250 And the Fugitive Slave Clause re-
ferred to “any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States.”251 
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These words allowed the drafters to avoid an explicit textual recognition 
of slavery. The decision not to use the word “slave” was intentional. Even as 
the Constitution protected slavery in a range of provisions, the word choice 
reflected a recognition by many of the delegates that slavery was at odds with 
basic moral and political principles.252 James Madison declared during the 
Convention that he “thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea 
that there could be property in men.”253 While Madison’s statement during 
the Convention was framed as his personal view against use of the word, years 
later he suggested that opponents of slavery were responsible for the exclusion 
of the word “slave” from the Constitution. Some states “had scruples against 
admitting the term ‘Slaves’ into the Instrument,” he wrote in 1819.254 Regard-
less of whether the decision not to use the word “slave” reflected the concerns 
of supporters like Madison or opponents, or some mix of both, the term was 
not used and, as Madison’s statements show, the decision not to use it was a 
considered one. 
Nonetheless, as the Committee of Style began its work, there was one 
point at which the constitutional text viewed slavery as “just”: the Fugitive 
Slave Clause provided that enslaved people who had escaped “shall be deliv-
ered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.”255 As historian 
Sean Wilentz has recently written: 
To describe a person’s claim as just could also imply that the state laws es-
tablishing such a claim were just. To say that the person may or may not be 
due the fugitive’s service or labor avoided that implication while it conveyed 
uncertainty about the justice of the state law or laws in question.256 
The use of the word “justly” in the Fugitive Slave Clause was thus profoundly 
significant. Elsewhere, the Framers struggled to avoid using the word “slave.” 
In the Fugitive Slave Clause, they suggested that slavery was “just.” 
2. New States 
Morris fought against giving new states full political equality with the 
original thirteen. Morris argued for “irrevocably fixing the number of repre-
sentatives” of the original states so as to guarantee their “prevalence in the 
National Councils.”257 Morris feared that “in time the Western people w[ould] 
outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished therefore to put it in the power of 
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the latter to keep a majority of votes in their own hands.”258 When the Con-
vention considered the Committee of Detail’s proposal that new states “be ad-
mitted on the same terms with the original States,”259 Morris successfully 
urged that the language be struck because “[h]e did not wish to bind down the 
Legislature to admit Western States on the terms here stated.”260 
In justifying his position, he voiced concern about the quality of the lead-
ers the new states would have: “The Busy haunts of men[,] not the remote 
wilderness, was the proper School of political Talents.”261 Madison sarcas-
tically responded that Morris’s argument suggested that “he determined the 
human character by the points of the compass.”262 
Critically, however, Morris was concerned not just that the new states 
would align against the original thirteen but that they would become slave 
states and align with the southern states against the northern states. Thus, his 
apprehension about the new states was linked to his opposition to slavery. He 
decried the fact that “Southn. Gentlem[e]n will not be satisfied unless they see 
the way open to their gaining a majority in the public Councils.”263 Morris 
likewise lamented that “[t]here can be no end of [Southern states’] demands for 
security” to protect their “interest” in slavery.264 He even envisioned the south-
ern states and the new states forming a coalition that would dominate the na-
tional government and threaten the interests of northern states: 
If the Southn. States get the power into their hands, and be joined as they will 
be with the interior Country they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain 
for the Mississippi. . . . The interior Country having no property nor interest 
exposed on the sea, will be little affected by such a war. He wished to know 
what security the Northn. & middle States will have agst. this danger.265 
The stakes of the new-states issue were high for both opponents and de-
fenders of slavery. In the wake of the Three-Fifths Clause and the Connecticut 
Compromise, the North would have a slight advantage in both houses of Con-
gress immediately after ratification. The seven northern states would have 
thirty-five delegates, and the six southern states would have thirty.266 The 
North’s slim advantage in the House was understood to be temporary. It was 
generally thought that the southern states would grow in population more 
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rapidly than the northern states and that population growth in the territories 
would also be more in the South than the North. As South Carolina’s Pierce 
Butler observed, “The people & strength of America are evidently bearing 
Southwardly . . . .”267 Morris’s unsuccessful arguments that the majority of 
representation should remain in the original thirteen states were meant to 
counter these demographic trends. 
One focal point of the debate about the representation to which new states 
would be entitled was Randolph’s proposal for a census and a requirement 
that representation in the House be adjusted in accordance with its findings.268 
Morris “opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much.”269 Morris “dwelt 
much on the danger of throwing such a preponderancy into the Western 
Scale, suggesting that in time the Western people w[ould] outnumber the At-
lantic States,” and he urged that Congress retain the power to decide whether 
to “readjust the Representation.”270 Therefore, Morris’s support for the origi-
nal thirteen states enjoying a permanent representational advantage over new 
states, as well as his aversion to population-based reapportionment, reflected 
a desire “to keep a majority of votes in [the North’s] own hands.”271 
While the census posed a threat to the North’s edge in the House, the po-
tential admission of new states posed a threat to its edge in the Senate. In the 
wake of the Convention’s adoption of the Three-Fifths Clause, Morris—orig-
inally one of the strongest critics of equal representation for the states—came 
to support the Connecticut Compromise, declaring that “he shall be obliged 
to vote for ye. vicious principle of equality in the 2d. branch in order to provide 
some defence for the N. States.”272 The Senate would be the bulwark against the 
South—unless slave states were admitted in greater number than free states. 
As previously discussed, Morris had been able to achieve a significant vic-
tory with respect to the admission of new states through the Territories 
Clause. Although the victory was achieved through deception rather than the 
force of the argument, the Territories Clause enabled Congress to permanently 
govern newly acquired territory as territories rather than as states.273 But as the 
Committee of Style began its work, the provisions on slavery and the admis-
sion of new states reflected the Convention’s rejection of Morris’s positions. 
*     *     * 
This Part surveyed Morris’s positions on the issues that were most im-
portant to him at the Constitutional Convention and the status of those issues 
 
 267. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 605; see also KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 192 
(discussing consensus about demographic trends). 
 268. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 570–71, 583–84. 
 269. Id. at 571. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 604. 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 65–66. 
46 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 120:1 
before the Committee of Style began its work. Morris championed a powerful 
national government. He fought for a strong executive while defending a 
broad conception of grounds for impeachment. He believed in the necessity 
of judicial review and a strong federal judiciary, and he sought to oblige Con-
gress to create lower federal courts. Because he saw the protection of private 
property as the fundamental reason for government’s existence, Morris 
wanted Congress to have the power to establish property requirements for 
membership and the Constitution to prohibit state interference with both pub-
lic and private contracts. He opposed slavery and wanted to check the political 
power of new states. As the Committee of Style began its work, the Constitu-
tion fell short of his vision on each of these critical dimensions. 
III. THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
This Part examines the provisions of the Constitution whose substantive 
meaning was changed by the Committee of Style. These changes follow a uni-
form pattern. With each substantive change, Morris reversed a loss he suffered 
during the Convention proceedings or advanced a position not reflected in 
prior drafts of the Constitution. Morris’s changes expressed his vision of the 
Constitution and provided textual support for positions that the Federalists 
would champion in the early republic. He was, in effect, creating a Federalist 
Constitution. But the changes were subtle, and those who held a competing 
view would not have noticed them as the Constitutional Convention drew 
rapidly to a close. During the constitutional debates of the early republic, Re-
publicans could offer alternative readings of these texts. But as Republicans 
advanced their readings, they frequently had to ignore some of Morris’s words 
or dismiss them as simply matters of style. In addition to discussing how Mor-
ris’s textual changes advanced his constitutional goals and how the language 
he drafted was construed in the early republic, this Part examines modern in-
terpretations of the clauses Morris changed. Strikingly, courts and modern 
originalist scholars have adopted Republican readings for the most part. 
Let me add a brief comment on how this Article was developed. I first 
paired the text referred to the Committee of Style with the text drafted by the 
Committee on a chart similar to that in the Appendix, but lengthier. I then 
studied the two texts to see where there were changes worth scrutinizing (such 
as added, deleted, or substituted words and punctuation). I also read Morris’s 
speeches at the Convention, Convention histories, and Morris’s biographies 
to unearth his constitutional vision. Next, I tried to determine whether the 
changes in text that seemed worth scrutinizing aligned with Morris’s consti-
tutional vision. Finally, I examined how the relevant text was used in the major 
constitutional debates of the early republic. 
I did not begin this project with any presupposition as to whether Gal-
latin’s charge about the General Welfare Clause was well-grounded or 
whether Morris tried to change the meaning of other clauses. Indeed, I have 
written a number of articles arguing that Founding-era judges and political 
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actors did not carefully parse constitutional text.274 I was therefore surprised 
to repeatedly find that the Committee’s subtle textual changes advanced goals 
Morris unsuccessfully fought for on the Convention floor and that Morris’s 
text figured prominently in the major early constitutional debates. Frankly, 
the fact that both Morris and those construing the Constitution focused on 
precise wording was an unanticipated discovery. 
Some changes made by Morris and the Committee did not advance Mor-
ris’s constitutional goals (or, if they did advance Morris’s goals, I missed some-
thing, which is certainly possible). These changes seem purely stylistic and 
without legal consequence or reflective of an attempt to be consistent in word 
choice.275 By contrast, the Presidential Succession Clause is an outlier in this 
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list: Morris made a change (revising the text so that it apparently enabled the 
placement of congressional officers into the presidential line of succession) 
that does not reflect an argument that he made at the Convention or a position 
he held prior to the Convention. I have still included discussion of the Presi-
dential Succession Clause because Federalists relied on his text in one of the 
major constitutional debates of the early republic and because, given his care 
with other texts, it seems likely that Morris intended a substantive change. All 
the other changes discussed here advanced Morris’s constitutional vision. 
A. The Preamble 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Is-
land and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Caro-
lina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitu-
tion for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.276 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
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We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to our-
selves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.277 
The Committee of Style’s changes to the Preamble reframed the Consti-
tution, converting it from a document establishing a confederation without 
an overarching purpose to one creating a nation animated by powerful goals. 
This new statement of the nation and its purposes, which reflected Morris’s 
own views about the national government, had significant legal consequence 
during the early republic. Today’s legal scholars and courts generally conclude 
that the Preamble is not a grant of power and that it has “little or no legal value 
or judicial usefulness”278 or is at most a gloss on powers otherwise granted in 
the Constitution.279 However, Founding-era Federalists repeatedly relied on 
the Preamble as a grant of power over the objections of their Republican op-
ponents. Courts’ failure to recognize the Federalist approach to interpreting 
the Preamble—an approach that was guided by Morris’s changes to the Pre-
amble’s text—has consequences of the greatest significance. 
Strikingly, the Convention records do not report any discussion about the 
Committee of Style’s revised preamble. But Antifederalists bitterly attacked 
the phrase “We, the People” in the state ratifying conventions. Since the de-
bates in Philadelphia were secret, nonparticipants did not know about the 
enumeration of states in the Committee of Detail’s preamble, but they were 
aware of the opening provision of the Articles of Confederation, which de-
clared the document to be the “articles of Confederation and perpetual Union 
between the states of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Geor-
gia.”280 The Constitution’s formulation was dramatically different. “What 
right had they to say, We, the people?” Patrick Henry angrily demanded.281 
“My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public wel-
fare, leads me to ask, Who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the 
people, instead of, We, the states?”282 
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Scholars have repeatedly argued that, as Clinton Rossiter put it, “[w]e ought 
not attach too much significance to this change.”283 On August 31, shortly be-
fore the Committee of Style began its work, the Convention decided that the 
new government would come into being if nine states ratified the Constitu-
tion.284 Rossiter writes, “Since no one could tell for certain which states would 
ratify and which would stall or even refuse flatly to join, the sensible course 
was to leave out any mention at all of New Hampshire and her twelve sisters.”285 
As a matter of drafting, however, one can easily frame options other than 
“We the People of the United States” that would have accounted for the pos-
sibility that one or more states might not ratify the document. For example, 
the essential formulation of the Committee of Detail’s preamble could have 
been preserved by beginning the Constitution with the words: “We the People 
of the States of the United States . . .” The selection of “We the People of the 
United States” rather than such a plausible alternative suggests that Morris’s 
“We the People of the United States” reflects a substantive vision. 
Morris’s statements at the Convention reflect his belief that the Constitu-
tion should create a government for a unified nation rather than for a confed-
eration of states. As he said at the Convention, rather than being a 
representative of Pennsylvania, he was “a Representative of America.”286 He 
expressed his view of the framing in an 1802 Senate speech: 
Never, in the flow of time, was there a moment so propitious, as that in which 
the Convention assembled. The States had been convinced, by melancholy 
experience, how inadequate they were to the management of our national 
concerns. The passions of the people were lulled to sleep; State pride slum-
bered; the Constitution was promulgated; and then it awoke, and opposition 
was formed; but it was in vain. The people of America bound the States down 
by this compact.287 
As the last sentence suggests, for Morris, the opening words of the Preamble 
reflected his conception of who the sovereign creators of the Constitution 
were: the Constitution was the creation not of the people of the various states 
acting in concert but of “[t]he people of America.”288 
Morris’s preamble not only changed who the authors of the Constitution 
were but also announced their goals: “to form a more perfect union, to estab-
lish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, 
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promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity.” This listing was novel. The Committee of Detail’s pream-
ble, by contrast, had not offered any statement of goals.289 The final three goals 
of Morris’s preamble—“provid[ing] for the common defence, promot[ing] the 
general welfare, and secur[ing] the blessings of liberty”—were in the Virginia 
Plan and were similar to those in the Articles of Confederation, although the 
focus in the Articles was on the defense, security of liberty, and general welfare 
of the states. But the second three goals—“to form a more perfect union, to 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity”—are not included in any of the 
predecessor documents. The New Jersey Plan also spoke of “union,” but the 
focus is dramatically different. The New Jersey Plan sought to maintain the 
current arrangement—the “Preservation of the Union.” Morris’s goal is, very 
literally, reformulation: “to form a more perfect union.” 
Despite Morris’s additions to the Preamble, courts and scholars today 
generally do not treat the Preamble as a source of substantive powers for the 
federal government. This leaves the specifically enumerated grants of power 
to Congress (or related powers that are implicit in those grants) as the only 
arguable basis for assertions of national authority. Writing for the Court in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts 
stated, “The Federal Government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enu-
merated powers.’ That is, rather than granting general authority to perform 
all the conceivable functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enu-
merates, the Federal Government’s powers.”290 Similarly, in Bond v. United 
States,291 the Court relied on the Marshall Court decisions in McCulloch v. 
Maryland292 and Cohens v. Virginia293 for the proposition that the federal gov-
ernment lacked a “police power” and narrowly construed the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention Implementation Act294 to avoid reaching local criminal 
conduct.295 The enumerated powers doctrine has also led to the invalidation 
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of congressional legislation in important recent cases such as United States v. 
Morrison,296 United States v. Lopez,297 and New York v. United States.298 
The conception of the Preamble as merely stylistic (or a gloss) also has 
implications for judicial power. Judge Staton’s dissent from the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s recent decision in Juliana v. United States invokes the Preamble’s refer-
ence to “our posterity” as the basis for exercising judicial authority to protect 
future generations against the harmful effects of climate change,299 but I have 
found no other modern cases that make a similar argument (and the Juliana 
majority does not even rebut the dissent on this point). 
The central authority for the proposition that the Preamble does not con-
fer powers is Justice Joseph Story, who wrote in his Commentaries: 
The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the 
general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power 
per se; it can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power 
expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, 
when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to ex-
pound the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually con-
ferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them.300 
Citing Justice Story, the Supreme Court held in Jacobson v. Massachusetts that 
the Preamble was not a grant of authority: “Although that Preamble indicates 
the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Con-
stitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power 
conferred on the Government of the United States or on of any of its Depart-
ments.”301 
At least since Jacobson, the standard view has been that the Preamble is 
not a grant of power, and when it has been discussed in the law-review litera-
ture, it has typically been treated as aspirational. Apart from the important re-
cent work of Professors Mikhail302 and Primus303 and the (widely attacked and 
 
 296. 529 U.S. 598, 610, 627 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act). 
 297. 514 U.S. 549, 566–68 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
 298. 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 
1985). 
 299. 947 F.3d 1159, 1178 (9th Cir. 2020) (Staton, J., dissenting). 
 300. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 221, at 164 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
 301. 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905). 
 302. John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implica-
ture, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1084–91 (2015); John Mikhail, The Necessary 
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almost completely forgotten) older work of Professor William Crosskey,304 aca-
demics have concluded that the Preamble was understood as either a rhetorical 
flourish or a gloss on other powers at the time of the Founding.305 But it is clear 
from Justice Story’s Commentaries that he was not setting forth a universally 
accepted position. He was taking a side in a debate. Admittedly, he asserts that 
“[t]he preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the 
general government, or any of its departments.”306 But the previous sentence is: 
“And, here, we must guard ourselves against an error, which is too often allowed 
to creep into discussions upon this subject.”307 Justice Story was attacking a po-
sition “too often heard.” And the history of the Preamble in the early republic 
provides many examples of the Preamble being read as a grant of power. 
While there was little discussion of the significance of the Preamble’s ob-
jects during the ratification debates, the most sophisticated Antifederalist 
writer, Melancton Smith, recognized their importance and decried the Pre-
amble in the essays he wrote under the pseudonym Brutus.308 Smith attacked 
the Preamble as conferring plenary power on the national government: “If the 
end of the government is to be learned from [the Preamble’s] words, which 
are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which 
is embraced by any government.”309 In writing his Federalist essays, Hamilton 
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was generally very attentive to acknowledging and countering Brutus’s argu-
ments.310 He did not, however, rebut this argument.311 
Morris’s preamble was to play a central role in the major constitutional 
debates of the early republic and, contrary to the standard position enunciated 
in Jacobson, it served “as the source of . . . substantive power conferred on the 
Government of the United States . . . [and] its Departments.”312 During de-
bates over presidential authority, slavery, establishing a national bank, the Al-
ien and Sedition Act, the Judiciary Act, and federal court jurisdiction over 
states, the Preamble was used for ends of fundamental importance to Morris. 
The Preamble was first invoked as a grant of power during the first sig-
nificant debate in Congress about the Constitution’s meaning—the 1789 de-
bate about whether the president alone had the power to remove principal 
officers. Congressman John Laurance invoked the Preamble as a basis for 
presidential power: “Would a regulation” that reflected the view that Congress 
had removal authority “be effectual to carry into effect the great objects of the 
constitution?” the Congressman asked.313 Invoking the Preamble’s General 
Welfare Clause, Laurance said that measures inconsistent with the “carrying 
of the constitution into effect, must be rejected as dangerous and incompatible 
with the general welfare.”314 In Laurence’s view, the Preamble granted author-
ity to the president to remove executive officers. 
The following year, Benjamin Franklin (Morris’s fellow Pennsylvania del-
egate) appealed to the Preamble as granting Congress the power to fight slav-
ery in a letter to Congress on behalf of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. 
Invoking the language of the Preamble, Franklin “observed, with real satisfac-
tion, that many important and salutary powers [were] vested in [Congress] 
for ‘promoting the welfare and securing the blessings of liberty to the people 
of the United States.’ ”315 Franklin urged Congress “to countenance the resto-
ration of liberty to those unhappy men, who alone, in this land of freedom, 
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are degraded into perpetual bondage” and to “step to the very verge of the 
power vested in you for discouraging every species of traffic in the persons of 
our fellow-men.”316 For Franklin, the Preamble was a grant of power that Con-
gress could draw on to combat slavery. 
The Preamble also played a central role in the first great debate in Con-
gress involving the scope of congressional authority—the debate about the 
constitutionality of the legislation creating the Bank of the United States. A 
review of the legislative record shows that most congressmen who spoke in 
favor of the bill’s constitutionality invoked the Preamble. 
Elbridge Gerry argued that the Preamble was a source of power that Con-
gress could draw on to create a Bank of the United States: 
The causes which produced the Constitution were an imperfect union, want 
of public and private justice, internal commotions, a defenceless community, 
neglect of the public welfare, and danger to our liberties. These are known to 
be the causes not only by the preamble of the Constitution, but also from our 
own knowledge of the history of the times that preceded the establishment 
of it. If these weighty causes produced the Constitution, and it not only gives 
power for removing them, but also authorizes Congress to make all laws nec-
essary and proper for carrying these powers into effect, shall we listen to the 
assertions that these words have no meaning, and that this Constitution has 
not more energy than the old?317 
In arguing for the Bank’s constitutionality, Gerry thus linked the Preamble 
and Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to “carry[] [the 
powers specified in the Preamble] into effect.”318 
Fisher Ames similarly argued that the Preamble “vested Congress with the 
authority over all objects of national concern or of a general nature” and that 
“a national bank undoubtedly came under this idea.”319 So too John Laurance, 
who—in keeping with his appeal to the Preamble during the removal-power 
debate—declared that the “great objects of this Government are contained in 
the context of the Constitution” and “inferred that every power necessary to 
secure these must necessarily follow.”320 Finally, Elias Boudinot also relied on 
the Preamble as providing authority for establishing the Bank: 
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is referencing the Preamble. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 304, at 200. Moreover, James Jackson’s 
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Mr. B. then took up the Constitution, to see if [the power to incorporate 
a bank] was not fairly to be drawn by necessary implication from those vested 
by this instrument in the legislative authority of the United States. It sets out 
in the preamble with declaring the general purposes for which it was formed: 
“the insurance of domestic tranquillity, provision for the common defence, 
and promotion of the general welfare.” These are the prominent features of 
this instrument, and are confirmed and enlarged by the specific grants in the 
body of it . . . .321 
Opponents of the Bank denounced this reliance on the Preamble. Madi-
son’s attack was forceful: “The preamble to the Constitution, said he, has pro-
duced a new mine of power; but this is the first instance he had heard of, in 
which the preamble has been adduced for such a purpose. In his opinion, the 
preamble only states the objects of the Confederation.”322 Other opponents of 
the Bank similarly attacked the view that the Preamble was a grant of power. 
William Branch Giles stated: 
To establish the affirmative of this proposition, arguments have been drawn 
from the several parts of the Constitution; the context has been resorted to. 
“We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to our-
selves and our posterity,” &c. It has been remarked, that here the ends for 
which this Government was established are clearly pointed out; the means to 
produce the ends are left to the choice of the Legislature, and that the incor-
poration of a bank is one necessary mean to produce these general ends. It 
may be observed, in reply, that the context contemplates every general object 
of Government whatever . . . .323 
Michael Jenifer Stone crisply made the same point: “I would ask if there is any 
power under Heaven which could not be exercised within the extensive limits 
of this preamble.”324 Edmund Randolph, attorney general during the Bank 
controversy, similarly argued that the Preamble was hortatory: 
The preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on, as a source of 
power. To this it will be here remarked, once for all, that the preamble, if it 
be operative is a full constitution of itself; and the body of the Constitution 
is useless; but that it is declarative only of the views of the convention, which 
 
ment. . . . The “general welfare” are the two words that are to involve and justify the assump-
tion of every power. But what is this general welfare? It is the welfare of Philadelphia, New 
York, and Boston; for as to the States of Georgia and New Hampshire, they may as well 
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 321. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1921 (1791). 
 322. Id. at 1957. 
 323. Id. at 1939. 
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they supposed would be left fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such 
is the legitimate nature of preambles.325 
The debate about the Bank of the United States thus prominently featured 
a fight about whether the Preamble was a grant of power. Most of the Feder-
alists who spoke in the House relied on the Preamble (among other grounds), 
and the Republicans argued that the Preamble was not a grant of power. The 
Federalists prevailed, which provides originalist support for reading the Pre-
amble as a grant of power.326 
The congressional debates in 1798 about the constitutionality of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts echoed the Bank controversy: Federalists relied on the Pre-
amble, and Republicans criticized that reliance. Responding to Albert Gal-
latin’s argument that Congress lacked authority to pass the Sedition Act, 
Samuel Sewall referred to “the general nature of the Constitution itself, which 
he drew from the preamble.”327 Sewall quoted the Preamble and then observed, 
“The Constitution, therefore, . . . in the outset, establishes the sovereignty of 
the United States, and that sovereignty must reside in the Government of the 
United States.”328 Robert Williams, an opponent of the Sedition Act, forcefully 
rejected Sewall’s view of the Preamble as a grant to Congress of broad powers: 
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If the principle which the gentlemen from Massachusetts have drawn 
from the preamble of the Constitution . . . be correct, it appeared to him un-
necessary to have any other provision in the Constitution besides the pream-
ble, as it may be inferred from that, that Congress has all power whatever.329 
The debate about the Preamble occurred again when Jeffersonian Repub-
licans acted to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, which established the federal 
circuit courts. Gouverneur Morris, now a senator from New York, argued that 
the proposed legislation was unconstitutional. Morris relied on the Preamble 
and the Judicial Powers Clause (which he also rewrote while serving on the 
Committee of Style)330 to make the case that Congress had a constitutional 
obligation to establish lower federal courts. “To form, therefore, a more per-
fect union, and to insure domestic tranquility,” he declared, “the Constitution 
has said there shall be courts of the Union to try causes, by the wrongful deci-
sion of which the Union might be endangered or domestic tranquillity be dis-
turbed.”331 Morris contended that federal courts strengthened union and 
promoted tranquility and that eliminating duly established courts would be 
unconstitutional. He closed his argument by invoking the Framers’ intent and, 
implicitly, the goal of ensuring “domestic tranquility”: 
The Convention contemplated the very act you now attempt. They knew also 
the jealousy and the power of the States; and they established for your and 
for their protection this most important department. I beg gentlemen to hear 
and remember what I say: It is this department alone, and it is the independ-
ence of this department, which can save you from civil war.332 
Thus, Morris understood the Preamble to mandate Congress’s establishment 
of lower federal courts. 
The other notable use of the Preamble in the early republic was in 
Chisholm v. Georgia.333 Both Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay relied on the 
Preamble to justify the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Georgia. Chief Jus-
tice Jay grounded that jurisdiction in the Preamble’s assertion that “the people 
of all the United States” created the federal government “to establish jus-
tice.”334 And Wilson construed the Preamble at length: 
Fair and conclusive deduction, then, evinces that the people of the United 
States did vest this Court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia. The 
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same truth may be deduced from the declared objects, and the general tex-
ture of the Constitution of the United States. One of its declared objects is, 
to form an union more perfect, than, before that time, had been 
formed. . . . Another declared object is, “to establish justice.” This points, in 
a particular manner, to the Judicial authority. . . . A third declared object is—
“to ensure domestic tranquillity.” This tranquillity is most likely to be dis-
turbed by controversies between States. These consequences will be most 
peaceably and effectually decided by the establishment and by the exercise of 
a superintending judicial authority.335 
For Wilson, federal court jurisdiction over states is logically necessary because 
of the Preamble.336 
Thus, the early history of the Republic shows that for the Federalists, the 
Preamble was not simply a powerful statement of nationhood. They read it to 
create presidential power to remove executive branch officials and congressional 
power to charter the Bank and pass the Alien and Sedition Acts. They used it to 
contend that Congress had an obligation to create lower federal courts and that 
federal courts had jurisdiction in Chisholm. The Federalists believed the Pream-
ble vested substantial legal power in each branch of the national government. 
B. Three Articles for Three Branches and Three Vesting Clauses 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial 
powers. 
The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate 
and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives, and a Senate. 
The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. 
His stile shall be, “The President of the United States of America;” and his 
title shall be, “His Excellency.” 
The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested 
in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, 
from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.337 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 
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The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of 
America. 
The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be 
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.338 
Alongside the changes to the Preamble, the most obvious change made by 
the Committee of Style was its restructuring of the provisions concerning the 
branches of government into three parallel articles, conveying a sense of their 
coequality. In addition to this structural change, the Committee modified the 
Vesting Clauses for each branch of government. Its alteration of Articles I and 
II’s Vesting Clauses has become one of its most legally consequential changes; 
politicians, judges, and scholars closely parse Morris’s language to advocate 
for their competing views on the scope of legislative and executive power.339 
But although modern participants in these debates give great weight to the 
Vesting Clauses’ phrasing, they have largely failed to recognize that the Vest-
ing Clauses were significantly changed at the last minute and that the changes 
were not debated on the Convention floor. And even those who recognize the 
Committee’s textual changes fail to grasp that those changes were substan-
tive.340 
One of the most familiar aspects of the Constitution is its treatment of the 
three branches in three parallel articles: Article I (legislative), Article II (exec-
utive), and Article III (judicial). Comparing the provisions produced by the 
Committee with the original provisions shows that this division is wholly the 
Committee of Style’s work. None of the state constitutions had that frame-
work, nor did any of the various plans presented to the Convention such as 
the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, and Pinckney’s Plan. The Committee 
of Detail’s draft constitution began with an article stating that the “stile” of the 
government should be “The United States of America” followed by a separa-
tion-of-powers article (Article II); the draft then wended its way through Con-
gress’s powers (Articles III through IX) before treating the executive in Article 
X and the judiciary in Article XI.341 
The parallel structuring of the three articles connotes parallel stature and 
authority. While today that idea may strike us as commonplace, it was not 
orthodoxy at the time of the Founding. The first state constitutions placed 
overwhelming authority in the legislatures, as did the Articles of Confedera-
tion, which did not provide for a separate judiciary or executive.342 The very 
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idea of the judiciary as a separate branch was contested: in British constitu-
tional theory, the judiciary was part of the executive,343 and that position had 
adherents in the United States, including John Adams.344 Though the arc of 
constitutional development during the Revolutionary era bent toward greater 
authority for the executive and the judiciary, the notion that the other two 
branches were coequal with the legislature was novel. The Committee of De-
tail’s structuring—eight articles about Congress appearing before an article on 
each of the executive and the judiciary—accords with the view that Congress 
was preeminent and the other branches almost an afterthought. While there 
were certainly stylistic reasons for reducing the ten original articles to three, 
that simplification also reflected Morris’s desire to elevate the presidency and 
the federal courts. It powerfully conveyed a vision of three coequal and inde-
pendent branches. 
If the structuring of three parallel articles for three branches has largely 
symbolic import, the revisions to the Vesting Clauses’ language have had a 
direct impact. Morris made three changes to the executive and legislative 
Vesting Clauses that merit highlighting. 
First, Morris dramatically, if subtly, reworked the Article II Vesting 
Clause. The version referred to the Committee focuses on who has the execu-
tive power. Again, it may seem totally unremarkable today that one person 
should have the executive authority, but, as has been noted, one of the major 
debates at the Convention had been over whether multiple people or one per-
son would wield the executive power. The Convention ultimately decided it 
would be one person, and the version sent to the Committee underscores that 
decision. “[A] single person” has “[t]he Executive power.” 
The Committee of Style’s version shifts focus, and in shifting focus, it 
shifts meaning. The clause now reads not as a definition of who the executive 
is but as a grant of executive power to the president. The “president of the 
United States of America” has “[t]he executive power.” From the early repub-
lic on, advocates of a powerful presidency have read the revised provision to 
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reflect a broad grant of power.345 It would have been much harder, as a textual 
matter, to read the earlier version as broadly.346 
Second, Morris changed “[t]he Executive power of the United States” to 
“[t]he executive power.”347 Reference to the “United States” was dropped. This 
permitted supporters of a powerful president to define the executive with ref-
erence to the British model—and to the King’s authority—in ways that they 
could not have under the earlier text.348 
Third, Morris qualified the grant of authority to the Congress but not the 
grant of authority to the president. The vesting provisions for the legislature 
and the executive sent to the Committee of Style are parallel, but the Vesting 
Clauses produced by the committee are not. While “ALL legislative power[] 
herein granted” is vested in Congress, “[t]he executive power” is vested in the 
president.349 Congress receives the legislative powers “herein granted”; the 
president receives executive powers without this limitation.350 
The argument that Article II’s revised Vesting Clause gives the president 
all executive powers (other than those limited or delegated elsewhere in the 
Constitution) made its appearance in the debate about the president’s consti-
tutional authority to remove executive officers notwithstanding the Constitu-
tion’s silence on the issue. As with his references to the Preamble during that 
debate, Fisher Ames invoked Morris’s Article II Vesting Clause to support his 
argument that the president enjoyed the removal power. Ames observed that 
the Constitution declares “that the executive power shall be vested in the pres-
ident” and added that “[u]nder these terms all the powers properly belonging 
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to the executive department of the government are given, and such only taken 
away as are expressly excepted.”351 
John Vining similarly declared that “there was a strong presumption that 
[the president] was invested with [the removal power]; because, it was de-
clared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in cases where 
it is otherwise qualified.”352 George Clymer argued that “the power of removal 
was an executive power, and as such belonged to the president alone, by the 
express words of the constitution, ‘the executive power shall be vested in a 
president of the United States of America.’ ”353 
While he believed that the president had the removal power, Madison in-
itially did not embrace the Vesting Clause argument to support his position but 
advanced functional arguments.354 Requiring senatorial advice and consent 
for removal “would be found very inconvenient in practice” and would “tend[] 
to lessen [the] responsibility” of the president over his subordinates,355 he as-
serted. Madison only advanced the Vesting Clause argument on June 17, one 
month after he first argued that the president had the removal power under the 
Constitution. Referring to the Vesting Clause, Madison contended that re-
quiring senatorial advice and consent for appointments was “an exception to 
this general principle; and exceptions to general rules are ever taken strictly.”356 
Yet several congressmen explicitly rejected the Vesting Clause argument. 
William Smith said that the Vesting Clause argument “proves too much, and 
therefore proves nothing; because it implies that powers which are expressly 
given by the constitution, would have been in the president without the ex-
press grant.”357 Alexander White contended that “the [only] executive powers 
so vested, are those enumerated in the constitution.”358 James Jackson argued 
that even if removal is an executive function, “it does not follow that it vests 
in the president alone, because [the president] alone does not possess all exec-
utive powers.”359 
The disagreement about the meaning of the Vesting Clause was also cen-
tral to the first great debate about the president’s foreign affairs powers: the 
Pacificus-Helvidius debate between Hamilton and Madison about the consti-
tutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation. 
Writing as Pacificus, Hamilton appealed to the text of the Article II Vest-
ing Clause to justify President Washington’s issuance of the Neutrality Proc-
lamation. Like supporters of a presidential removal power, he argued that the 
 
 351. 11 DHFFC, supra note 313, at 979. 
 352. 10 id. at 728. 
 353. Id. at 738. 
 354. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 348, at 549 n.17. 
 355. 10 DHFFC, supra note 313, at 735. 
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 357. Id. at 936–37. 
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Vesting Clause gave the president all executive powers not withheld by spe-
cific constitutional provisions.360 Quoting the Vesting Clause and the Consti-
tution’s enumeration of executive powers, Hamilton argued that the 
enumeration did not imply that the president was not fully vested with the 
executive power: “It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to 
consider this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the 
more comprehensive grant contained in the general clause, further than as it 
may be coupled with express restrictions or qualifications . . . .”361 The only 
limits on the president’s possession of executive powers were those the Con-
stitution explicitly specified, such as its restriction on the president unilater-
ally exercising the treaty power. 
Hamilton then advanced a second Vesting Clause argument—one not ad-
vanced in the removal debate: 
The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in regard to 
the two powers the Legislative and the Executive serves to confirm this in-
ference. In the article which grants the legislative powers of the Governt. the 
expressions are—“All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the UStates”; in that which grants the Executive Power the ex-
pressions are, as already quoted “The EXECUTIVE PO<WER> shall be vested in 
a President of the UStates of America.”362 
Relying on Morris’s insertion of “herein granted” into the Article I Vesting 
Clause, Hamilton thus argued that the absence of a similar qualification in 
Article II’s Vesting Clause supported a broad understanding of the president’s 
powers, a constitutional goal that both Hamilton and Morris shared. In con-
trast to Congress, which only possesses the powers Article I “herein grant[s],” 
the president has all executive powers not expressly limited. 
Madison’s response as Helvidius reflects a different view of the Vesting 
Clause and the scope of executive power than Hamilton’s. Madison argued 
that the power to proclaim neutrality fell within the legislative sphere because 
it followed from the power to make war and to make treaties, both legislative 
powers.363 Despite the tension between Madison’s broad conception of the 
scope of executive power in the removal debates and the narrow view in his 
Helvidius essays, Madison explicitly reaffirmed his position on the removal 
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 363. James Madison, Helvidius Number 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in PACIFICUS-
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power in his exchange with Hamilton.364 He argued that removal is an execu-
tive power but that neutrality is not.365 
Morris had crafted language which shifted the meaning of the Vesting 
Clause from identifying who would have the executive power (one president, 
rather than several people sharing the office) to a grant of authority (the pres-
ident received executive power). In the Helvidius-Pacificus debate, both Mad-
ison and Hamilton drew on Morris’s language and read the Article II Vesting 
Clause as a grant of power. Their disagreement was over the scope of that 
grant. Hamilton also relied on Morris’s insertion of “herein granted” into the 
Vesting Clause of Article I. Although Madison did not address that textual 
argument, it would be a mistake to see Hamilton’s argument as reflecting a 
standard approach at the time of the Founding. I have not found any evidence 
of anyone else (in the ratification debates or early constitution debates) mak-
ing the “herein granted” argument as a basis for an expansive concept of ex-
ecutive power. 
To sum up: Morris’s reformulation of the Article I and II Vesting Clauses 
was consequential, and it played a critical role in the first two great debates 
about the scope of executive power. His language provided the basis for a 
broad reading of the executive power in the removal debate and by Hamilton 
in the fight over the Neutrality Proclamation. At the same time, there was no 
consensus about how to read the constitutional language. The removal debate 
shows that there was disagreement about whether the Article II Vesting 
Clause provided the president with powers greater than those in the specifi-
cally enumerated grants. And the Pacificus-Helvidius debate shows that, while 
both Hamilton and Madison read the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of 
executive power to the president, there was disagreement between them as to 
the scope of executive power. 
Morris’s language has been central to modern debates about executive 
power, but there has been no recognition that he changed the Constitution’s 
meaning. Thus, modern advocates of broad executive powers have strongly 
relied on Morris’s Article II Vesting Clause language and the presence of 
“herein granted” in Article I but not Article II. The landmark modern case is 
Myers v. United States.366 In finding that the president’s removal power could 
not be limited by Congress, Chief Justice Taft read the executive Vesting Clause 
as granting the president all executive powers (except for those textually 
placed elsewhere): “It would not consist with the rules of sound construction, 
to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the 
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more comprehensive grant in the general clause, further than as it may be cou-
pled with express restrictions or limitations . . . .”367 He then contended that the 
difference between the two Vesting Clauses reinforced that reading: “The dif-
ferent mode of expression employed in the Constitution, in regard to the two 
powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm this inference.”368 
Taft’s approach has a range of modern analogues. Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Morrison v. Olson begins by observing that “[t]he principle of separation of 
powers is expressed in our Constitution in the first section of each of the first 
three Articles.”369 He then highlighted the fact Congress has only legislative 
powers “herein granted,” while the president has all executive powers.370 The 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) torture memo of 2003,371 the substantial body 
of unitary executive scholarship,372 and Justice Thomas’s recent opinion con-
cerning the presidential recognition power in Zivotofsky v. Kerry373 similarly 
rely on the language of the Vesting Clauses in Articles I and II. 
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Proponents of a limited conception of executive power have advanced a 
position on Morris’s changes that mirrors that of unitary-executive advocates. 
As the critics argue for a limited conception of executive power, they also con-
tend that Morris and the Committee of Style did not change the Constitution’s 
meaning. Thus, Professors Lessig and Sunstein argue that “the Vesting Clause 
“says who has the executive power; not what that power is.”374 
Champions of the limited view of executive power have repeatedly dis-
missed the phrase “herein granted” as without substantive meaning. For in-
stance, Professors Sunstein and Lessig assert that 
the addition of “herein granted[]” . . . was made at the last moment by the 
Committee on Style, a committee without the authority to make substantive 
changes. The change induced no debate at all; this suggests that the framers 
saw it as having an effect as slight as we argue it should have.375 
In his dissent in Myers, Justice McReynolds wrote: “The words ‘herein 
granted’ were inserted by [the Committee of Style] . . . and there is nothing 
whatever to indicate that anybody supposed this radically changed what al-
ready had been agreed upon.”376 And according to Professor Martin Flaherty, 
“Given the amorphous nature of executive authority during this era, it is im-
plausible that the popular understanding of Morris’s Executive Power Clause 
was in any way different from the Convention’s understanding of Wilson’s 
earlier version.”377 Commenting on the Committee of Style’s addition of 
“herein granted,” Professor Monahan observes: “[T]he ‘legislative history’ of 
the difference in language . . . provides no basis for ascribing any importance 
to this difference.”378 “The difference . . . may well have been accidental,”379 
Professor David Currie suggests. 
Thus, advocates of a broad conception of executive power and advocates 
of a limited conception alike rely on Morris’s text, and neither see him chang-
ing the Constitution’s meaning. But early debates about the meaning of the 
Constitution show that Morris’s revisions gave advocates of a powerful exec-
utive the language they relied on, even as the opponents of this view advanced 
a competing view of that text. 
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C. Qualifications Clause 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL 
Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the Age of twenty 
five Years at least; shall have been a Citizen in the United States for at least 
three Years before his Election; and shall be, at the Time of his Election, a 
Resident of the State in which he shall be chosen. 
The Legislature of the United States shall have Authority to establish such 
(uniform) Qualifications of the Members of each House, with Regard to 
Property, as to the said Legislature shall seem (proper and ⟨fit⟩) expedient.380 
PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty-
five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least 
seven years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, an 
inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen.381 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of 
twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall 
be chosen.382 
Morris’s reframing of the Qualifications Clause so that it set forth specific 
disqualifying characteristics (rather than prerequisites for membership) rep-
resents an attempt to give Congress the power to impose additional require-
ments (like property qualifications) on officeholders. The change can easily be 
read as simply stylistic, but Morris had the substantive goal of altering the 
clause’s meaning to advance his larger project of protecting private property.383 
The Committee of Detail’s proposals—the first versions of the Qualifica-
tions Clause quoted above—gave Congress the power to establish property 
requirements for membership, alongside explicit age, citizenship, and resi-
dency requirements. Madison and Franklin argued against giving Congress 
the power to establish such property requirements.384 Morris, taking a diamet-
rically opposite position, “moved to strike out ‘with regard to property’ in or-
der to leave the Legislature entirely at large.”385 Morris would have given 
Congress the power to add whatever limitations it wanted: “The Legislature of 
the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications 
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of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legisla-
ture shall seem expedient.”386 Morris’s proposal was rejected,387 and the Con-
vention voted to remove the Committee of Detail’s provision giving Congress 
the power to impose property qualifications for membership.388 The only sub-
stantive change in the first proposal was that the citizenship requirement was 
increased from three years to seven years in response to a successful motion 
by Mason and Morris.389 
Morris subtly changed the Qualifications Clause while serving on the 
Committee of Style. He converted a series of positive requirements (“Every 
Member of the House of Representatives shall be . . .”) into a series of disqual-
ifying attributes (“No person shall be a representative who shall not . . .”). 
Nearly two centuries later, the House of Representatives argued in Powell v. 
McCormack that this negative formulation enabled it to add requirements for 
service in the House beyond citizenship and age.390 Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Warren dismissed this contention: 
[R]espondents’ argument misrepresents the function of the Committee of 
Style. It was appointed only “to revise the stile of and arrange the articles 
which had been agreed to . . . .” “[T]he Committee . . . had no authority from 
the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted 
by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so; and certainly the Convention 
had no belief . . . that any important change was, in fact, made in the provi-
sions as to qualifications adopted by it on August 10.”391 
Rather than apply the language of the ratified Constitution, Warren treated the 
language referred to the Committee of Style as controlling. An irony is that War-
ren observed that only one delegate “noted his opposition” to taking the ability 
to add additional requirements for membership away from Congress: Mor-
ris.392 Warren dismissed Morris as the outlier, failing to recognize that Morris 
was the one who wrote the final text. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Powell’s interpretation of the Qualifica-
tions Clause in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.393 Thornton presented the 
question whether Arkansas could impose term limits on members of the 
House of Representatives. As the House did in Powell, in Thornton the state 
argued that the negative phrasing of the Qualifications Clause “suggests that 
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they were not meant to be exclusive.”394 The Thornton Court reviewed Powell’s 
examination of the drafting history, including the Convention’s rejection of 
Morris’s proposal that the House be able to add qualifications.395 It found that 
treatment of the history convincing: “We thus conclude now, as we did in Pow-
ell, that history shows that, with respect to Congress, the Framers intended the 
Constitution to establish fixed qualifications.”396 With respect to the negative 
phrasing issue, the Court cited the segment of the Powell opinion on the Com-
mittee of Style and stated: “This [negative phrasing] argument was firmly re-
jected in Powell, and we see no need to revisit it now.”397 
The Qualifications Clause is a case study consistent with a recurring pat-
tern involving Morris’s changes. Morris’s revisions to the Qualifications 
Clause represented both an attempt to reverse a loss on the Convention floor 
(concerning the text of the clause) and an attempt to advance a larger consti-
tutional goal important to him (the protection of private property). Morris’s 
negative phrasing did not make clear that additional requirements could be 
added. But it created ambiguity where none had existed before—which is why 
the House and the State of Arkansas were able to press their argument that 
qualifications could be added. Yet the Court decided to disregard Morris’s—
and the Constitution’s—text. It treated the Committee’s mandate as limited 
to matters of style and therefore gave legal effect to the text referred to the 
Committee rather than the Committee’s text. 
D. Enumeration Clause 
PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The proportions of direct taxation [and representation] shall be regulated by 
the whole number of free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and con-
dition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths 
of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except 
Indians not paying taxes) which number shall, within three years after the 
first meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every ten years after-
wards, be taken in such manner as the said Legislature shall direct.398 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective num-
bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free per-
sons, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and excluding 
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration 
shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the 
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United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner 
as they shall by law direct.399 
The significant change between the two versions is the committee’s addi-
tion of an “actual enumeration” requirement. This language was not discussed 
at the Convention. We have no direct evidence of why Morris added it, but at 
the Convention he opposed both the constitutional requirement that repre-
sentation in the House be revised in accordance with population changes and 
the requirement of a census.400 While he was unsuccessful in these efforts, the 
“actual enumeration” language advanced the same underlying goals at the 
core of his constitutional vision: limiting the power of new states and weak-
ening the slave states. 
In the late eighteenth century, there were two ways to assess population: 
actual counting of individuals and assessment based on educated estimates. 
Before the “actual enumeration” requirement was added, the constitutional 
text would have permitted either methodology. “[A]ctual enumeration” re-
quires counting.401 
Without a census to rely on, delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
assigned the initial number of seats each state would have in the House based 
on estimates of their population. It was a contentious process, particularly be-
cause the decision affected the balance of power between northern and south-
ern states. Morris was intimately involved in these discussions, having chaired 
the committee that first examined the question.402 Ultimately, the Convention 
fixed on an allocation under which thirty-five representatives would be from 
the seven northern states and thirty from the six southern states. Of the thirty 
southern representatives, eight would be from the Deep South (Georgia and 
South Carolina).403 
Those numbers were revised after the 1790 census. After the first census 
was conducted, Washington wrote to Morris bemoaning that “the real num-
ber will greatly exceed the official return.”404 Although Washington was dis-
turbed by this result, Morris would not have been. 
 
 399. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590–91 (Article I, Section 2, Clause b). 
 400. See Section II.E.2; Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571. 
 401. See Thomas R. Lee, The Original Understanding of the Census Clause: Statistical 
Estimates and the Constitutional Requirement of an “Actual Enumeration,” 77 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 18–32 (2002). 
 402. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 540 (Morris’s proposal for committee); id. at 
542 (named to committee); id. at 559 (committee chair). For further discussion, see Vile, supra 
note 13, at 160–61. 
 403. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (listing number of representatives by state). 
 404. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (July 28, 1791), 8 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 22 MARCH 1791–22 SEPTEMBER 1791, at 381, 384 (Mark A. Mastro-
marino ed., 1999). 
72 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 120:1 
Given the general consensus among the Founders that population growth 
would be to the South and West,405 the first census might have been expected 
to result in increased representation of the South (and particularly of the Deep 
South). Precisely the opposite happened. The census of 1790 produced slightly 
increased representation of the North and occasioned a sharp decline in rep-
resentation from the Deep South.406 Most notably, although the overall num-
ber of representatives increased by more than 60 percent, Georgia lost a 
seat.407 Thus, Morris’s adding the “actual enumeration” requirement ad-
vanced his goals: the difference between the delegates’ estimate of representa-
tion and the actual census indicate that “actual enumeration” led to the 
undercounting of population in the frontier areas in the South and the West 
whose political power he wished to diminish. 
While the goals that Morris fought for at the Convention would suggest 
he sought to make a substantive change when he added the phrase “actual 
enumeration,” the Supreme Court took the opposite interpretive approach in 
Utah v. Evans,408 assuming consistency, not change. Evans was the Court’s 
most recent encounter with the question whether to follow the ratified text or 
the text referred to the Committee of Style. Utah argued that the Census Bu-
reau’s use of sampling violated the constitutional requirement of “actual enu-
meration.”409 In holding that sampling was permissible, Justice Breyer stressed 
the fact that the words “actual enumeration” were added by the Committee of 
Style: 
[T]he Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, 
in revising the language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Although 
not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee 
of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning” of the 
draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Hence, the Framers 
would have intended the current phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be 
made . . . in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the sub-
stantive equivalent of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants] 
shall . . . be taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” And the Com-
mittee of Style’s phrase offers no linguistic temptation to limit census meth-
odology in the manner that Utah proposes.410 
Breyer employed a strong presumption that the words used by the Com-
mittee of Style did not alter the meaning of the words used by the Committee 
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of Detail. The result was that the Committee of Style’s text, rather than being 
closely parsed by the Court, was understood as not changing the meaning of 
the Committee of Detail’s text. 
In dissent, Justice Thomas attacked the idea that the Committee of Style 
should be treated as having a limited mandate: 
Carrying the majority’s “argument to its logical conclusion would constrain 
us to say that the second to last draft would govern in every instance where 
the Committee of Style added an arguable substantive word. Such a result is 
at odds with the fact that the Convention passed the Committee’s version, 
and with the well-established rule that the plain language of the enacted text 
is the best indicator of intent.” Rather than rely on the draft, I focus on the 
words of the adopted Constitution.411 
Justice Thomas is alone in taking this approach. The Court has either dis-
regarded the Committee of Style’s language (as in Powell) or strongly pre-
sumed that the Committee of Style’s language meant what the previously 
adopted text meant (as in Evans). But with respect to his addition of “actual 
enumeration,” Morris was likely trying to do precisely what the Court major-
ity in both Powell and Evans presumed was not happening: he wanted to 
change the clause’s meaning. 
E. Contract Clause 
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1787) 
[I]n the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and de-
clared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, 
that shall, in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts 
or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously formed.412 
PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
No State shall coin money; nor emit bills of credit, nor make anything but 
gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts; nor pass any bill of attainder 
or ex post facto laws; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into 
any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of nobility.413 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
No state shall coin money, nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing but 
gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor pass any bill of attainder, 
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nor ex post facto laws, nor laws altering or impairing the obligation of con-
tracts; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into any treaty, al-
liance, or confederation, nor grant any title of nobility.414 
Morris had been the preeminent defender of property rights during the 
Convention debates. He proposed limiting the franchise to property owners, 
empowering Congress to establish property qualifications for membership in 
the House and Senate, and barring compensation for senators.415 By contrast, 
Morris’s position on the Contract Clause was more complicated. Though 
Morris had made the argument that government modification of public con-
tracts was unconstitutional when Pennsylvania was considering cancelling a 
corporate charter, at the Convention he opposed adding a contracts clause 
modeled on the Northwest Ordinance’s to the Constitution.416 
Of all the clauses in the Committee of Style draft, the Contract Clause may 
be the most puzzling. Every other change made by the Committee of Style 
reflected a reworking of text previously approved by the Convention. But the 
only time the Contract Clause had been considered by the Convention, it was 
voted down. Nonetheless, the clause reemerged and appeared in a modified 
form in the Committee proposal. 
Historians and legal scholars have made two claims about this turn of 
events. The first aims to explain why Morris went from opposing a proposed 
Contract Clause to writing one into the Constitution. It posits that one of 
Morris’s fellow Committee members (King, Hamilton, or de facto committee 
member Wilson) must have persuaded Morris to include the Contract 
Clause.417 The second is an explanation of how a provision rejected by the 
Convention majority ended up in the Committee’s draft. It argues that the 
Committee dishonestly changed the Constitution’s substance.418 
Neither argument, however, withstands close scrutiny. Morris’s argument 
that it would be unconstitutional for the Pennsylvania legislature to revoke the 
Bank of North America’s charter shows that he favored prohibiting state in-
terference with contracts, including public contracts.419 There was thus no 
need for fellow Committee members to convince him that a clause barring 
state interference with contracts was a good idea. 
It is also unlikely that the Committee would try to sneak a clause rejected 
by the Convention delegates into its draft constitution. The other delegates 
would not have missed the Committee’s addition of a clause that they rejected. 
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And Morris’s changes to the constitutional text were mostly subtle (except for 
the revisions to the Preamble) and lacking in obvious substantive import. 
Significantly, the Convention records provide indirect evidence that the 
delegates adopted a contracts clause at some point before the Committee of 
Style began its work. The day after the Convention rejected the Contract 
Clause, John Dickinson noted that because the term “ex post facto” applied 
only to criminal cases, “some further provision” would be necessary to “re-
strain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases.”420 In other words, 
Dickinson informed the delegates that a contract clause was necessary because 
the ban on ex post facto legislation they had already adopted would not pre-
vent state interference with contracts. While Madison reports no further dis-
cussion of the Contract Clause prior to the work of the Committee of Style, 
Dickinson’s speech almost certainly prompted both discussion of (either not 
recorded by Madison or taking place off the Convention floor) and agreement 
on a contract clause. 
The Committee of Style’s draft departed in three ways from the Northwest 
Ordinance’s contract clause. First, the Committee’s clause is narrower in one 
way: “in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts” be-
comes “laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts.” Morris had ob-
jected to King’s proposal as “going too far. There are a thousand laws relating 
to bringing actions—limitations of actions which affect contracts . . . .”421 Both 
removing the phrase “in any manner whatever” and substituting “altering or 
impairing” for “interfere with or affect” seem to address this concern and to 
limit the open-ended nature of the clause. 
Second, and more significantly, Morris removed the word “private.” 
“[I]nterfere with or affect private contracts or engagements” becomes “altering 
or impairing the obligation of contracts.” The change appears intentional: it 
supported the clause’s application to public contracts, which was consistent with 
the position that Morris took in suggesting that the Pennsylvania legislature 
could not constitutionally revoke the charter of the Bank of North America.422 
Third, while the Northwest Ordinance by its terms applies only to “pre-
viously formed” contracts, the Contract Clause is not limited to previously 
formed contracts. This change was to be consequential when Chief Justice 
Marshall (unsuccessfully) argued that the Contact Clause applied prospec-
tively (specifically, to bankruptcy legislation) in Ogden v. Saunders.423 While 
there is no evidence that Morris would have wanted the clause to have pro-
spective application, given his concern with protecting private property it 
seems likely that he would have viewed the question as the Chief Justice did—
and therefore that Morris’s omission of “previously formed” was intentional. 
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At least according to Madison’s notes, there was almost no discussion of 
the clause on the Convention floor after it was proposed by the Committee. 
The words “altering or” were dropped without recorded discussion.424 El-
bridge Gerry, the only speaker to discuss the clause, moved that the clause 
apply to the federal government as well as the states, but no one seconded his 
motion. After Gerry’s unsuccessful motion, the Convention adjourned. When 
they reconvened the following day, they moved on to other topics. That is the 
only record we have of the Convention’s consideration of the Committee of 
Style’s proposal.425 
There was little discussion of the clause during the ratification debates. 
Antifederalists Patrick Henry426 and James Galloway427 suggested that the 
clause might reach contracts between the states and private individuals. By 
contrast, Antifederalist delegates to the Convention like George Mason and 
Luther Martin did not explicitly address whether the clause applied to public 
contracts.428 In general, when Federalists discussed the clause, they spoke of 
its application to private contracts; Convention delegate William Davie was 
the only Federalist to state clearly that the clause “refer[red] merely to con-
tracts between individuals.”429 
Nonetheless, in the years following the Convention, two Committee of Style 
members stated that the clause reached public contracts. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 
Justice Wilson opined that the Contract Clause applied to public contracts: 
What good purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State 
might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be ame-
nable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling judiciary power? We 
have seen, that on the principles of general jurisprudence, a State, for the 
breach of a contract, may be liable for damages.430 
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Alexander Hamilton, in the opinion he wrote for property owners who 
held land pursuant to the contested Yazoo land grant from Georgia, took the 
same position. Hamilton argued that the Georgia legislature’s statute over-
turning its prior land grant was unconstitutional under the contract clause 
because public contracts fell within the ambit of the clause: 
Every grant from one to another, whether the grantor be a state or an individ-
ual, is virtually a contract that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing granted 
against the grantor, and his representatives. It, therefore, appears to me that 
taking the terms of the constitution in their large sense, and giving them effect 
according to the general spirit and policy of the provisions, the revocation of 
the grant by the act of the legislature of Georgia, may justly be considered as 
contrary to the constitution of the United States, and, therefore, null.431 
Similarly, in his jury charge in the case of Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 
former Convention delegate Justice William Paterson declared that a state 
statute repealing a land grant “impairs the obligation of a contract, and is 
therefore void.”432 And when Chief Justice Marshall applied the Contracts 
Clause to a land grant in Fletcher v. Peck,433 his opinion was consistent with 
the opinions of Hamilton, Wilson, and Paterson.434 
Focusing on the absence of the word “private” in the Contract Clause, 
Douglas Kmiec and John McGinnis have argued that Fletcher is consistent 
with the original understanding of the clause.435 Making that textual argument 
as well as pointing to the evidence of Hamilton, Wilson, and Paterson’s state-
ments, Professor James Ely has reached the same conclusion.436 
This is, however, a minority view. In his classic study The Contract Clause 
of the Constitution, Benjamin Wright argues that the the Contracts Clause was 
originally understood to apply only to private contracts. Wright’s argument 
rests on the view that the Constitution’s language was modeled on the North-
west Ordinance.437 Pulitzer Prize historian Leonard Levy similarly declares 
that the Court “transmogrified” the Contract Clause by departing from the 
clearly established original understanding that the Contract Clause applied 
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only to private contracts in Fletcher.438 That view continues to hold sway. 
Thus, Professor Bradford Clark wrote in the Harvard Law Review in 2010 that 
“the clause was generally understood to apply only to private contracts be-
tween individuals, not to a state’s own contracts” and that it “was modeled on 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.”439 
The Contract Clause, then, fits into the pattern we have seen previously: 
the Committee of Style’s draft departed from prior language (the Northwest 
Ordinance’s contract clause) in ways that reflected Morris’s views. In the years 
after ratification, members of the Committee (and, once again, Wilson and 
Hamilton) drew on the clause to advance views that they shared with Morris. 
Nonetheless, leading academic commentators have read the clause by focus-
ing on the Convention debates before the Committee began its work, rather 
on the text and the way it was construed in the early republic. 
F. Presidential Succession Clause 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act 
as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President 
and Vice President; and such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disa-
bility be removed, or a President shall be elected.440 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
[T]he Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resigna-
tion or inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what of-
ficer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until 
the disability be removed, or the period for chusing another president arrive.441 
When rearranging the Constitution’s text on presidential succession, 
Morris changed “officer of the United States” to “officer.” While other changes 
made by Morris and the Committee of Style have had more impact on our 
constitutional history, this is one of the changes that has received the most 
scholarly attention (although the fact that Morris was the author of the change 
has once again been ignored).442 In part, that attention reflects the significance 
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of the text. Depending on how the clause is read, the statute that places the 
speaker of the House second in the line of presidential succession after the vice 
president may be unconstitutional.443 And in part it presents an intellectual 
puzzle for originalists, since the text that was referred to the Committee of 
Style and Madison’s reading of the text proposed by the Committee of Style 
point to one understanding of who can succeed the president, whereas the text 
of the Succession Clause and the First Congress’s interpretation of it in light 
of other constitutional provisions point to another. 
Until late in the Convention’s proceedings, the Constitution did not pro-
vide for a vice president. The draft Constitution provided that the president 
was to be succeeded by the president of the Senate up to the end of August.444 
Morris objected to this proposal and suggested that the chief justice should be 
the presidential successor. He did not offer an explanation, but in the same 
speech, he referenced his proposal that the chief justice be part of the presi-
dent’s cabinet, which suggests that his preference for the chief justice stemmed 
from his belief that the chief justice might counsel the president and be part 
of his cabinet.445 Madison followed Morris and also objected to the designa-
tion of the Senate president, although it was not because of the possibility that 
the chief justice would be in the cabinet.446 Since the delegates were contem-
plating a new election if a president died, Madison argued that if the president 
of the Senate were acting president, the Senate “might retard the appointment 
of a President in order to carry points whilst the revisionary power was in the 
President of their own body.”447 
The delegates returned to this clause after they had decided to create the 
vice presidency. Randolph then proposed what is, in substance, the first Suc-
cession Clause above—in which Congress has the power to establish which 
“officer of the [United States]” shall succeed the president and vice presi-
dent.448 The one difference between the Randolph proposal and the clause re-
ferred to the Committee of Style is that, in Randolph’s proposal, the 
designated “officer of the [United States]” would have served “until the time 
of electing a President shall arrive.”449 Madison objected that the language 
“would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election.”450 He 
proposed the substitute language “until such disability be removed, or a Pres-
ident shall be elected.” Morris seconded the proposal, which narrowly 
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passed—six states to four, with one state divided. One ground for objection 
was that Congress should not be limited to selecting only “officers of the 
[United States]” to fill the vacancy.451 “They wished it to be at liberty to ap-
point others than such,” Madison observes in his notes.452 He does not indi-
cate who voiced this objection, although presumably Morris was not among 
this group since he had seconded Madison’s proposal. 
The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 provides that sitting 
members of Congress cannot hold “any Office under the United States.”453 
The standard reading is that because of the Incompatibility Clause, members 
of Congress are not “officers of the United States.”454 Thus, if the terminology 
in the two clauses are read to have consistent meanings, as the Succession 
Clause was submitted to the Committee of Style, Congress was empowered to 
place members of the executive and judicial branch in the line of presidential 
succession, but not members of Congress. 
But Morris’s beliefs at the time may not have aligned with this textual in-
ference, as he seems to have believed members of Congress would be in the 
presidential line of succession. Shortly after the delegates voted to adopt the 
language concerning presidential succession and “officer[s] of the United 
States,” in a debate concerning who would preside over the Senate, Morris ob-
served that “[i]f there should be no vice president, the President of the Senate 
would be temporary successor.”455 Although Morris did not develop this state-
ment (or, at least, Madison did not record any further explanation), Morris ap-
pears to have believed that, if something happened to the vice president, the 
president of the Senate would become the “temporary” vice president.456 
When Congress passed the first Succession Act in 1792, it placed the pres-
ident pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker as next in the line of succes-
sion following the vice president.457 During the debate over the statute, a 
number of Republican congressman unsuccessfully argued that, as a constitu-
tional matter, members of Congress could not be in the line of succession be-
cause they were not “officers.” Jonathan Sturges declared that he “could not 
find that the Speaker of the House, or President of the Senate pro tem. were 
officers of the Government in the sense contemplated by the Constitution.”458 
William Branch Giles agreed: “The characters referred to he did not think 
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were officers.”459 Madison had the same view of the presidential Succession 
Clause, observing in a letter that Congress “certainly err[ed]” and “it may be 
questioned whether [the Speaker and president pro tempore] are officers, in 
the constitutional sense.”460 
Madison and the other Republicans seem to have read “officer” as having 
the same meaning as “officer of the United States,” even though the Commit-
tee of Style had deleted “of the United States” from the clause. They imposed 
a restriction on who was an “officer” that neither the final provision itself nor 
related provisions of the Constitution imposed. Indeed, a couple of represent-
atives read the Constitution as if the Committee of Style had not altered the 
clause. Alexander White “observed[] that the Constitution says the vacancy 
shall be filled by an officer of the United States. The President, pro tempore, of 
the Senate[] is not an officer of the United States.”461 Similarly, in contending 
that the secretary of state should be first in the line of succession, William 
Loughton Smith noted that “by the Constitution, the vacancy is to be filled 
with an officer of the United States. This narrows the discussion very 
much.”462 Both White and Smith asserted that “of the United States” was part 
of the clause, even though that language had been removed. 
In contrast, Federalist congressman took the position that the speaker and 
the president pro tempore were “officers” within the meaning of the Consti-
tution and could thus be placed in the line of succession. Elbridge Gerry, de-
fending the bill, asked: “[I]f [the Speaker] is not an officer, what is he? [Gerry] 
then read a clause from the Constitution, which says that the House shall 
choose their Speaker and other officers.”463 Theodore Sedgwick was surprised 
to hear the idea controverted, believing it was clear that the Speaker of the 
House and the president pro tempore of the Senate were officers. “In common 
parlance he was sure there was no difficulty in the matter.”464 
Originalist scholars have disagreed about how to read the clause. Profes-
sor Akhil Amar and Dean Vikram Amar, who have written the leading essay 
arguing that the current succession statute is unconstitutional, contend that 
“[t]here is considerable historical evidence that the Constitution’s drafters 
used the term ‘Officer’ in the Succession Clause as shorthand for ‘Officer of 
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the United States.’ ”465 They note the Committee of Style’s change but dismiss 
it as irrelevant.466 
In support of the competing view that members of Congress can be placed 
in the line of succession, Dean Manning has countered that the Committee of 
Style’s language should be given effect because it is the text that was ratified: 
[E]ven if the Committee of Style acted ultra vires by making substantive 
changes to the text, the ratifiers accepted them. . . . [T]he natural import of the 
text submitted to the States would be . . . that the unrestricted term “Officers” 
is broader than the phrase “Officers of the United States.” Thus, the drafting 
history does not provide a convincing textual argument for reading the Suc-
cession Clause to exclude members of Congress from the line of succession.467 
The change that Morris made here is unlike the other changes surveyed 
in this Article, which clearly advanced goals that Morris had unsuccessfully 
fought for. That is not the case here. At the same time, examination of related 
arguments Morris made at the Convention suggest that he would have favored 
giving Congress the power to place congressional officers in the line of suc-
cession (which is what the revised text did). Morris had originally favored the 
chief justice succeeding the president, but that was at a stage in the proceed-
ings when the chief justice would have been (if Morris had his way) in the 
presidential cabinet. That rationale disappeared when Morris’s proposal that 
the chief justice be in the cabinet was not accepted. 
Since his earlier rationale for favoring the Chief Justice no longer applied, 
Morris may have changed the text because he thought the line of succession 
should be opened up. He generally favored giving Congress discretion to 
frame rules—as with his Preamble or his Qualifications Clause, which gave 
the House and the Senate power to establish requirements for membership—
and that position suggests that he would have favored giving Congress wide 
discretion in framing the line of presidential succession. Moreover, his state-
ment on the Convention floor about the president of the Senate being in the 
line of succession suggests that he read the pre-revision text to permit con-
gressional members to be in the line of succession. The Committee of Style 
revision would then have been consistent with his overarching belief in the 
importance of congressional discretion, and it would have strengthened the 
reading he already gave to the Succession Clause. 
Alternatively, this change may have been a drafting error or, as the Amars 
suggests, “officer” may have been a “shorthand” for “officer of the United 
States.” But Morris was consistently a careful drafter, which suggests that the 
change was intentional and that he meant to include members of Congress as 
potential officers in the line of succession. 
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It is also noteworthy that, in the debates about the Presidential Succession 
Act, the Federalist congressmen read “officer” to mean “officer,” whereas Re-
publicans read “officer” as meaning “officer of the United States.” Historians 
and legal scholars have repeatedly concluded that the two parties’ constitu-
tional positions were driven by partisan interests: Republicans wanted Jeffer-
son (the secretary of state) to be first in the line of succession after the vice 
president, while Federalists wanted the Federalist president of the Senate to 
have that position.468 But this is not a convincing explanation: the Federalists 
could have advanced their partisan interests by fighting to place Hamilton (the 
treasury secretary) in the line of succession after the vice president. The fight 
over succession is, however, consistent with a deeper difference in constitu-
tional interpretation: In this instance as in others, the Federalists carefully 
parsed constitutional text, whereas Republicans engaged in looser construc-
tion. Although they clearly did not want to elevate Jefferson, Federalists may 
also have used the tighter construction here, not for partisan reasons, but be-
cause they had a consistent interpretive approach. 
G. Impeachment Clauses 
During the Convention debates, Morris initially opposed presidential im-
peachment, but he changed his mind and ultimately championed expansive 
grounds for impeachment.469 The impeachment provision referred to the 
Committee was not as broad as Morris wanted, and in the Committee report 
he revised the text to expand the grounds for impeachment and bring it closer 
to the conception he had unsuccessfully argued for. 
While Morris did not prevail in the floor debates about the scope of im-
peachment, he did successfully place the trial of the impeached official in the 
Senate. On the Committee, he inserted language to consolidate his win by 
making clear that the Senate was the only possible forum for trial. 
1. High Crimes and Misdemeanors 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
[The president] shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the 
House of representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States . . . . 470 
 
 468. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PE-
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dential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 459–60 (1949). 
 469. See supra Section II.B.2. 
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REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.471 
Morris dropped the phrase “against the United States” from the Impeach-
ment Clause. “[O]ther high crimes and misdemeanors against the United 
States” became simply “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The question 
whether this change was legally consequential played a central role in the de-
bate about whether the impeachment of President Clinton for acts not related 
to his exercise of office was constitutionally permissible,472 and it has been raised 
more recently with respect to President Trump (although it was not at issue 
in his impeachment trial).473 The issue is whether the Constitution’s language 
makes impeachable activity that is criminal (or not criminal but wrong in some 
significant way) but that is not related to the president’s performance in of-
fice.474 Thus, scholars have debated whether lying to a grand jury about an affair 
or financial crimes related to business activities would be impeachable.475 
The dominant view among academics is that the change in language should 
be ignored and the clause should be read as if it still contained the “against the 
United States” language. As Professor Cass Sunstein has recently written: 
Was the deletion designed to broaden the legitimate grounds for impeach-
ment? That is extremely unlikely. As its name suggests, the Committee on 
Style and Arrangement lacked substantive authority (which is not to deny 
that it made some substantive changes), and it is far more likely that this 
particular change was made on grounds of redundancy.476 
Professor Jack Rakove, another leading adherent of this view, observes 
that Morris was a champion of a strong executive and an opponent of im-
peachment; as a result, the Committee of Style’s change should not be under-
stood to increase the range of impeachable offenses.477 This approach, which 
has been called the “executive function” approach, contends that, despite the 
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change in language, the president can only be impeached for acts related to 
the exercise of his office, not for personal acts.478 Like Rakove, Professor Jon-
athan Turley, the leading voice on the other side of the originalist debate dur-
ing the Clinton impeachment (although the leading academic opponent of 
President Trump’s impeachment), has acknowledged that Morris “repre-
sented the original extreme wing on impeachment, opposing any impeach-
ment for the chief executive.”479 Turley is unable to explain why Morris might 
have made the change, but Turley’s broader conception of the clause focuses 
on both the ratified text and history.480 
What these accounts both miss is that, as discussed above,481 Morris 
changed his mind about impeachment. He initially opposed it but ultimately 
favored a broad conception of impeachable offenses: 
He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would 
say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Mag-
istrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst it by displacing 
him. . . . [He] ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery[,] Corrupting 
his electors, and incapacity . . . .482 
Morris’s statement suggests that he did not remove “against the United 
States” because it was redundant. Rather, he had a capacious view of when 
impeachment was appropriate, including circumstances like “incapacity” and 
“Corrupting his electors” that could fall outside the ambit of acts as president; 
while “high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States” is typically 
read as limited to official acts, the deletion provided textual support for mak-
ing impeachable “high crimes and misdemeanors” that did not arise from acts 
as president. 
A related question raised by the change in the text is whether it was de-
signed to make “maladministration” impeachable, an outcome Morris fa-
vored.483 Madison’s notes are often read as reflecting a compromise: Mason 
proposes maladministration; Madison objects that this would give Congress 
unconstrained ability to remove from office a president it disagreed with; 
Morris defends “maladministration”; Mason yields to Madison and offers 
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“high crimes and misdemeanors” as a narrowing substitute.484 The problem 
with this account is that, according to Blackstone, maladministration is one 
example of “high crimes and misdemeanors.”485 Thus, under one view Mason 
“snookered”486 Madison—expanding the scope of the clause while pretending 
to narrow it. 
At the same time, the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors against the 
United States” suggests a narrowing construction of the clause. The phrase 
“against the United States” implies that the scope of the term would be inde-
pendently determined in the United States without relying on British prece-
dent. While maladministration might be impeachable in Great Britain, the 
House and Senate might determine that it was not a “high crime[] and misde-
meanor[] against the United States.” In contrast, Morris’s deleting “against the 
United States” textually supports continuity with British precedent. Thus, 
Morris’s removal of the phrase strengthened the textual argument that a pres-
ident could be impeached for maladministration and for acts outside the scope 
of his office. 
The controversy over how to read the Impeachment Clause—and the type 
of activities that were impeachable—was central to the first impeachment un-
der the Constitution and only impeachment of the Federalist era, that of Re-
publican senator William Blount. Blount was charged by the House with 
conspiring to launch a military attack against Spain in order to win the Loui-
siana territories and Florida for Great Britain.487 In the Senate, defense counsel 
Alexander Dallas mounted a series of jurisdictional arguments, including the 
argument that only acts committed by an officer in his official capacity could 
be the basis of impeachment: “[O]fficial offences and offenders were alone 
contemplated.”488 House manager James A. Bayard, a Federalist, responded 
with an appeal to text: “[T]here is not a syllable in the Constitution which 
confines impeachment to official acts . . . .”489 The Senate ultimately acquitted 
Blount, holding that it lacked jurisdiction.490 Blount had made a series of other 
jurisdictional arguments in addition to his argument about the scope of im-
peachable offenses, including that senators are not “civil officers” within the 
meaning of the Impeachment Clause and that he could not be impeached 
since he had resigned from office.491 
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The Senate resolution does not state which jurisdictional ground (or 
grounds) it relied on, and scholars have argued about what the basis of the 
decision was, with many contending that the decision reflected a determina-
tion that a Senator is not impeachable.492 Moreover, even as Blount was ac-
quitted, there had been significant support for conviction, with a majority of 
Federalist senators voting against Blount.493 The critical point is that there 
were competing readings of the text, and once again the Federalist position 
was to parse the text closely. 
2. Trial by the Senate 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The Senate of the United States shall have power to try all impeach-
ments . . . .494 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.495 
Unlike his other changes, Morris added the word “sole” not to overturn a 
defeat but to consolidate a victory. Morris had prevailed in the relevant floor 
vote. Madison had argued that, after impeachment by the House, trial should 
be by the Supreme Court. According to Madison, if trial was by the Senate, the 
president “was made improperly dependent.”496 Pinckney agreed with Madi-
son and was also concerned that trial in the Senate would “render[] the Presi-
dent too dependent on the Legislature.”497 Morris countered that “[t]he 
Supreme Court were too few in number and might be warped or cor-
rupted.”498 Morris prevailed by a vote of nine to two.499 
This clause was at issue in United States v. Nixon.500 Former judge Walter 
Nixon argued that the Supreme Court could review his Senate trial despite the 
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Impeachment Clause’s provision making the Senate the “sole” trial author-
ity.501 According to Nixon, the Committee of Style adding the word “sole” was 
a “cosmetic edit” without substance.502 The opinion found against the judge 
on several grounds. Significantly, it relied on the Powell Court’s accepting that 
“the Committee of Style had no authority from the Convention to alter the 
meaning of the Clause,”503 but it also stated that “we must presume that the 
Committee’s reorganization or rephrasing accurately captured what the 
Framers meant in their unadorned language.”504 The Court assumed that the 
two versions of the clause have the same meaning.505 Between all the changes 
Morris made as the Committee’s drafter, this is the one instance in which this 
assumption is consistent with the Convention votes: Morris had won, and he 
was trying to clarify the text so that it did not permit a reading inconsistent 
with his victory. 
Adding “sole” closed off the argument that there could be other venues 
for the trial. Madison’s proposal that the Supreme Court try the case was not 
clearly barred by the Committee of Detail’s language, but it was clearly barred 
by the new language. The Committee of Style’s language made the clause for 
the Senate parallel with the clause for the House, which provided that the 
House “shall have the sole power of impeachment.”506 The change reinforced 
the point that the Senate alone could try the cases. Had the change not been 
made, the difference between the two clauses would have made possible the 
argument that other venues for the trial were possible (since “only” the House 
could impeach but there was no similar statement about the Senate). Morris 
revised the constitutional language so that his victory on the floor would not 
be subsequently undercut. 
H. The Federal Judiciary 
The one area in which Morris admitted having used his role on the Com-
mittee to deceptively change the Constitution’s meaning was in his treatment 
of the judiciary (although he did not specify what exactly he had done).507 
During the floor debates, Morris had been a fierce advocate of a strong federal 
judiciary. The provisions referred to the Committee were at odds with his views 
in two ways: Congress was not required to establish lower federal courts (alt-
hough it was allowed to do so), and the text did not give federal courts the 
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power of judicial review.508 In both areas, Morris changed the text to advance 
his goals. 
1. Judicial Vesting Clause 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested 
in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, 
from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.509 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be 
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.510 
Morris’s crafting of three parallel articles with three (largely) parallel 
Vesting Clauses has already been discussed. It reflected his desire to elevate 
the judiciary (and the executive) to equal stature with Congress.511 He also 
made a substantive change to the Article III Vesting Clause, and that change 
bore on the creation of lower federal courts. 
After the question of whether to empower Congress to create lower fed-
eral courts divided the Convention, the Madisonian Compromise empowered 
Congress to create lower federal courts but did not require it to do so. The 
compromise provided “that the National Legislature be empowered to insti-
tute inferior tribunals.”512 In explaining this language, Wilson and Madison said 
it gave Congress “discretion . . . to establish or not establish” lower federal 
courts.513 The Committee of Detail then wrote the language quoted above, 
which also reflected the Madisonian Compromise’s vesting Congress with the 
discretion to create (or not create) lower federal courts.514 On the Committee 
of Style, Morris wrote text to reverse this decision. Consistent with his commit-
ment to a strong judiciary and national power, he devised language best read to 
mandate that Congress create lower federal courts.515 Congress’s power to “con-
stitute[]” lower courts “when necessary” became language that can be read as 
a mandate to “ordain and establish” inferior courts “from time to time.” 
In the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, Madison contended that the 
Constitution permitted Congress to empower state courts to act as federal 
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courts.516 But Morris had drafted text that was repeatedly invoked as mandat-
ing the congressional obligation to create lower federal courts. William Smith, 
the “primary spokesperson for the federalists,”517 argued that the word “shall” 
and the text as a whole mandated creating lower federal courts: 
The words, “shall be vested,” have great energy, they are words of command; 
they leave no discretion to Congress to parcel out the Judicial powers of the 
Union to State judicatures . . . . 
Does not, then, the constitution, in the plainest and most unequivocal 
language, preclude us from allotting any part of the Judicial authority of the 
Union to the State judicature?518 
Egbert Benson denounced a proposal that would have given lower federal 
courts only the admiralty jurisdiction as inconsistent with the Constitution’s 
text. “It is not left to the election of the Legislature of the United States whether 
we adopt or not a judicial system like the one before us; the words in the con-
stitution are plain and full, and must be carried into operation,” Benson re-
marked.519 Elbridge Gerry declared: “You cannot make Federal courts of the 
State courts, because the constitution is an insuperable bar . . . . We are to ad-
minister this constitution, and therefore we are bound to establish these 
courts, let what will be the consequence.”520 And Fisher Ames once again read 
Morris’s text in accordance with their shared constitutional vision. Opposing 
a motion that would have barred creating lower federal courts, Ames ex-
pressed the conclusion 
that offences against statutes of the United States, and actions, the cogni-
zance whereof is created de novo, are exclusively of federal jurisdiction . . . . 
These, with the admiralty jurisdiction, which it is agreed must be provided 
for, constitute the principal powers of the district[] courts.521 
Most tellingly, Morris read his own text to require establishment of lower 
federal courts. During the debate over the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 
then-Senator Morris and then stated that the Article III Vesting Clause 
amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts shall exist. . . . In declaring 
then that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress shall 
ordain and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not 
the express words, of the Constitution. The Convention in framing, the 
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American people in adopting, that compact, did not, could not presume, that 
the Congress would omit to do what they were thus bound to do.522 
The delegates had agreed to a compromise under which Congress did not 
have to create lower federal courts. As Morris’s view of the text indicates, how-
ever, he had written language that was read by a range of political leaders (in-
cluding himself) to mandate creating lower federal courts. In following the 
Madisonian Compromise, the Court and leading commentators have relied on 
the debates and failed to see that Morris changed the text and that he and other 
Federalists read this text in a way at odds with the Madisonian Compromise. 
The leading exponent of reading this text as requiring the creation of 
lower federal courts was the constitutional historian Julius Goebel. In his 1971 
account of the historical antecedents of the Supreme Court, Goebel wrote: 
The effect of eliminating the words “as shall, when necessary” was to deprive 
Congress of power to decide upon the need for inferior courts and so to give 
full imperative effect to the declaration that “The judicial power . . . shall be 
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts . . . .” That the Com-
mittee intended to convey the sense of an imperative is apparent from the 
choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary constitutional vocab-
ulary—“ordain and establish”—to direct what Congress was to do.523 
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Goebel’s argument that Congress had a constitutional obligation to create 
lower federal courts under the Judicial Vesting Clause has been the subject of 
overwhelming criticism. Some scholars disagree with Goebel because they 
read the text of the clause differently. “[I]t remains to be seen that the words 
‘ordain and establish’ are significantly more imperative than the phrasing of 
the original draft,” Professors Redish and Woods contend.524 But the principal 
criticism of Goebel’s reading is that it is inconsistent with the Madisonian 
Compromise. For example, Professor Robert Clinton writes: 
Goebel’s claim seems insupportable insofar as it suggests the tacit adoption 
by the Committee of a mandatory obligation by Congress to establish infe-
rior federal courts. Such a conclusion is contradicted by the almost unques-
tioned adherence of the Convention to the Madisonian compromise and the 
limited charge of the Committee of Style “to revise the style of and arrange 
the articles agreed to by the House.”525 
Professor David Engdahl argues that “Goebel’s attribution of deft sleight-of-
hand to subvert the June 5th compromise dishonors the Style Committee 
members and supposes the other delegates fools.”526 
Like these academic commentators, the Supreme Court’s leading 
originalists have also assumed that the Article III Vesting Clause embodies the 
Madisonian Compromise. Writing for the Court in Printz v. United States, 
Justice Scalia observed that “[i]n accord with the so-called Madisonian Com-
promise, Article III, § 1, established only a Supreme Court, and made the cre-
ation of lower federal courts optional with the Congress.”527 And in upholding 
a jurisdiction-stripping statute in Patchak v. Zinke, Justice Thomas, writing for 
a plurality of the Court, found that congressional statutes stripping federal 
courts of jurisdiction were constitutional because of the Madisonian Compro-
mise.528 “[T]he so-called Madisonian Compromise,” he stated, “resolved the 
Framers’ disagreement about creating lower federal courts by leaving that de-
cision to Congress.”529 
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1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 105 n.109. 
 527. 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997). 
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 529. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906. 
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What the Court and the leading scholarly voices have missed, once again, 
is that here (as elsewhere) Morris’s goal was not to comply with the Conven-
tion’s decisions but to overturn them. In arguing that the Article III Vesting 
Clause is inconsistent with the Convention’s prior decision, even Goebel failed 
to recognize that the Committee’s changes were part of a broader pattern of 
revisions by Morris. 
2. Law-of-the-Land Provision 
PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the 
authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, 
and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall 
be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the constitutions or laws of 
the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.530 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.531 
Because the Constitution does not explicitly state that federal courts have 
the power to invalidate federal statutes, the popular view—most prominently 
associated with Alexander Bickel—is that judicial review was not part of the 
original understanding and was created out of whole cloth in Marbury v. Mad-
ison.532 Because judicial review is thus thought to operate outside of the origi-
nal constitutional framework established by “We the People,” for Bickel and 
others the conflict between judicial review and popular governance gives rise 
to the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”533 As Professor Barry Friedman ob-
serves, “The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ . . . has been the focal point of 
modern constitutional scholarship.”534 
This account overlooks a great deal. There was a significant body of judi-
cial-review caselaw before the Constitutional Convention, the overwhelming 
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majority of delegates at the Convention who spoke about judicial review were 
in favor of it, judicial review was endorsed during the ratifying debates, and 
state and federal courts frequently exercised the power in the years before 
Marbury.535 Because of these factors, the conventional view among academics 
is that judicial review was established before Marbury.536 
It is also generally accepted by academics that the text of the Constitution 
does not provide a basis for judicial review by federal courts of federal stat-
utes.537 This standard understanding, however, overlooks the “law of the land” 
language that Morris added to the Constitution. Challenging the conventional 
wisdom, a handful of scholars have recently recognized that the law-of-the-
land provision authorizes federal courts to review federal statutes for consti-
tutionality.538 
The history of the law-of-the-land language follows what should now be 
a familiar pattern. Morris (and others who also served on the Committee of 
Style) supported judicial review on the Convention floor, but the text referred 
to the Committee did not explicitly provide for judicial review.539 By adding 
the law-of-the-land formulation to the Supremacy Clause, Morris and the 
Committee revised the text in a way that advanced their ends. Committee 
members Hamilton and Wilson subsequently drew on this language in con-
tending that the Constitution provided for judicial review. 
The relevant clause in the Committee of Detail’s draft had mandated that 
state courts be governed by the federal constitution: “[T]his Constitu-
tion . . . shall be the supreme Law of the several States, and of their Citizens 
and Inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in 
their Decisions.”540 The exclusive focus is on the states and their courts. The 
Constitution is “the supreme law of the several States.” The Committee of 
 
 535. See Treanor, supra note 202 (discussing origins of judicial review). 
 536. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF 
CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 38–59 (2019); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 124–27 (2004); SYLVIA 
SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 6, 37–38 (1990); Larry D. Kra-
mer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5, 87–88 
(2001); Treanor, supra note 202. 
 537. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL 
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 79–84 (1991); John O. McGinnis, The Duty of 
Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 857–59 (2016); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation 
in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 429 (1998); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme 
Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989); Wil-
liam W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16–22. 
 538. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2003); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of 
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 907 (2003). Prakash and Yoo also see Article III, Section 
2 as a textual basis for judicial review. See id. at 901–02. 
 539. See supra Section II.C.2. 
 540. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 169. 
October 2021] The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener 95 
Style dramatically altered the sentence’s import by providing that “this Con-
stitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the land.” Both federal and state 
judges must now review statutes for consistency with the federal constitution. 
Committee of Style members played a crucial role in establishing the law-
of-the-land provision as the basis for judicial review. In Federalist 16, Hamil-
ton stated that judges had the power to pronounce a statute “contrary to the 
supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and void.”541 In Federalist 33, he 
stated that congressional statutes “which are not pursuant to its constitutional 
powers . . . will [not] become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely 
acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such.”542 
James Wilson also invoked the law-of-the-land provision as the basis for 
judicial review in his lectures on the law. He stated that when a congressional 
statute was “manifestly repugnant to some part of the constitution,” a federal 
court would have “the right and . . . the duty” to invalidate it because the rules 
given by the “supreme power of the United States . . . [are] the law of the land” 
and “contradictory rule[s]” by “subordinate power[s] . . . [are] necessar[il]y 
void.”543 
Wilson deployed this same line of argument as a Supreme Court justice. 
In 1792, the Supreme Court first confronted the question of whether to en-
force an unconstitutional statute in Hayburn’s Case. Riding Circuit, Wilson, 
along with Justice Blair and Judge Peters, invoked the law-of-the-land provi-
sion as support for their decision to refuse to follow the Invalid Pensioners 
Act.544 The law-of-the-land provision also was critical to another important 
pre-Marbury judicial-review case, Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance. Justice Pat-
erson, a former Convention delegate, told the jury that the Constitution 
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contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; 
it is paramount to the power of the legislature . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [I]f a legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle . . . it will be 
the duty of the court to adhere to the Constitution, and to declare the act null 
and void.545 
And although it does not play a central role in the decision, the law-of-the-
land provision was similarly invoked by Chief Justice Marshall in his final ar-
gument in Marbury: 
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what 
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; 
and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be 
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. 
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States 
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all writ-
ten constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that 
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.546 
Once again, commentators have failed to recognize either how Morris 
changed the meaning of the text or how the modified text was read in the 
Founding generation. While the conventional wisdom among academics is 
that the constitutional text does not provide a basis for judicial review of fed-
eral statutes by federal courts, Morris’s changes to the Supremacy Clause pro-
vided that very basis, and Hamilton, Wilson, Paterson, and Marshall all read 
the law-of-the-land language as justifying judicial review. 
I. Slavery and New States 
Morris was the most vocal opponent of slavery during the Convention 
debates.547 Though he was unsuccessful in opposing the Three-Fifths Clause 
on the Convention floor,548 Morris kept up his antislavery campaign as a 
member of the Committee. As already noted, Morris slyly inserted language 
in the Territories Clause that could be used to keep potential slave states in 
permanent territorial status.549 Morris made two other changes to weaken 
slavery’s constitutional footing. First, he altered the language of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause to remove the Constitution’s one textual endorsement of slavery 
as moral. Second, he subtly changed the language of the New States Clause in 
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a way designed to provide a textual basis for keeping potential slave states 
from achieving statehood. 
1. Slavery and the Fugitive Slave Clause 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
If any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States shall es-
cape into another State, He or She shall not be discharged from such service 
or labor in consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State to which 
they escape; but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their ser-
vice or labor.550 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping into an-
other, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be discharged 
from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to 
whom such service or labour may be due.551 
Because the constitutional provisions concerning slavery were fiercely 
scrutinized by proslavery delegates, Morris was constrained in editing those 
provisions. Yet he managed to make one subtle but significant change. 
Like the Three-Fifths and the Slave Trade Clauses, the Fugitive Slave Clause 
did not use the word “slave.”552 The Fugitive Slave Clause instead referred to 
“any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States.”553 The ab-
sence of the word “slave” from these provisions reflected a conscious choice.554 
Despite the drafters’ conscious refusal to use the word “slave,” the Fugi-
tive Slave Clause originally provided that a captured slave “shall be delivered 
up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.”555 The use of the word 
“justly” implied that the ownership of an enslaved person was “just.”556 This 
was the only point in the text of the entire Constitution that referred to slavery 
as just or moral. 
As it emerged from the Committee of Style, the Fugitive Slave Clause pro-
vided that a captured slave “shall be delivered up on claim of the party to 
whom such service or labour may be due.”557 Morris had eliminated the word 
“justly.” The change was profound. As historian Sean Willentz has recently 
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written, “The committee’s revision . . . removed the possible implication that 
there was justice in slavery.”558 
When the Convention delegates reviewed the Committee of Style’s pro-
vision, they did not discuss the change and its significance. Madison’s notes 
indicate that the only part of the clause that the delegates debated was the use 
of the word “legally.” Madison reports that speakers (whom he did not name) 
“thought the term ⟨legal⟩ equivocal” and that it “favor[ed] the idea that slavery 
was legal in a moral view.”559 As a result, the phrase “under the laws thereof” 
was substituted for the word “legally.”560 
The word “legally” (which Morris and the Committee of Style added as 
they removed the word “justly”) does not connote morality in the same strong 
way as the word “justly.” Nonetheless, the delegates’ argument against “le-
gally”—that it should be removed because it suggested that “slavery was legal 
in a moral view”—means that the two words suggesting slavery’s morality 
were removed from the Constitution. 
These changes proved consequential. During the antebellum period, 
while some abolitionists such as William Garrison attacked the Constitution 
as a proslavery document, other abolitionists argued that the Constitution did 
not sanction slavery.561 It was, according to Frederick Douglas, “a glorious lib-
erty document.”562 By removing the Fugitive Slave Clause’s implicit linkage of 
slavery and morality, Morris’s elimination of the word “justly” made that ar-
gument possible. 
2. New States Clause 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union: but no new 
State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of the 
present States, without the consent of the Legislature or such State as well as 
of the general Legislature. Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of 
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two or more States or parts thereof without the consent of the Legislatures 
of such States as well as of the Legislature of the United States.563 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new 
state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor 
any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, 
without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of 
the Congress.564 
Morris did not want new states created in the West to have greater polit-
ical power than the original thirteen states, both because he thought repre-
sentatives of the western states would be poorly prepared for leadership and 
because he worried that adding new states would tip the balance of national 
power in favor of slavery.565 Intending to bar the creation of new states from 
territories, Morris revised the Territories Clause in such a way that the other 
Framers did not realize the clause’s meaning when they adopted it.566 
Morris’s revision of the New States Clause advanced these same ends by 
prohibiting the creation of new states from current states. The previous ver-
sion of the New States Clause permitted new states to be created within the 
territory of existing states if the state legislature and Congress approved.567 
Morris changed the provision so that new states could never be created from 
the boundaries of existing states, making the language about permission from 
the state legislature and Congress inapplicable to the creation of new states 
from land within existing states.568 
The independent clause “no new State shall be hereafter formed or erected 
within the jurisdiction of any of the present States without the consent of the 
Legislature or such State as well as of the general Legislature”569 became the 
independent clause “no new state shall be formed or erected within the juris-
diction of any other state.”570 The provision about formation of new states 
through legislative and congressional consent now applies only to the for-
mation of new states “formed by the junction of two or more States or parts 
thereof.”571 As with the General Welfare Clause, Morris converted a comma 
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into a semicolon to change constitutional meaning.572 Read carefully, Morris’s 
version prohibits creating a new state through partition, regardless of the af-
fected state’s or Congress’s approval. 
A literal reading of Morris’s text would have barred the admission of the 
slave state of Kentucky (which was formed out of Virginia) and Tennessee 
(which was formed out of North Carolina). But the free state whose admission 
was on the horizon—Vermont—was not, as of 1787, a part of another state. It 
was an independent republic.573 Kentucky and Tennessee, but not Vermont, 
were “within the jurisdiction of any other state.”574 The balance of free states 
would increase by one, rather than decrease by one. Morris’s textual revision 
was remarkably elegant. 
In contrast to this subtle reading of the New States Clauses, both Madison 
and Luther Martin read the provision to permit the creation of states through 
partition.575 These were the only two comments about the clause in public 
writings from the ratification debate, and no one addressed the clause at a state 
ratifying convention.576 Not only is there little evidence from the ratification 
debates, but this evidence is of particularly limited value because Madison was 
the only supporter of the Constitution opining on the clause’s meaning and 
his readings of the constitutional text repeatedly contradicted those the Fed-
eralists would employ in the early republic. 
The strongest evidence that the clause was understood to permit parti-
tion—the Madisonian reading—is the admission of Kentucky as the fifteenth 
state in 1792 (following Vermont’s admission the previous year). Kentucky 
was formed out of Virginia with the Virginia legislature’s consent; the con-
gressional statute authorizing Kentucky’s admission referenced Article IV, 
Section 3;577 and President Washington urged Kentucky’s admission.578 The 
records of the congressional discussions indicate that no one raised the con-
stitutional issue one way or the other. Thus, Kentucky became a state through 
partition, and no one objected. 
Tennessee’s admission followed a different path, which may have been 
adopted to allay concerns about the constitutionality of Kentucky’s admission. 
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Rather than authorizing Tennessee’s creation from within its boundaries, North 
Carolina ceded the area that was to become Tennessee to the United States in 
1790, and it was governed as a territory for six years.579 Tennessee was finally 
admitted as a state in 1796.580 According to Kesavan and Paulsen’s study of the 
New States Clause, the fact that Tennessee was not directly created through 
the partition of North Carolina “casts some doubt upon the interpretation of 
the second clause that permits the admission of new breakaway States into the 
Union with the consent of their parent States and of Congress.”581 
At first glance, the question of how to construe the clause would seem of 
only antiquarian interest. As Kesavan and Paulsen phrase it, the issue is 
whether Congress made a constitutional “mistake[]” in admitting Kentucky 
(formed out of Virginia), Maine (formed out of Massachusetts), and West Vir-
ginia (formed out of Virginia).582 Given the long-settled recognition of these 
partitions, the dislocation involved in reuniting the states, and the ambiguity 
of the text, there has been no push among other academics or political actors 
to reunite the divided states. 
Yet the issue does have modern significance. The congressional statute 
admitting Texas gives it the right to divide into four states.583 After Kesavan 
and Paulsen wrote a law-review article noting this power and suggesting that 
Texas seize upon it,584 the issue has received playful attention, with Malcolm 
Gladwell devoting a podcast to the legal research.585 There has also been a po-
litical movement to divide California into three states, with a petition to effect 
partition gaining enough signatures in 2018 to be placed on the ballot.586 
The limited scholarly literature on the partition question follows familiar 
lines. Kesavan and Paulsen conclude that partition is constitutionally permis-
sible because they see the text as ambiguous, the drafting history supports par-
tition, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon holds that the Committee 
of Style had no power to change constitutional meaning.587 Similarly, Dean 
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McGreal writes: “We should not read the Committee’s change to alter the 
Clause’s meaning. . . . They were called the Committee of Style—and not the 
Committee of Substantive Revisions—for a reason: Their role was to clean up 
the document’s style.”588 
Unlike the other textual changes surveyed in this Article, this one did not 
generate Federalist arguments. I have not found any evidence of anyone argu-
ing against Kentucky’s admission on constitutional grounds, although consti-
tutional concerns about partition may explain Tennessee’s circuitous path to 
statehood. But once again, a close reading of the text—one that attends to the 
punctuation—leads to a different outcome than the conventional understand-
ing; here, it would bar partition. 
J. Engagements Clause 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
All debts contracted and engagements entered into, by or under the author-
ity of Congress shall be as valid against the United States under this consti-
tution as under the confederation.589 
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of 
this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Con-
stitution as under the confederation.590 
Consistent with his support for a strong national government, Morris was 
a forceful advocate for federal assumption of all Revolutionary War debts. On 
August 22, he proposed a provision stating, “The Legislature shall discharge 
the debts [and] fulfil the engagements ⟨of the U. States⟩.”591 While his motion 
was successful, the Convention soon backtracked. Mason objected to the pro-
vision imposing an obligation to repay all debts: “The use of the term shall will 
beget speculations and increase the pestilent practice of stock-jobbing.”592 
Supporting Mason, Randolph proposed the language noted above.593 Ran-
dolph’s proposal passed, ten states in favor and one against, with only Morris 
speaking against the proposal and with only Morris’s Pennsylvania voting 
against Randolph’s proposal.594 
 
 588. Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitu-
tional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393, 2411 (2001). 
 589. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571 (Article VII, Section 1). 
 590. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 603 (Article VI). 
 591. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 377. 
 592. Id. at 413. 
 593. Id. at 414 (“All debts contracted & engagements entered into, by or under the author-
ity of Congs. shall be as valid agst the U. States under this constitution as under the Confedera-
tion.”). 
 594. Id. 
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Morris’s language for the Committee did not overturn the Convention’s 
decision that repayment was not mandatory. He did, however, neatly expand 
the scope of the clause in an important way. The previously adopted language 
authorized assumption of debts incurred only “by or under the authority of 
Congress.”595 Implicitly, that language did not allow assumption of state debts 
unauthorized by Congress. But the Committee of Style’s language—covering 
debts incurred “before the adoption of this Constitution”—allowed Congress 
to assume state debts, regardless of whether those debts had been previously 
authorized by Congress.596 As treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton used 
this power to assume state Revolutionary War debts, regardless of whether 
they had been authorized by Congress, and Federalist members of Congress 
agreed that the Constitution gave the national government this power.597 
*     *     * 
While the Committee of Style’s mandate was, as its name suggests, limited 
to style, as the Committee’s drafter Gouverneur Morris covertly challenged 
the results of the Convention’s prior proceedings and revised a striking num-
ber of fundamentally important constitutional provisions in order to advance 
his constitutional agenda. He wrote text that expanded national authority, 
broadened presidential powers, provided the basis for judicial review, man-
dated the establishment of lower federal courts, increased the national gov-
ernment’s ability to assume state debts, barred states from interfering with 
their own contracts, expanded the range of actions that could warrant presi-
dential impeachment, threatened to prevent the admission of the slave states 
Kentucky and North Carolina, enabled Congress to add prerequisites for ser-
vice in Congress, required “actual enumeration” of people when the census 
was conducted, and removed the Constitution’s recognition of the ownership 
of enslaved people as “just[].” He also wrote text that gave Congress the power 
to enact legislation to promote the general welfare, although this “trick,” un-
like the others, was discovered and the earlier language restored. 
Morris placed language in the Constitution that Federalists (including Al-
exander Hamilton and James Wilson) repeatedly relied on in the great consti-
tutional debates of the early republic. At the same time, Republicans also made 
textualist arguments that interpreted Morris’s text. Apart from his revival of 
the previously rejected Contract Clause, Morris did not write text that clearly 
 
 595. Id. at 408. 
 596. Pfander, supra note 8, at 1291–93 (quoting Report of Committee of Style, supra note 
5, at 603). 
 597. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 206–14 (2003); 2 
ANNALS OF CONG. 1316 (1790) (statement of Rep. Clymer) (“[A]ssumption of the State debts 
appeared to him a measure of a federal complexion . . . .”); id. at 1318 (statement of Rep. Sher-
man) (arguing that assumption is constitutional because state “debts are to be looked upon as 
the absolute debts of the Union”); id. at 1324 (statement of Rep. Gerry) (arguing for the consti-
tutionality of assumption of the state debts). 
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transformed constitutional meaning. But Morris’s language was more con-
sistent with the readings Federalists advanced. Republicans repeatedly had to 
ignore or minimize words added by Morris, whereas Federalists were able to 
employ close readings of the constitutional text. Nonetheless, in area after 
area, the Republican readings have been accepted by the Supreme Court and 
leading academics as reflecting the original understanding. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE’S CHANGES 
Recognizing Morris’s changes has important consequences for modern 
constitutional law. First, it provides important support for a central critique 
of traditional originalism by revealing a new problem with the search for col-
lective intent: the Constitution’s drafter, rather than crafting text that reflected 
the Convention’s decisions, wrote language that advanced his own goals. The 
text does not reflect the delegates’ collective intent. 
Second, this Article’s history is relevant to a series of important modern 
controversies. From the vantage point of original public meaning, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly erred in recent cases involving Committee of Style lan-
guage, by either dismissing the ratified constitutional text or assuming that the 
Committee of Style’s language had the same meaning as the language previously 
adopted by the Convention. Of the Court’s members, only Justice Thomas has 
recognized that, from the perspective of the public meaning originalist, the 
Court’s role is to interpret the ratified text, which is to say Morris’s text. Thus, 
for a public meaning originalist, Justice Thomas’s approach is the correct one. 
The Federalist readings of the text Morris drafted are sufficiently powerful 
such that a public meaning originalist should reject the mainstream view that 
the Republican readings best reflect the original understanding of the consti-
tutional text. Indeed, in most cases, the Federalist reading is not simply a plau-
sible competing reading but the superior reading of the text, because the 
Republican readings cannot fully explain the Constitution’s text. 
A. Drafters’ Intent Originalism 
When the modern jurisprudence of original understanding emerged in 
articles like then-Professor Robert Bork’s 1971 Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems598 and Justice Rehnquist’s The Notion of a Living 
Constitution,599 and in Professor Raoul Berger’s book Government by Judici-
ary,600 original understanding was conceived of as Framers’ intent, with a 
principle focus on drafters’ intent—what the delegates to the Philadelphia 
 
 598. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1 (1971). 
 599. William H. Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 693 (1976). 
 600. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997). 
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Convention meant when they wrote the constitutional text.601 While these 
writings offered a critique of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence and an al-
ternative to it, drafters’ intent jurisprudence was not created in the 1970s but 
reflected an established approach to interpreting the Constitution. For ex-
ample, in both Myers v. United States602 and Powell v. McCormack603 the 
Court looked to drafters’ intent as a basis for interpreting constitutional text. 
Indeed, the Powell Court appealed to drafters’ intent as a basis for dismissing 
the significance of the changes made by the Committee of Style.604 
Drafters’ intent originalism has been forcefully criticized. Some critiques 
go to the legitimacy of originalism as an interpretive methodology.605 For ex-
ample, critics have focused on the dead-hand problem presented by a decision 
made by those no longer alive and by a process from which women, enslaved 
people, Native Americans, and (in some states) people without property were 
excluded.606 They have also argued the methodology is inappropriate because 
of the frequent sparseness of the historical record,607 the failure of originalism 
to recognize reliance interests and established practices,608 the bad results it 
can produce,609 and the fact that the Founders often did not confront issues of 
contemporary importance.610 
But two critiques have been addressed not to the originalist enterprise as 
a whole but to drafters’ intent specifically. They reflect internal critiques in 
which drafters’ intent is challenged as being inconsistent with the premises of 
 
 601. For a good history of modern originalism that discusses the rise of a jurisprudence of 
Framers’ intent and the eventual shift to public meaning originalism, see Kesavan & Paulsen, 
supra note 442, at 1134–48. 
 602. 272 U.S. 52, 109–10 (1926). 
 603. 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969). 
 604. See supra text accompanying notes 277, 395–397. 
 605. The literature here is enormous. For some of the important discussions of these cri-
tiques (some accepting the critiques and others challenging them), see Daniel A. Farber, The 
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Jamal Greene, Rule 
Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1684–90 (2016); Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Re-
flections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1987); 
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 
(1998); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 
192–96 (2008); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 
1102–05 (1998); Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
780, 792–97 (2014). 
 606. Greene, supra note 605, at 1685. 
 607. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary 
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1986). 
 608. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN L. REV. 703, 712–
13 (1975). 
 609. Id. 
 610. Farber, supra note 605, at 1093. 
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originalism. In The Original Understanding of Original Intent,611 Professor Jef-
ferson Powell argues that the original interpretive understanding was that 
drafters’ intent was not controlling. The second critique, associated with Pro-
fessor Paul Brest,612 is that the search for a collective intent of the drafters must 
fail because individual drafters understood the text in different ways or had 
“no intent or an indeterminate intent” with respect to a given clause’s mean-
ing.613 In other words, the drafters did not have a shared understanding of 
what the words meant. 
These critiques have won wide acceptance among originalists and led to 
“new originalism,”614 which involves a reconceptualization of the originalist’s 
goals. As Professor Cass Sunstein recently noted, “[p]ublic meaning original-
ism is the dominant approach” to original understanding.615 The new 
originalist seeks to recover the original public meaning of the text (rather than 
drafters’ intent or ratifiers’ intent). In Professor Larry Solum’s influential for-
mulation, the search for public meaning is the search for “the communicative 
content of the constitutional text[, which] is determined by the semantic 
meaning of the text as enriched by the publicly available context of constitu-
tional communication.”616 The core insight of new originalism is that the 
democratic legitimacy that underlies originalism requires giving effect to the 
decision of “We the People” in adopting the Constitution. “We the People” 
adopted the intent of neither the drafter nor the ratifiers; “We” adopted a sys-
tem of constitutional government created by particular words as those words 
were understood at the time of ratification. 
The history of the Committee of Style bolsters the originalist case for pub-
lic meaning originalism, as opposed to drafters’ intent originalism, because it 
adds a new dimension to the critique of the search for collective intent. The 
problem with determining collective intent is not simply that the legislative 
process—given its focus on compromise and masking disagreement, as well 
 
 611. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885 (1985). 
 612. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204 (1980). 
 613. Id. at 214. 
 614. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
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 615. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1674 n.13 (2018). 
 616. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
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originalism, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
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October 2021] The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener 107 
as its inability to anticipate future issues—does not lead to collective under-
standing (the problem that Brest and others have identified).617 Rather, the 
problem is also that in a series of critical cases the person who wrote the text 
consciously sought to advance a constitutional vision that was different than 
that of a majority of his fellow delegates: Morris had lost fights on the Con-
vention floor and sought to reverse those decisions. 
My point here is not that the Constitution should be interpreted in accord-
ance with the drafter’s intent (that is, Morris’s intent). Giving effect to the subjec-
tive intent of the drafter is at odds with the majoritarian premises of originalism. 
But recognizing what Morris did—and the way in which Republicans and Feder-
alists then battled over the meaning of his text—reveals a new reason why the 
search for collective constitutional meaning is illusory: Morris wrote the Consti-
tution’s text hoping to change the text’s meaning while using sufficiently opaque 
words so that his fellow delegates would not notice the change. 
But while the history presented in this Article strengthens one of the ma-
jor arguments against drafters’ intent originalism, to a remarkable extent the 
caselaw and scholarship discussed here evidence the striking, continuing in-
fluence of drafters’ intent originalism, despite it having been largely discred-
ited. As will be discussed in more detail in the next Section, the modern 
Supreme Court caselaw considering whether to give effect to Committee of 
Style text is split between cases wholly disregarding changes contained in that 
text and cases adopting a strong presumption that the text reflects the prior 
drafting history. In one of the most salient constitutional law cases of recent 
years, Printz v. United States, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, assumed 
that the Constitution reflects the Madisonian Compromise, even though Mor-
ris’s text departed from it.618 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice 
Thomas made the same assumption in Patchak v. Zinke.619 And as discussed 
in the previous Section, a veritable who’s who of leading constitutional schol-
ars, including Cass Sunstein, Jack Rakove, Akhil and Vikram Amar, Martin 
Redish and Curtis Woods, David Currie, Saikrishna Prakash, Martin Flaherty, 
Michael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan, Richard Fallon, and Larry Lessig have 
all misunderstood the Constitution’s text because they posit that changes made 
by the Committee of Style were either ultra vires or purely stylistic. Drafters’ 
intent originalism has been discredited as a jurisprudential approach, but in 
practice both leading academics and the Court have continued to rely on that 
approach when they are interpreting text drafted by the Committee of Style. 
 
 617. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 612, at 214, 229. 
 618. 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997). 
 619. 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (plurality opinion). 
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B. Relevance of the Committee of Style’s Text to Current Controversies 
This Article has revealed a series of textual readings that reflect Morris’s 
goals and that were employed by Federalists in early constitutional controver-
sies. It has uncovered the Federalist Constitution.620 But these readings are 
consistently at odds with the mainstream academic view of the original mean-
ing of the text. Thus, Federalists read the Preamble as a substantive grant of 
authority to both courts and Congress, but the conventional view is that it was 
purely stylistic or, at most, a gloss on Article I’s grant of powers to Congress. 
Similarly, the dominant views among academics are that the Contract Clause 
did not cover public contracts, that there was no constitutional requirement 
for the establishment of lower federal courts, that there is no textual basis in 
the Constitution for judicial review of congressional statutes, and that the Im-
peachment Clause does not extend to nonofficial acts. 
In each case, however, Federalists read the clause in a way that is different 
than the conventional modern views of the original understanding. And while 
the punctuation of the New States Clause would seem to indicate that states 
like California and Texas cannot be divided, no scholar has reached that con-
clusion. In each of these instances, scholars read the Constitution as if the 
Committee of Style had not changed the text. 
There are two instances in which there is some support among academics 
for the Federalist view as reflecting the original understanding, although there 
is also support among academics for the Republican position. Many (pro-ex-
ecutive) scholars621 (as well as the Court in Myers and the Office of Legal 
Counsel in its 2003 torture memo) have relied on the presence of “herein 
granted” in the Article I Vesting Clause to support a broad reading of execu-
tive power.622 But numerous other prominent scholars have dismissed the sig-
nificance of this phrase, treating it as simply stylistic and crediting it with no 
substantive significance.623 
A similar point can be made about the word “officer” in the Presidential 
Succession Clause. Some scholars, following Madison and the Republicans, 
have read the phrase as if it were still “officer of the United States” (as it was 
before the Committee of Style began its work). Others have argued that “of-
ficer” means “officer,” as the Federalists did.624 The question then becomes 
what relevance this history has for resolving current controversies. 
This Section first looks at the approach the Court and commentators have 
employed when the Committee’s language departed from previously adopted 
text, then discusses what approach courts should take. 
 
 620. The following two paragraphs summarize the conclusions of supra Part III. 
 621. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 371, at 570–71. 
 622. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 138 (1926); OLC Torture Memo, supra note 
371, at 4–5. A separate question is how broadly the “executive power” was understood to be at 
the time of the Founding. See supra Section III.B. 
 623. See supra notes 374–379 and accompanying text. 
 624. See supra Section III.F. 
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1. Supreme Court Case Law and Academic Commentators on the 
Committee of Style 
In the past half century, the Supreme Court has heard four cases in which 
a party claimed that the Committee of Style’s changes to text that the Conven-
tion had previously approved were without legal significance. Though the 
Court agreed in each case, its decisions reflected two different approaches: 
disregarding the changes entirely or presuming that the changes were not sub-
stantive. Academics have largely followed the second path, presuming that the 
changes were not meant to alter the meaning of the relevant provisions. Nei-
ther is a sound basis of decision for a public meaning originalist. From the 
perspective of public meaning originalism, the correct approach is that taken 
by Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas appropriately focuses on the text of the 
Constitution. Even though no justice has agreed with him, Thomas’s approach 
is truest to public meaning originalism’s central tenet that the role of courts is 
to apply the text that “We the People” adopted. 
The leading Supreme Court case reflecting the first approach—disregard-
ing the Committee of Style’s revisions—is the 1969 decision Powell v. McCor-
mack.625 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren disregarded the 
Committee of Style’s text, stating that “[t]he Committee . . . had no authority 
from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as 
voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so.”626 Similarly, in the 1995 
decision U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, Justice Stevens cited Powell and 
stated, “This argument [the appeal to the Committee of Style text] was firmly 
rejected in Powell, and we see no need to revisit it now.”627 
The Court’s approach in Powell—with its focus on drafters’ intent and 
disregard of text—is not surprising. The opinion was written before original-
ists turned away from drafters’ intent. The only surprise is that the appeal to 
originalism came from Chief Justice Warren, who was not generally an 
originalist.628 In light of the widespread acceptance (even among originalists) 
of Brest’s and Powell’s critiques by 1995, however, it is more surprising that 
Justice Stevens relied on this approach in Thornton in 1995. 
 
 625. 395 U.S. 486 (1969); cf. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 113 (1925) (dismissing idea 
that the Committee intended to change the clause’s meaning “sub silentio”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 390–391. 
 626. 395 U.S. at 538–39 (citation omitted). 
 627. 514 U.S. 779, 792 n.8, 816 n.27 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 628. Warren famously dismissed the relevance of original understanding in Brown. See 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (“[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 . . . .”). 
Powell was not, however, the only opinion in which Warren drew on original understanding. 
There was at least one other such decision. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (plu-
rality opinion) (discussing original understanding of Eighth Amendment); see also Greene, su-
pra note 605, at 1670 (“Chief Justice Warren—Powell edition—is a model originalist.”). 
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In any case, the reliance on drafters’ intent reflected in both decisions is 
inconsistent with the majoritarian premise that lies at the heart of original-
ism’s appeal: When the state conventions ratified the Constitution, they 
adopted the text before them, not the drafting history that remained secret 
until Madison’s notes were published in 1840. For a public meaning original-
ist, the dismissal of the Constitution’s text in Powell and Thornton was a clear 
mistake. To disregard the ratifiers’ decision is to disregard what “We the Peo-
ple” decided. Text trumps secret history. 
The two other Supreme Court cases did not simply dismiss the Commit-
tee’s text but instead adopted a strong presumption that the Committee of 
Style’s text meant the same as the text referred to the Committee. In Nixon v. 
United States, the Court found that the addition of the word “sole” to the Im-
peachment Clause did not alter the clause’s meaning.629 Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
[A]ccepting as we must the proposition that the Committee of Style had no 
authority from the Convention to alter the meaning of the Clause, we must 
presume that the Committee’s reorganization or rephrasing accurately cap-
tured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language. That is, we must 
presume that the Committee did its job. This presumption is buttressed by 
the fact that the Constitutional Convention voted on, and accepted, the 
Committee of Style’s linguistic version. We agree with the Government that 
“the word ‘sole’ is entitled to no less weight than any other word of the text, 
because the Committee revision perfected what ‘had been agreed to.’ ” Sec-
ond, carrying Nixon’s argument to its logical conclusion would constrain us 
to say that the second to last draft would govern in every instance where the 
Committee of Style added an arguably substantive word. Such a result is at 
odds with the fact that the Convention passed the Committee’s version, and 
with the well-established rule that the plain language of the enacted text is 
the best indicator of intent.630 
There is a significant shift in focus from Powell here. In Powell, the Court 
treated the language sent to the Committee of Style as dispositive. In Nixon, 
in contrast, the Court parses the Committee of Style’s text (which had been 
adopted by the Convention) and rejected the idea “that the second to last draft 
would govern in every instance where the Committee of Style added an argu-
ably substantive word.”631 Rather than disregarding the Constitution’s text, 
the Court embraced the presumption that the text sent to the Committee and 
the Committee’s proposal have the same meaning. 
In Utah v. Evans, the Court’s most recent confrontation with the Com-
mittee of Style, the Court again adopted the presumption approach.632 The 
question before the Court was whether the Census Bureau’s use of sampling 
 
 629. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 630. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 231–32 (citations omitted). 
 631. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 632. 536 U.S. 452 (2002). 
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violated the “actual enumeration” requirement of the Census Clause.633 Justice 
Breyer stated: 
[T]he Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, 
in revising the language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Although 
not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee 
of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning” of the 
draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Hence, the Framers 
would have intended the current phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be 
made . . . in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the sub-
stantive equivalent of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants] 
shall . . . be taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” And the Com-
mittee of Style’s phrase offers no linguistic temptation to limit census meth-
odology in the manner that Utah proposes.634 
Here, again, the Court embraced a presumption. The fact that the Com-
mittee was not empowered to change the Constitution’s meaning “strongly 
suggest[ed]” that that Committee’s text had “a similar meaning” to the previ-
ously adopted text. There was “no linguistic temptation” to read the Commit-
tee’s text as having a different meaning from the previously approved text. 
This reliance on drafting history as a gloss on the constitutional text is con-
sistent with one strand of public meaning originalism, a strand embraced by 
Justice Scalia. While Justice Scalia famously rejected the use of legislative his-
tory,635 he repeatedly used the drafting history of the Convention as evidence of 
what the words of the Constitution meant at the time of ratification.636 Indeed, 
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Nixon.637 
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When construing text drafted by the Committee of Style, many of the 
leading works of scholarship surveyed in this Article have embraced the pre-
sumption evidenced in Nixon and Evans. Cass Sunstein thus finds that the 
Committee’s deletion of the phrase “against the United States” from the Im-
peachment Clause was without legal significance.638 And he and Professor 
Lessig take a similar approach in concluding that the addition of “herein 
granted” to the Article I Vesting Clause did not expand executive power.639 
Professor Amar and Dean Amar read the Presidential Succession Clause as if 
the words “of the United States” had not been deleted.640 
Professor Michael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan offer the most sustained 
treatment of this presumption as a guide to interpretation.641 They contend that 
the draft of the Constitution referred by the Framers to the Committee of 
Style [should have] the status of a committee report—it is authoritative evi-
dence of legal meaning, but not legal authority. Thus, when the text of the 
Constitution is unambiguous, it trumps the “second-to-last” draft of the 
Constitution, as is the case in statutory interpretation; but when the text of 
the Constitution is ambiguous, its meaning may be informed by the Consti-
tution’s “committee report.” Indeed, the Constitution’s committee report is 
superior to committee reports in ordinary legislation generally. It is a more 
prolix form of the final “statute,” and is therefore probably less ambiguous. 
It is also a more reliable, consistent, and faithful guide to interpretation be-
cause it is the product of the “Congress” as a whole.642 
Under this approach, the drafting history serves as “an extratextual dictionary 
of constitutional meaning.”643 
Regardless of whether the drafting history illuminates the words of the Con-
stitution as a general matter, the presumption breaks down in the case of the dis-
honest scrivener. Contrary to the view expressed by Professor Klarman and the 
other leading historians of the Convention, Morris did not seek to simply “put the 
finishing touches on the Constitution.”644 He did not aim to “accurately capture[] 
what the Framers meant in their unadorned language”645 or fashion “the substan-
tive equivalent of the draft phrase.”646 He selected words that changed the Consti-
tution’s meaning. Assuming continuity of meaning is a mistake. 
 
 638. SUNSTEIN, supra note 474, at 48 (“As its name suggests, the Committee on Style and 
Arrangement lacked substantive authority (which is not to deny that it made some substantive 
changes), and it is far more likely that this particular change was made on grounds of redundancy.”). 
 639. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 374, at 48–49. 
 640. Amar & Amar, supra note 442, at 116 (“A later style committee deleted the words ‘of the 
United States,’ but no evidence suggests that this style change was meant to change meaning.”). 
 641. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 442, at 1208. 
 642. Id. at 1208–09. 
 643. Id. at 1198. 
 644. KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 188–89 n.*. 
 645. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993). 
 646. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 475 (2002). 
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The problem occurs again and again when Morris’s changes are overlooked 
or dismissed as simply matters of style: the original public meaning of the text 
is lost. When he rewrote the Preamble, or changed language in Article III’s Vest-
ing Clause, or dropped “private” from the Contracts Clause, or added “herein 
granted” to Article I’s Vesting Clause, or omitted “justly” from the Fugitive Slave 
Clause, or described the Constitution as “the law of the land,” or used a negative 
framing for the Qualifications Clause, or changed the punctuation of the New 
States Clause or the General Welfare Clause, or made the other changes dis-
cussed in this Article, he sought to change the meaning of these clauses. Morris’s 
changes enabled new textualist arguments about what the Constitution meant; 
the assumption of continuity fails to recognize this change. 
Indeed, in analyzing the Committee of Style’s text, scholars and jurists 
should operate on an assumption of discontinuity. As I have pursued the pro-
ject of comparing the Committee of Style’s text to the previously approved 
text, I have repeatedly encountered changes that at first appeared cosmetic but 
that in fact had substantive significance. That experience leads me to believe 
that, in approaching Morris’s text and seeking to recover original public 
meaning at a distance of more than two hundred years, courts and scholars 
should flip the assumptions that have guided opinions like Nixon and 
Thornton and mainstream academic argument. I believe it is likely that further 
research will reveal that Morris changed other clauses to advance his consti-
tutional goals.647 Where the Committee of Style text departs from the text pre-
viously approved by the Convention, the modern reader, rather than 
assuming continuity, should attempt to puzzle through the changes to see 
whether they in some way covertly advanced Morris’s constitutional vision. 
From the vantage point of constitutional jurisprudence, it is important to 
recognize that I am not arguing that courts should today apply drafter’s intent 
because it is the drafter’s intent. In other words, I am not arguing that because 
Morris, the drafter of the Constitution, wanted the text to be understood in a 
certain way, we should read it today as he would have wanted it read. The pow-
erful critiques of Framers’ intent that scholars have made apply with even more 
force to drafter’s intent. Because the majoritarian basis of originalism rests on 
ratification by “the people” in the state ratifying conventions, the question is 
what the words meant to the ratifiers (or, under another school of originalist 
thought, what the words themselves meant in 1787), not what Morris (or the 
other people at the Convention) hoped to achieve.648 At the same time, he was 
a drafter with remarkable awareness of how words would be construed. This 
Article reveals a series of clauses whose original meaning has been wholly or 
largely lost. Focusing on Morris helps us uncover readings at the time of ratifi-
cation and the early republic that have disappeared from our consciousness. 
 
 647. For a discussion of some of the other clauses where Morris changed text, see supra 
note 275. Although I have not found any of these clauses to reflect intentional changes of mean-
ing, further research may produce a different result. 
 648. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609–10 
(2004). 
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The final Supreme Court approach to the Committee of Style’s text is the 
approach of Justice Thomas. In his dissent in Utah v. Evans, Justice Thomas 
attacked any use of the language referred to the Committee of Style. “The 
Court,” he stated, “places undue weight on the penultimate version of the 
Clause, the iteration that was given to the Committee of Detail and Committee 
of Style. . . . Rather than rely on the draft, I focus on the words of the adopted 
Constitution.”649 Justice Thomas has not been able to convince another mem-
ber of the Court to join his position and has not developed a rationale for his 
approach. Dean Manning, however, has applied it in his analysis of the Presi-
dential Succession Clause and the Committee’s omission of the words “of the 
United States”: “[E]ven if the Committee of Style acted ultra vires by making 
substantive changes to the text, the ratifiers accepted them. The relevant fact 
is that the ratifiers acted on the text submitted to the States, not on the se-
quence of ‘secret deliberations’ of the Constitutional Convention . . . .”650 
Unlike the other two approaches, the Thomas-Manning approach recog-
nizes (at least implicitly) the possibility that the Committee of Style altered the 
Constitution’s meaning. Underlying the “focus on the words of the adopted 
Constitution,”651 to use Justice Thomas’s phrase, is an awareness that the words 
of the ratified Constitution may have had a different meaning than the words 
referred to the Committee of Style. This reliance on the words of the Consti-
tution accords with public meaning originalism’s core principle because its 
focus is on the interpretation of the words adopted by the ratifiers as “We the 
People” would have understood them.652 Thus, from the vantage point of the 
public meaning originalist, the Thomas-Manning approach is the correct one. 
Yet much of the text that Morris wrote did not have a clear meaning. Mor-
ris’s changes were crafted to avoid provoking the delegates who adopted the 
text he was changing. Thus, the question becomes how to interpret text that can 
be read in different ways. That topic that is the subject of the next Section. 
2. The Text, the Construction Zone, and the Federalist Constitution 
Recovering the original public meaning of the Committee of Style’s text 
at more than two hundred years’ remove is complicated. It requires recogni-
tion of three points. First, the drafter of the Committee systematically altered 
constitutional meaning to advance his own constitutional vision. Second, the 
constitutional text he drafted was susceptible of competing interpretations, 
one he favored and one he opposed. Third, the constitutional text generally 
fits the reading he favored better than the reading he opposed. 
 
 649. Evans, 536 U.S. at 495–96 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 650. Manning, supra note 442, at 144. 
 651. Evans, 536 U.S. at 496 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 652. See Whittington, supra note 648, at 609–10. 
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As has been discussed, Morris acknowledged that, with respect to certain 
constitutional provisions, he intentionally employed opaque language to ad-
vance goals he desired while avoiding discovery: “I went as far as circum-
stances would permit to establish the exclusion. . . . [H]ad it been more 
pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.”653 “[I]t be-
came necessary to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not 
alarm others . . . .”654 
Implicit in these statements, however, is not only the idea that the text he 
crafted was opaque but the idea that, when carefully read, this text supported 
his constitutional vision better than the alternative vision held by other dele-
gates. Morris “select[ed] phrases, which express[ed] [his] own notions.”655 
Moreover, he believed that constitutional interpretation should be about the 
words, not what his fellow delegates hoped to achieve. As he wrote in 1814, 
“[W]hat can a history of the Constitution avail towards interpreting its provi-
sions. This must be done by comparing the plain import of the words, with 
the general tenor and object of the instrument.”656 
Morris’s changes—adding the words “herein granted” to the Article I 
Vesting Clause, dropping the word “private” from the Contracts Clause, or 
changing “the law of the several states” to “the law of the land”—were subtle. 
The one dramatic change—the revision to the Preamble—could be under-
stood as stylistic and a pragmatic response to the possibility that not all thirteen 
states would ratify the Constitution. As a result, exhausted delegates hurriedly 
reviewing the final draft missed the substantive changes to the document. 
From Morris’s perspective, the weakness of his approach was that, as he 
created new textual readings, there were competing textual readings. Federal-
ists could read the Preamble as a grant of authority, but Republicans dismissed 
it as simply rhetoric. Federalists read Article III’s Vesting Clause as mandating 
lower federal courts; Republicans disagreed. Hamilton and Wilson read the 
Contract Clause to cover contracts with the state; Randolph and Williamson 
read it as limited to private contracts. Moreover, when Republicans did not 
engage with text, they did not feel compelled to abandon their constitutional 
positions. Madison as Helvidius did not counter Hamilton’s use of the “herein 
granted” argument as Pacificus, but he still argued that Hamilton’s under-
standing of executive power was erroneous. Hamilton and Wilson read the 
law-of-the-land language to authorize judicial review, but the Constitution 
does not clearly grant federal courts the power to review federal statutes for 
unconstitutionality, and in the early republic, critics of judicial review could 
 
 653. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 66, at 404; see 
supra text accompanying note 66. 
 654. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420; see supra 
text accompanying notes 12, 76. 
 655. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420. 
 656. Id. 
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argue that it lacked a constitutional basis. The question then becomes how a 
modern court should choose between competing readings. 
Professor Lawrence Solum has recently offered a valuable approach to 
how an originalist should decide cases. The first level of inquiry is whether 
“the constitutional text . . . provide[s] determinate answers to constitutional 
questions.”657 If the answer is no, the originalist moves to the “construction 
zone.”658 In the construction zone, one looks to sources beyond the text—like 
structure, constitutional values, or precedent—to resolve controversies pitting 
two plausible originalist readings against each other.659 
The Federalist readings of the clauses discussed here are sufficiently com-
plete explications of the text such that, for an originalist, these clauses either 
are within the construction zone or are superior readings that should be 
adopted without additional reference to structure, constitutional values, or 
precedent. Morris crafted his text so it would be, at the very least, ambiguous. 
Because the focus of this Article is historical, detailed analyses of how the fif-
teen clauses discussed here should be interpreted by a modern originalist—
and whether they fall within the construction zone or whether the Federalist 
reading is superior—are outside of the scope of this Article. But Morris was a 
careful drafter, and it is striking that, in the debates in the early republic, Fed-
eralists were repeatedly able to parse the text closely and Republicans were not. 
Republicans are often described as “strict constructionists,” whereas Fed-
eralists, such as Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall, are described as “loose 
constructionists.”660 But in the debates surveyed here, precisely the opposite is 
true. The Federalists were able to explain the Constitution’s words. Republi-
cans repeatedly had to ignore or add words—often interpreting clauses as if 
they still employed the language referred to the Committee of Style rather than 
the Constitution’s actual text. Federalists found power in the Preamble; Re-
 
 657. Solum, supra note 616, at 458. 
 658. Id. 
 659. Id. at 578. 
 660. For classic treatments of the loose construction–strict construction divide, see LANCE 
BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 273–302 (1978); 
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 66–76 (1987); Powell, supra note 611, at 
923–34. Professor Jonathan Gienapp has written an influential new study that reflects this dichot-
omy and traces its origins to the controversy about whether Congress could constitutionally create 
a bank. See GIENAPP, supra note 17, at 213–47. For a significant and novel perspective on the loose 
construction–strict construction divide, see Farah Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, 130 YALE 
L.J. 2 (2020). Professor Peterson makes a strong argument that whereas the Federalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation was grounded in a public-legislation model, the Republican model 
was based on an analogy to private legislation. See id. at 7. This Article does not challenge Peterson’s 
focus on the public legislation–private legislation model. Rather, it flips the dichotomy that under-
lies the loose construction–strict construction debate. The traditional view is that Republicans 
closely parsed constitutional text and Federalists treated it as more open-ended. In contrast, the 
research presented here shows that, at least with respect to Morris’s text, the Federalists closely 
parsed the constitutional language, while Republicans were less attentive to specific word choice. 
October 2021] The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener 117 
publicans treated it as stylistic. Madison, in his Helvidius essay, ignored Ham-
ilton’s argument about the “herein granted” text.661 In the debate about the 
presidential succession bill, Madison interpreted the Presidential Succession 
Clause as if it still read “officer of the United States” rather than “officer,” and 
several Congressman erroneously asserted that the clause read “officer of the 
United States.” In contrast, Federalists read “officer” to mean “officer.” 
In the first impeachment debate, Republicans read the impeachment 
clause as if it still read “high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States,” 
rather than simply “high crimes or misdemeanors.” Federalists could argue 
that the text reached unofficial acts. The words “ordain” and “establish” in Ar-
ticle III’s Vesting Clause are best read as words of obligation, as the Federalists 
read them when arguing that the Constitution mandated that Congress estab-
lish federal courts. Republicans interpreted the Contract Clause as if it still had 
the word “private” in it; Federalists could appeal to the Constitution’s text, 
which did not contain a limit to “private” contracts. Federalists could invoke the 
text stating that the Constitution was the “law of the land” when they justified 
judicial review; Republican opponents of judicial review had no text to rely on. 
There are a handful of clauses for which the Republican and Federalist read-
ings are equally plausible. The New States Clause, the Territories Clause, and the 
Qualifications Clause fall into this category. In the clauses listed in the preceding 
paragraphs, the Federalist readings are more consistent with the words themselves 
than are the Republican readings. In contrast, with respect to the clauses in this 
paragraph, the Republican and the Federalist readings parse the text equally well. 
But in the great majority of instances, the Federalists had the better argu-
ment in interpreting a particular clause. Republicans had to ignore words or 
phrases; Federalists were able to parse the text closely. This was no accident. 
Morris advanced his constitutional vision with extraordinary skill. He was, in 
the words of fellow Committee of Style members Madison and Hamilton, a 
“genius,”662 and the project he was pursuing was of the most fundamental im-
portance. He was drafting the Federalist Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1798, on the floor of the House, Albert Gallatin charged that Gouver-
neur Morris, the drafter for the Committee of Style, had tried to revise the 
 
 661. The limits of the argument here should be noted. I am suggesting that the presence of 
the phrase “herein granted” in the Article I Vesting Clause and its absence in the Article II Vest-
ing Clause connotes that the president has all executive powers except for those expressly as-
signed elsewhere (such as the power to declare war). A separate and critical question is what the 
phrase “executive powers” meant, a matter of sharp controversy. Compare Prakash & Ramsey, 
supra note 348 (advancing the Vesting Clause thesis of broad executive power), with Mortenson, 
supra note 348, at 1169 (“[Executive power] extended only to the implementation of legal norms 
created by some other authority.”). 
 662. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, supra note 52 (Hamilton); 3 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 500 (Madison); see also supra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
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General Welfare Clause in order to expand the powers of Congress but that a 
fellow delegate had caught the “trick” and restored the original constitutional 
text.663 Despite the fact that this charge was made more than two hundred 
years ago, and despite Morris’s reputation as lacking integrity, no previous 
work of scholarship has compared the constitutional provisions referred to 
the Committee of Style with the Committee of Style’s proposals in order to 
assess whether he altered text to advance his constitutional vision. 
This Article has shown that Morris—a committed nationalist who fa-
vored a strong executive and judiciary and strong protection for private prop-
erty, and who opposed slavery and the grant of political power to the West—
subtly revised the text of a breathtaking range of clauses in order to advance 
his constitutional vision, repeatedly seeking to gain victory in crucial areas 
where he had been unable to obtain the result he desired during earlier Con-
vention debates. He wrote text that could be read to expand the power of the 
national government (the Preamble), strengthen the executive (the Vesting 
Clauses of Articles I and II), mandate the creation of lower federal courts (the 
Article III Vesting Clause), provide a textual basis for judicial review (the law-
of-the-land provision), elevate the constitutional position of both the executive 
and federal courts (the basic structure of Article I, Article II, and Article III), 
bar state interference with public contracts (the Contract Clause), block the 
admission of slave states Kentucky and Tennessee to the Union while permit-
ting the admission of the free state of Vermont (the New States Clause), in-
clude members of Congress in the line of succession to the presidency (the 
Presidential Succession Clause), expand the ability of the national government 
to assume state debts (the Engagements Clause), allow Congress to add qual-
ifications to membership (the Qualifications Clause), and broaden the 
grounds for impeachment (the Impeachment Clause). Morris also removed 
constitutional text suggesting that slavery was just (the Fugitive Slave Clause). 
It is a remarkable list of some of the most important parts of the Constitution. 
Morris’s text provided Federalists with language that they repeatedly re-
lied on in the major constitutional debates of the early republic. Federalists 
drew on Morris’s text to argue for presidential power to remove executive 
branch officers, the presidential ability to issue a Neutrality Proclamation, 
Congress’s power to create the Bank of the United States and enact the Sedi-
tion Act, federal courts’ right to hold congressional and state statutes uncon-
stitutional, congressional power to impeach an officer for acts outside the 
scope of office and to place members of Congress in the line of presidential 
succession, and Congress’s obligation to create lower federal courts. Morris’s 
text was used to argue for a congressional power to abolish slavery, and aboli-
tionists relied on his revision of the Fugitive Slave Clause when they argued 
that the Constitution did not endorse slavery. Yet Morris’s changes were sub-
tle. Rather than creating clear constitutional meaning, he created text that was 
 
 663. For Gallatin’s charge, see 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379; see also discus-
sion supra Section I.D. 
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the subject of controversy. In the great debates of the early republic, Republi-
cans fought Federalists with their own readings of Morris’s text. 
Although it has never been presented with the full range of changes made 
by the Committee, the Supreme Court has, in four cases in the past half century, 
considered whether to give effect to particular language drafted by the Com-
mittee of Style. It has twice decided to disregard the Committee’s language 
(even though it became the language of the Constitution) and twice adopted 
the presumption that the Committee’s language had the same meaning as the 
language that the Convention had previously adopted. From the perspective of 
public meaning originalism, the dominant school of originalist thought, nei-
ther approach withstands scrutiny—the former because it ignores the ratified 
text, the latter because it fails to see that the text was revised by the Committee 
to change its meaning. Only Justice Thomas has focused on construing the 
text that was ratified, the proper approach for a public meaning originalist. 
More broadly, on point after point, Republican readings of the Constitu-
tion have come to be seen by academics and the Court as the original under-
standing. From the vantage point of public meaning originalism, however, 
awareness of the early readings of the text written by Morris and the Commit-
tee enables reviving Morris and the Federalists’ readings of the Constitution. 
These revived readings challenge the conventional wisdom about the original 
understanding of textual provisions that are central to many of the most im-
portant debates in constitutional law. Federalist readings are consistently at 
least as well grounded in the text as Republican readings. With respect to the 
great majority of clauses, the Federalist readings are textually superior. 
What this Article shows, most fundamentally, is that Morris was both a 
legal drafter of extraordinary skill and vision and a dishonest scrivener. As a 
member of the Committee of Style, he covertly rewrote critical elements of the 
Constitution to achieve results he had been unable to achieve on the Conven-
tion floor. The charge made two hundred years ago concerned a “trick” that 
was uncovered and undone. But that was just one trick among many, and 
those other subtle but important changes have not been recognized until now. 
Scholars and jurists have failed to see a critical fact: Morris’s tricks shaped the 
Constitution.  
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APPENDIX 
PROVISION TEXT REFERRED TO 
COMMITTEE OF STYLE 
COMMITTEE OF STYLE TEXT 
Preamble “We the People of the States of 
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode-Island and Providence 
Plantations, Connecticut, New-
York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North-Carolina, South-Carolina, 
and Georgia, do ordain, declare 
and establish the following Con-
stitution for the Government of 
Ourselves and our Posterity.”664 
“We, the People of the United 
States, in order to form a more 
perfect union, to establish justice, 
insure domestic tranquillity, pro-
vide for the common defence, 
promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Consti-




Article II: “The Government 
shall consist of supreme legislative, 
executive and judicial powers.” 
Article III: “The legislative 
power shall be vested in a Congress, 
to consist of two separate and dis-
tinct bodies of men, a House of 
Representatives, and a Senate.” 
Article X, Section 1:“The Ex-
ecutive power of the United States 
shall be vested in a single person. 
His stile shall be, ‘The President of 
the United States of America;’ and 
his title shall be, ‘His Excellency.’ ” 
Article XI, Section 1:“The  
Judicial Power of the United States 
both in law and equity shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and 
in such Inferior Courts as shall, 
when necessary, from time to time, 
be constituted by the Legislature of 
the United States.”666 
Article I, Section 1:“ALL leg-
islative powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States, which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.” 
Article II, Section 1: “The ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in a 
president of the United States of 
America.” 
Article III, Section 1: “The 
judicial power of the United 
States, both in law and equity, 
shall be vested in one supreme 
court, and in such inferior courts 
as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.”667 
 
 664. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565. 
 665. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590. 
 666. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565 (Articles II and III); id. at 572 (Article 
X); id. at 575 (Article XI). 
 667. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590 (Article I); id. at 597 (Article II); 
id. at 600 (Article III). 




Article IV, Section 2: “Every 
Member of the House of Repre-
sentatives shall be of the age of 
twenty-five years at least; shall 
have been a citizen of the United 
States for at least seven years be-
fore his election; and shall be, at 
the time of his election, an inhab-
itant of the State in which he shall 
be chosen.” 
Article VI, Section 2: “The 
Legislature of the United States 
shall have authority to establish 
such uniform qualifications of 
the members of each House, 
with regard to property, as to the 
said Legislature shall seem expe-
dient.”668 
Article I, Section 2, Clause a: 
“No person shall be a representa-
tive who shall not have attained to 
the age of twenty-five years, and 
been seven years a citizen of the 
United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an inhabitant of 




Article VII, Section 3: “The pro-
portions of direct taxation [and 
representation] shall be regulated 
by the whole number of free citi-
zens and inhabitants, of every age, 
sex, and condition, including 
those bound to servitude for a 
term of years, and three fifths of 
all other persons not compre-
hended in the foregoing descrip-
tion, (except Indians not paying 
taxes) which number shall, within 
three years after the first meeting 
of the Legislature, and within the 
term of every ten years after-
wards, be taken in such manner 
as the said Legislature shall di-
rect.”670 
Article I, Section 2, Clause b: 
“Representatives and direct taxes 
shall be apportioned among the 
several states which may be in-
cluded within this Union, accord-
ing to their respective numbers, 
which shall be determined by 
adding to the whole number of 
free persons, including those 
bound to servitude for a term of 
years, and excluding Indians not 
taxed, three fifths of all other per-
sons. The actual enumeration 
shall be made within three years 
after the first meeting of the Con-
gress of the United States, and 
within every subsequent term of 
ten years, in such manner as they 
shall by law direct.”671 
 
 668. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565 (Article IV); 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 1, at 248 n.6 (Article VI). 
 669. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590. 
 670. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571. 
 671. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590–91. 
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Contract 
Clause 
 Article I, Section 10: “No state 
shall coin money, nor emit bills of 
credit, nor make any thing but 
gold or silver coin a tender in pay-
ment of debts, nor pass any bill of 
attainder, nor ex post facto laws, 
nor laws altering or impairing the 
obligation of contracts; nor grant 
letters of marque and reprisal, nor 
enter into any treaty, alliance, or 





Article X, Section 1: “The Legisla-
ture may declare by law what of-
ficer of the United States shall act 
as President in case of the death, 
resignation, or disability of the 
President and Vice President; and 
such Officer shall act accordingly, 
until such disability be removed, 
or a President shall be 
elected[.]”673 
Article II, Section 1, Clause e: 
“[T]he Congress may by law pro-
vide for the case of removal, 
death, resignation or inability, 
both of the president and vice-
president, declaring what officer 
shall then act as president, and 
such officer shall act accordingly, 
until the disability be removed, or 







Article X, Section 2: “He [the 
President] shall be removed from 
his office on impeachment by the 
House of representatives, and 
conviction by the Senate, for trea-
son or bribery or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors against 
the United States . . . .”675 
Article II, Section 4: “The presi-
dent, vice-president, and all civil 
officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from office on im-
peachment for, and conviction of 
treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.”676 
 
 
 672. Id. at 596–97. 
 673. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 573. 
 674. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 599. 
 675. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575. 
 676. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 600. 
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Trial by the 
Senate 
Article IX, Section 1: “The Senate 
of the United States shall have 
power to try all impeach-
ments . . . .”677 
Article I, Section 3, Clause e: “The 
Senate shall have the sole Power to 
try all Impeachments.”678 
 




Article XI, Section 1: “The 
Judicial Power of the United 
States both in law and equity shall 
be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such Inferior Courts as 
shall, when necessary, from time 
to time, be constituted by the 
Legislature of the United 
States.”679 
Article III, Section 1: “The 
judicial power of the United 
States, both in law and equity, 
shall be vested in one supreme 
court, and in such inferior courts 
as the Congress may from time to 




Article VIII: “This Constitution 
and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof, and all treaties made or 
which shall be made under the 
authority of the United States 
shall be the supreme law of the 
several States, and of their citizens 
and inhabitants; and the judges in 
the several States shall be bound 
thereby in their decisions; any 
thing in the constitutions or laws 
of the several States to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”681 
Article VI: “This constitution, and 
the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, any thing 
in the constitution or laws of any 
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Slavery Article XV: “If any Person bound 
to service or labor in any of the 
United States shall escape into 
another State, He or She shall not 
be discharged from such service 
or labor in consequence of any 
regulations subsisting in the State 
to which they escape; but shall be 
delivered up to the person justly 
claiming their service or labor.”683 
Article IV, Section 2: “No person 
legally held to service or labour in 
one state, escaping into another, 
shall in consequence of 
regulations subsisting therein be 
discharged from such service or 
labor, but shall be delivered up on 
claim of the party to whom such 
service or labour may be due.”684 
New States 
Clause 
Article XVII: “New States may be 
admitted by the Legislature into 
this Union: but no new State shall 
be hereafter formed or erected 
within the jurisdiction of any of 
the present States, without the 
consent of the Legislature of such 
State as well as of the general 
Legislature. Nor shall any State be 
formed by the junction of two or 
more States or parts thereof 
without the consent of the 
Legislatures of such States as well 
as of the Legislature of the United 
States.”685 
Article IV, Section 3: “New states 
may be admitted by the Congress 
into this union; but no new state 
shall be formed or erected within 
the jurisdiction of any other state; 
nor any state be formed by the 
junction of two or more states, or 
parts of states, without the consent 
of the legislatures of the states 




Article VII, Section 1: “All debts 
contracted and engagements 
entered into, by or under the 
authority of Congress shall be as 
valid against the United States 
under this constitution as under 
the confederation.”687 
Article VI: “All debts contracted 
and engagements entered into 
before the adoption of this 
Constitution shall be as valid 
against the United States under 
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